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The South African Breweries Limited (SAB) is an extremely profitable business. In 1996, for example, group profits 
before taxes exceeded R3 billion, some 10 percent of total assets. For a capital intensive manufacturing enterprise, 
this represents a truly extraordinary result. The company is also South Africa's premier industrial enterprise. Between 
1990 and 1996, for instance, SAB 's return on equity consistently averaged around 5 percent per annum above the 
representative return on equity, calculated for the market as a whole. And as the country's largest single 
one percent of the country's fixed capital stock. For these reasons, SAB is in its own right an economic unit of some 
interest and significance. 
But for the purposes of this dissertation, thr~e additional features of the SAB group are significant._Eirstly, SAB may 
be regarded, for many practical purposes, as the single supplier of malt beer in South Africa, a position which on 
,___ ----=·--=----~-~-----·--- , . =-- --
several occasions has been termed a '~ly". Secondly, SAB has until fairly recently formed part of a greater 
system of diversified arrangements-namely the Anglo American group. The company has also diversified into a 
variety of operations in its own right. SAB is therefore located at the heart of South Africa's so-called "group" 
structure: the group is itself a diversified conglomerate; and has for a considerable period of its history formed part 
of a broader conglomerate. Thirdly, SAB is part of a set of "~id" arrangements, an elaborate hierarchical system 
of corporate ownership and control. 
Each of these features of the SAB group-monopoly, conglomerate, pyramid-will be examined in detail in this 
dissertation. For the moment, it will be sufficient to note only that SAB is an interesting subject of analysis, for four 
distinct reasons. Firstly, the company is extremely profitable. Secondly, the company is also the sole supplier of malt 
r 
~n South A~~~ Thirdly, the company forms an integral part of the South African system of conglomerates. 
=::;> . 
Finally, the group is also a pyramid. At this point, it should be an obvious question whether an explanation for the 
superior profitability of the SAB group may be found in any one, or some combination, of these factors. In particular, 
the following chapters aim to establish whether SAB's position as single supplier in the malt beer industry; SAB's 
strategy of conglomerate diversification; and the group's pyramid corporate structure, are related in an economically 
important way to the profitability of this, South Africa's premier industrial enterprise. 
In this dissertation, the above question is addressed systematically: Chapter 1 examines the influence on SAH.'.s__, 
pp:>fit~bility_()fth~_<::OJl!p~ny's "1Tionopoly" or single supplier position in the domestic~m.alt_ beer industry. Chapter 
2 investigates SAB's c:;onglomerate structure to establish whether the firm's superior profitability may be exp_la'.n_ed, 
by the system of diversified groups. Chapter 3 examines the impact on SAB 's profitability of the "pyramid" corporate 












THE SCOPE OF MONOPOLISTIC BEHAVIOUR IN THE 
SOUTH AFRICAN MALT BEER INDUSTRY 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The traditional analytical apparatus in industrial economics is based on a triplet of conceptual extremes, 
namely perfect competition, oligopoly and monopoly (Alberts, 1984; Lin, 1988). These models are 
' ~ --
supplemented by a range of highly refined intermediate models of industry and market structure (Bradburd, 
1980; Clarke and Davies, 1983; Grossman and Hart, 1986). Jn the present chapter, the basic analytical 
apparatus made up of these models is retained as the underlying theoretical framework, sometimes in 
favour of significant advances in the pure economic theory of industrial organisation and market structure 
(for example, Alchian and Demsetz, 1972), since the conceptual content of these models-apart from 
being both simple at)d familiar-provides a number of useful insights into market structure and firm 
behaviour. Firstly, the insights that flo~ from the classical model of monopoly point to some of the devices 
and consequences of anticompetitive behaviour, including output restriction (Bradburd, 1982) and price 
inflation (Fourie, 1991 ).-5~qndl),, the monopol.)( modcl points to s.ome..oi.ibe iocentives that underlie 
. . { - ..... 
.£!.Onopolistic behaviour, inclyc:ling.4im-irush~r(Caves, Fortunato and Ghemawat, 1984) and 
' ~ 
' 
exc~ve profits <B.tadburd and Caves, 1982). 
But despite the useful theoretical insights, and the important conceptual framework, that may be derived 
from concepts such as monopoly, oligopoly and perfect competition, it is necessary to bear in mind 
throughout the analysis that these are essentially theoretical devices. As such, they will seldom be directly 
applicable to the complex phenomena found in reality (Greer, 1971; Hawkins and Radcliffe, 1971; Hatten 
and Schendel, 1977; Bresnahan, 1981; Sumner, 1981; Sullivan, 1985). Rather, the concepts will usually 
require qualified interpretations, or specific assumptions, to make for an empirically meaningful 
investigation. Monopolistic behaviour, for example, will not usually assume such obvious forms as output 
restriction or excessive profits (Peltzman, 1985). Rather, the more explicit forms of monopolistic behaviour 
should generally be seen as sufficient--certainly not necessary--conditions for the existence of monopoly. 
Thus, the concepts 'monopoly' and 'oligopoly' are on their own too theoretically restrictive for empirical 
purposes. 
To overcome the narrow application that these concepts have to the economic phenomena found in 











industry-it will be useful to elaborate a more manageable definition, a more basic definition, of 
"monopoly". For thi~ purpose, the ordinary ~flnition of a monopolis! ,~; :.iic~ r~is~s -pri~es: and ln' 5 
SO~; .. circums!a_g_f.~S -&Q§,.!S, bey~~d the level -that would n;rmally be ex ected under Com~etitiv~ ~ 
- -""· -), 
c' < ~. "'t ' ..-.,,_,_ ,~ '-.,,_. ~ - ~ 1' '· 
~io~s-belies t~e more ~~~rk~~ed as 
monopolistic. Th~;E~-~ti~ns ~~y be oytlin,ed as follows. Firstly, _'!,lli-Dl-Ql!!~t qay~ !!O il).centiy_e~ehave 
monopolistically, The7a'bility to en~age in m£!1Qpolistic..P..e.hav.icmr-to determine prices unilateral!y, for 
_.,-o"'-·-C·"""'-~- ~~· <'~ ;" • • • • <~ ~ ' t l 
example-is significant only ifthe firm has an incentive to do so. Secondly, a firm must have the a_l:>ility, ,/ 
"'to heha~e monopolistically'.-The incentive to raise prices unilaterally, for example, will not be meaningful _, 
": '......---.------- ·- · ~-~--'-- _ ~-...._ r.~ A' .. ~ 
if the firm is not free, at least to some extent, to ~et the price of its product. Thirdly, an alternative 
.- ____ ..... ...,.,__ \.. \...._,---~ -- ...., ,_ \_ / .... -... .... . '--'·""'~ - r.J 
explan_~Jioµ of_ an apparent monopolistic situation-such as a single supplier in a partic~lar --- ·-- - ~ . ' 
I 
indus~-should (rightly) be expected if the evidence does not point to monopolistic behaviour. In contrast 
with the conceptually narrow and empirically restrictive notion of monopoly, the above hierarchy of 
conditions is sufficiently broad to be subjected to empirical analysis. 
Q.>.'< ,r\C (>., 
This particular empirical G.Q!l9~Rtion of monopolistic behaviour is useful for several reasons. Firstly, the 
flexibility offered by this conception allows us to examine non-competitive behaviour as it arises within 
a particular firm. Thus, the above approach allows us to avoid, for example, the stylised observations 
available from industry-level and other aggregate studies of market concentration. The following analysis 
aims to avoid the latter approach, since the evidence accumul ted by industry-wide studies is largely 
empirically indeterminate, isolating several as yet irreconcilable stylisations of non-competitive behaviour. 
(For examples of the variety of empirical results, see: Domowitz, Hubbard and Petersen, 1986, and Hall, 
1986; Davies, 1979, and Schmalensee, 1991. For a summary of the stylised facts, see: Schmalensee, 1991.) 
Thus, as may be seen hi the following sections, the above conception of monopolistic behaviour allows 
us to examine non-competitive behaviour as it arises within a particular firm, without sacrificing the 
general applicability of our conclusions. This approach is not without problems of its own, of course, since 
a focus on the level of individual firms or industries does not, by itself, appear to guarantee convergence 
of opinion (see for example, Fourie and Smith, 1994, and the response by Leach, 1994). Nonetheless, the 
following sections will argue that this particular problem, unlike the problems with industry-wide studies, 
may be addressed and for many purposes substantially resolved. 
The second reason for the usefulness of the broad conception of monopolistic behaviour devised above, 
is that it all_o~s ~~ll}QJ_ejm::Jusive-vje.w_ Q_f):1:iq_11_<?PO~i~!i£_and..olig9pol!~t~c behaviour. It will be desirable to 
avoid; for example, the excessively narrow approach, popular in certain academic quarters, of producing 
a steady stream of mathematical adjustments from models of non-competitive behaviour-particularly 













fundamental insights and intuitive conceptions of industry structure and monopolistic behaviour. This 
approach is important, for our purposes, since elaborate econometric or mathematical-theoretical models 
of oligopolistic competition, entry, and so on, will not usually be applicable to an industry, such as the 
South African malt beer industry, in which there is effectively a single supplier. Finally, as may be seen 
below, the consistency of our conception of monopolistic conditions with the more usual definition allows 
our approach in the following empirical analysis to be both intuitive and conceptually accessible. 
For these reasons, it will be useful for our purposes to frame monopolistic behaviour in terms of three 
distinct empirical conditions. The following analysis of monopolistic conditions in the South African malt 
beer industry is structured accordingly. Section 2 examines SAB's ability to behave monopolistically in 
the South African malt beer industry. Section 3 investigates SAB's incentive to behave monopolistically 
in the beer industry. Section 4 discusses the implications for barriers to entry in the malt beer industry. 
Section 5 presents the chapter's principal conclusions. 
2. SAB'S ABILITY TO BEHAVE MONOPOLISTICALL YIN THE BEER INDUSTRY 
According to the three empirical statements presented above, the ability to behave monopolistically is a 
~ ......... '"=""-_' _ _,,... ~ ' - .... - . 
necessary condition for the_ existence of !llOnop_oJy ... In this section, the analysis considers several relevant 
_.-"'\._-/..___-~--·'-- --- - - \~ ~ --.-"'., _, ~- -- . 
elements of SAB's ability to behave monopolistically in the South African malt beer industry. And since 
the existence of monop_olistic conditions is normally associated with the freedom of a producer or sui:mlier 
~~---~ ~--::--~---"-=-=--- , :_ ~ '1-·..., -·· •' ' ' .. ~ 
~~t:'::111_ine_pfice_s unilater~_lly (Reekie, 1984a), the analysis in this section considers primarily SAB's 
ability to set South African beer prices. 
2.1 DETERMINANTS OF THE REAL BEER PRICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
~:r(_::', 
\;··"· 
\c-~ '__~,-, ' 
~ (,-.!{f;''" I .. 
In this section, we consider SAB's ability to determine South African be~r_prices unil~erally.;---that is, 
~ -......._;';______..~-
SAB 's ability to exert an independent influence over the price of malt beer. It will be useful in this regard 
to examine the determinants of domestic malt beer prices. Economic theory leads us to expect, for 
example, that a monopolist's pricing behaviour is de!ermined by such fact-ers as-the. elasticjty of dq:nand, 
the availability ~ol substitutes,. and barriers to entry in the particular industry or market (Cowling, 1976). 
,..,,.-----. -- • ---k---.--- ,.,-- ") • - - ----· ,.., ' ' ' 
In particu'!ar, t~11~list's prices are expected to be high~~,_tl~e less price elastic is de~a~d;Jh~ more· 
!:!nique is the product~that is, the less cross-price elastic is demand; !1~ ~th~ l1ig_h_~r are ~a!riers to entry 
- --- --- - ·-~- ~-··--,_ _ _,-. 












. Taken together, these observations suggest that monopolistic pri~ing may be evaluated with respect to two 
conceptually distinct conditions. Firstly, it must be established whether the firm has a substantial degree 
of fyeedom to set tb~~s of its products. 'secondly: if the a~alysis find~ that the firm is indeed fr~e o ' 
' . 
C'<lo so, it must then be established whether the firm determines its prices with explicit consideration for 
5demand elasticities, avaHability o_f sub~titutes, the level of industry competitio_n, and so 'an. Thus, so f~r 
as the ability to behav~ monopofi~ticaily is concerned,'itwo~ld ~eem appropriate to conclude that th~mth 
African malt beer industry is c~¥-JllQJlQJ2.9listic conditions only if SAB has the ability to raise 
p~eng~!l~ a~dJLJh_~nts of s~~'~ be~: p~i:: __ in~~~~~ fll-~tm;$_ that indicate_mc:in~pq_l~t!c 
behaviou;}:quivalently, we may infer from contrary evidence that t~possiollity of monopolistic 
behaviour in the South African beer industry must be logically excluded. The determinants of South 
' . ·k 
\,.. " ~ ' .,J.;:c·. ·.- . 
African beer prices are examined in the following sections. .,.-1 c1• r•' · · 
l-\tt•1'.'J' . 
. ~ . . 
..,la.c.-1""'":5 ) /, : 
The first deterHiinant of the beer price to consider is government's ~-~fise policy. In its annual reports to 
shareholders, and in occasional submissions to the Competition Board, SAB repeatedly emphasises the 
adverse effects of government excise duties on its financial performance (SAB, 1995). The company's 
claims are twofold. _Firstly, SAB contends that a series of excessive excise duty increases in the 1950s 
prompted its merger in 1956 with Ohlsson'~ Cape and Chandlers Union breweries. Since SAB came to 
~--· ..... ___ .... --.... ~t···· .. ,,/• .. .. . .1····· . .. ··• " 
proquce94% of industry output as a direct result of the 1956 beer industry merger (Competition Board, 
~"-~""'-~·---~·-·............._.·~-~ .... -· . __ ., ""....,_ __ ,.,_ ,.--·,1.,,.~--~""- -- -, --.,,__., - -·. 
1982), this claim states;:by implication, that government excise duties on beer are an important reason for 
. . 't(,,··· -..... .. . • -- ' • / .• ' 
SAB's current dominant 12osition in the m~!!J~e~tindustry. Secondly, SAB cites government's asymmetric 
~~----,-----0--1···~-- ""-> .. ·~- ... ---.~ .... --}--- - . _- ~ _,,,, -- ,..___ -- '\, _,. "'-----
a;,:>.EJ~~~t!on o[ excise duties a,.g~_in$t beer (particularly in favour o!-yvine and spirits) as the ~eason behind 
its ~onglomerate diversification-first into wine and spirits, and subsequently into a broader range of 
jlO'"----·,,,._,,,_ ~... -··~ :· .. ~'- - _....,...., 
industrial interests (SAB, 1995). Since SAB has become an integral part of corporate South Africa's 
conglomerate landscape, this claim states by implication that the government's historical excise stance 
accounts for a significant part of the company's current conglomerate structure. 
It will be useful to consider the relationship between excise duties and the beer price in more detail for the 
following reasons. Firstly, since a later chapter will be concerned with examining and modeling the 
profitability of SAB's beer division, it will be useful to investigate those events-including the 1956 
merger-that directly affected the beer division's profitability. Secondly, the Competition Board also has 
---~"=.---~---~ .. ~ - - ' ~··-. 
an interest in the profitability of SAB's beer division, and has on occasion cited both "monopolistic 
' i ,::<'O .r-• ·-· ~ ( • 
.. . 
conditions" in the malt brewing industry (Competition Board, 1982: 68-72), and the government ruling 
that originally justified the 1956 merger in the "public interest" (Board of Trade & Industry, 1958). 
Thirdly, since a later chapter will be concerned with the economic rationale for SAB's program of 












by SAB for its strategy of horizontal diversification, incl~~mJh~.!Jl;~~ 
~r~~-~if1~_~!\~21?}Eit~at.fhe_expell~~~~lt l!eer~~inally, a~~':_­
of excise duties offers an enormous range of empirical possibilities-from estimating price-elasticities to 
-~-·~ ----,~-'"""=--__.......,.. . ._,,,,,,,-=--,,....~-=~~·'---....,._,....,_~-~ ·~. ' 
identifying the importance of returns to scale (Sumner, 1981; Sullivan, 1985). For these reasons, it will 
be useful to consider SAB's claims in more detail. The claim that the government has applied excise duties 
fasymmetrically-in favour of wine and at the expense of beer-is considered in a later section. In the 
present section, we consider the first component of SAB's cl:. z: the relationship between 
government's excise duty and the South African beer price. , 
' 
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---REAL BEER PRICE - - - - - - . BEER EXCISE DUTY I 
In 1955, according to SAB, government introduced "punitive and highly discriminatory" excise duties, 
which seriously prejudiced beer. In response, and at SAB's initiation, "the three main brewing groups were 
merged to establish a more resilient and viable entity" (SAB/ 1995: 9). It would be desirable, of course, 
to investigate this claim by estimating the relationship between excise duty and beer prices for the period 
between, say, 1950 and 1960. This approach would offer the advantage of establishing more directly 
whether the significant increase in excise duties in the 1950s led to substantial increases in the beer price. 
However, comparable beer price data are not directly available for the pre-1957 period, since the 1956 beer 
industry merger combined the operations of three distinct companies. Instead, beer price data were 
compiled for the post-1957 period to see what general conclusions might be drawn about the relationship 












the 1950s excise increases may then be analysed to gain a sense of their likely impact on SAB's financial 
performance. The data are presented in Figure 1. Note that, to exclude the joint influence of the general 
price level on the two variables, data for beer prices and excise duty are expressed in real or price-adjusted 
terms. 
Figure 1 indicates that, ~etyeen 195 8 aod....19-2.6, increases in the real nrice_QfJJl<ilt beer have been 
,accompanied consistently..J2Y. increases in government excifil:...d....!!t}'. Indeed, the relationship is extremely 
close, which suggests that gover.~m~nt e),(cjse duti~S...fl~a_§jgnifi_cant determinant of short-te!J!l.chang~s 
.in tb.e~al beei:..p.J:ige. This relationship is confirmed in Output 1, a simple (mean normal) regression model 
explaining changes in the real beer price with changes in excise duty. 
OUTPUT 1. EXCISE DUTY AND THE REAL PRICE OF BEER, 1958-1996. 
LS// Dependent Variable is Real Beer Price 
Range: 1958 - 1996 Format: Annual percent changes Number of observations: 39 
=========================================================================== 
Independent variable Coefficient Two-tailed significance level. 
=========================================================================== 
Constant 






R-squared 0.734832 Mean of dependent var -1.488153 
Adjusted R-squared 0.727666 S.D. of dependent var 4.985488 
S.E. of regression 2.601710 Sum of squared resid 250.4491 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.653614 F-statistic 102.5344 
=========================================================================== 
The following observations may be drawn from Output l. Firstly, the parameter estimate on the excise 
variable indicates that increases in the real beer price do not fully incorporate increases in excise duty; the 
regression model indicates that, on average, a one-percent increase in excise duty results in a half-percent 
(.51 %) increase in the rea} peeq~rice. This observation suggests that SAB contains changes in the real beer 
t'\ot ~l+,l b1r~t GI-b~ . . . d Add" . I "d "" h" b . . price, at least patlla y, y ausor mg mcreases m excise uty. · 1t1ona ev1 ence ior t is o servatlon is 
provided below. But more importantly for present purposes, Output 1 indicates that almost three-quarters 
(73.5%) of changes in the real beer price are explained by changes in real excise duty. Indeed the 
substantial explanatory power of excise duty suggests that government's excise policy is the single most 












By way of drawing a conclusion from the above analysis, it is sufficient to note the earlier suggestion that 
monopolistic pricing behaviour is possible only if a firm is free, at least to a significant degree, to set prices 
~~ince a substantial part of the South African beer price is determined independently of SAB, 
the implication would appear to be that SAB's pricing strategy cannot be logically consistent with 
monopolistic behaviour, at least as defined earlier. Rather, the beer price appears to be primarily dependent 
on government's excise policy. 
2.2 DETERMINANTS OF THE PURE BEER PRICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 
T.htb_pr~ceding analygs_dr-ew-the_c.oneiusionthat-goverl'im'~nJ excise.dut)ds~a"<Significant determinant of 
the_beer__pi:ic_ejn_South Africa. It will be useful, therefore;toisoiate-the-effects_of-excise duty on the beer 
price by calculating a "pure" beer price. (For our purposes, a "pure" beer price may be devised as the beer 
price adjusted for both inflation and excise duty.)~is a,djµstme,nt is appropriate since the pure price 
. e::icr::..Jtf't..rr /.(f'1/c Ill 
represents that part of the beer price which ~u~s directly to SAB. That is, the analysis has considered, 
up to this point, the real beer price, which represents the effe_ctiv~ R_rjc~_p_ai_d ove_r by beer drinkeJ2,_~fter, 
~ ~ - ----.._.~- - . 
accounting for inflation. It will be appropriate to examine the pure beer price, since this will reflect the ------- - -~ ~---
price that accrues directly to SAB as a producer of beer-after accounting for excise duty, which accrues 
directly to the government-and presumably, the price that SAB will use as the base for its pricing 
behaviour. Table 1 presents aggregate changes in the real beer price, real excise duty, the pure beer price, 
and the rate of inflation for different five-year periods between 1958 and 1996. 
TABLE 1. AVERAGE BEER PRICE AND EXCISE DUTY INCREASES, 1958-1996. 
. ~-
Average percent change over period 
1958-62 1963-67 1968-72 1973-77 1978-82 1983-87 1988-92 1993-96 Average 
Nominal beer price 1.7 2.4 2.4 2.8 3.3 3.2 4.8 4.1 3.1 
Nominal excise duty 2.1 4.2 3.3 2.1 1.7 I.I 3.5 4.~ 2.8 
Consumer prices 2.2 2.9 4.4 10.8 12.6 13.9 13.2 7.9. 8.5 
Real beer price 1.7 2.7 I.I -4.3 -5.1 -6.6 -2.2 1.5 -1.5 
Real excise duty 2.6 6.8 3.3 -6.0 -8.8 -11.3 -5.2 1.9. -2.2 
Pure beer price I.I -0.6 -1.3 -2.5 -1.9 -3.9 -0.9 1.4 -I.I 
The following observations may be drawn from Table 1. Firstly, the real beer price (or the price paid over 
by beer consumers) is positively related to real excise duties: during periods when e~cis~ing_e_ase 
in constant price terms, the real beer price increases as well; and vice versa. This observation is merely a 
restatement of the earlier finding that the beer price is· positively related to changes in excise duty. 
Secondly, the pure beer price (or the price effectively earned by beer producers) is also positively related 












between excise duty and the beer price (see Figure 1). But more importantly, these results suggest that 
SAB 's ability between 1973 and 1992 to maintain increases in the selling_Qrice of beer bel.Qwjoc_r~as~_s '------. 
in the general price level has been achieved, not only through "improved efficiencies and greater 
. productivity" as SAB claims (SAB, 1993: 13): but because, over th~ment excise 
duties have decreased in real terms as well. Table 1 indicates, for example, that the real beer price 
decreased by 1.5% between 1958 and 1996, while over the same period, excise duties adjusted for inflation 
decreased by 2'.2%. These observations confirm our earlier suggestion that the beer price is to a large extent 
dependent on the government's particular stance towards excise duty. 
It would seem reasonable to con9lude, then, that an analysis of SAB's pricing behaviour must take explicit 
account of the influence of government excise duty, since this element of the beer price is evidently the 
single most important determinant of changes in the real beer price in South Africa. In particular, around 
three-quarters of changes in the real beer price are the direct result of changes in government excise duties, 
which suggests that the scope for unilateral manipulation of the beer price would appear to be around one-
quarter of total changes in the beer price. Clearly, at this early point in our analysis, a promising conclusion 
has been reached: the scope for monopolistic pricing in the South African malt beer industry appears to 
be seriously limited. 
OUTPUT 2. DETERMINANTS OF THE PURE BEER PRICE, 1960 - 1994. 
LS// Dependent Variable is Pure Beer Price 
Range: 1960 - 1994 Format: Annual percent change Number of observations: 35 
=========================================================================== 




Real Income Elasticity 










R-squared 0.007868 Mean of dependent var -1.759851 
Adjusted R-squared -0.088145 S.D. of dependent var 4.284614 
S.E. of regression 4.469460 Sum of squared res id 619.2584 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.666602 F-statistic 0.081947 
========================================================~~================= 
Apart from the significant impact and central importance of excise duties, it will be useful to identify the 
remaining factors that affect the beer price in South Africa. As noted earlier, for example, a monopolist 
is expected to formulate its pricing strategy with explicit regard for such factors as output volumes and the 












price- and income-elastic is the demand for beer. The significance of these factors is examined in Output 
2. 
The following observations may be drawn from Output 2. Firstly, the re'!! income elasticity of demand for --------· ~--,----
~e~J is .. l!ot -~igJ!if!can!lY ~jffe.re!1t _fr~!!!_ J:er9 (92% p-level). Secondly, t!:!_~ !:_e_al.@ice elasticity ~f 
-------.-, __ -=---=- ,,,,,=---
_de111and is also statistic;ally_ in~ignificant (69% p-level). Thirdly, beer prices and the volume of beer 
- ~,...,----..,,.. ___ - - -,--. ~ -- ~-·-- .___. ___ -----~~------· _.....------=---.-.... 
co~uE1~d_ ar~ n9t rylated in a directly observable way (81 % p-level). Finally, the explanatory power of beer 
volumes and the price- and income-elasticities of demand for beer, taken together, is extremely low (R·< 
0.01). Thus these indicators of monopolistic behaviour appear to exert a far less significant influence on 
the beer price than government's excise stance. As indicated earlier, excise duties explain around 73% of 
beer price changes, while the monopolistic factors examined above together explain less than 1 % of 
changes in the beer price. Thus, to the extent that beer sales volumes are the appropriate empirical 
counterpart of monopolistic behaviour such as output restriction (Chang and Stekler, 1986), and to the 
extent that demand elasticities serve as appropriate measures of the potential for monopolistic pricing 
(Cowling, 1976),.llJ~'.!tulrlJ:tppeac that SAB _dQ~S n_ot)lav_t:, ~QY nota!Jle _ability to behave monopolisticall)' 
- - ~ '- ,.. - - --- . - -· ~- - -·- - .,.._-=' 
jp~th~ Q~~r iqdustry, since beer sales~volumes_ and the price_"'. aqcl income-elasticities of beer demand enter 
into SAB's pricing behaviou~ }n_~ s!~ti_stkall~ ~1:}fgaj'[~~\-;~."ri t.- - --- --- -- - - --- - - - -
But before the analysis may reject outright the proposition that SAB has a distinct ability to behave 
monopolistically in the malt beer industry, a comment on the economic implications of the above statistical 
results will be appropriate. In particular, the point will not be made that actual economic behaviour is in 
any way constrained by apparent statistical insignificance. Such a conclusion would clearly be incorrect 
(Wald, 1939). We have merely made the point that it is a necessary condition, for monopolistic behaviour, 
that the empirical relationships on which this sort of behaviour would appear to depend must be robust, 
particularly for purposes of exacting a profit from exploiting such a relationship (McCloskey and Ziliak, 
1996). That is, it will be far from satisfactory to conclude that SAB exacts a profit by setting beer prices 
in strict accordance with demand elasticities if a straightforward empirical estimate reveals that these 
factors are not sufficiently significant (in the usual statistical sense) for purposes of designing a conclusive 
strategy that aims to exploit this sort of relationship. Such a conclusion would be warranted only for 
estimated values which point to a substantially more robust relationship than would appear to be the case 
from Output 2. That is, SAB would not be expected to frame its pricing policy in accordance with factors 
which, even in a carefully designed econometric analysis, do not appear to be robust enough for any 
practical purpose, least of all monopolistic behaviour. Thus, if the determinants of SAB's pricing 
behaviour were ranked in terms of their significance, then monopolistic factors-such as market power, 












influence of excise duties on the beer price. Indeed, the preceding statistical analysis suggests that these 
factors may even be irrelevant. 
2.3 THE POSSIBILITY OF MONOPOLISTIC BEHAVIOUR IN THE BEER INDUSTRY 
In concluding this section, it will be useful to re-examine the hierarchy of conditions posed at the outset. 
In terms of those conditions, the preceding analysis considered SAB's ability to behave monopolistically. 
In particular, _[§AB exerts an~ial mono12olistic influence or "market power" in the beer industry, 
then the beer price should be determined by such factors as SAB's output level, the demand elasticity for - - ~- ~ ~
m,31!Jte.er,_and the availability of substituJ.s&..Jhe preceding analysis suggests, however, that the South 
African beer price is dominated by government's excise policy. This suggests that South Africa's dominant 
beer producer cannot exert any significant independent influence over the beer price. For our purposes, 
it should only be noJed th<!_t exactly the opposite would be exgect~d of a firm exercising market power over 
.;.""" ~'--------~0----e-__ ---=~-=c·~---------~__,~~  
prices. 
But apart from the dominant impact of government excise duties, the preceding analysis has suggested that 
two additional factors limit SAB's independent influence over the beer price. Firstly, the relationship 
between the beer price and output volumes is empirically insignificant, which appears to exclude the 
---~.~~.~-~ ... __ -- ---- -~~~~~
possibility of the more usual form of monopolistic pricing behaviour such as output restriction. 
Monopolistic behaviour of the output-limiting kind operates through output volumes; and since the 
w:i_~j!.t..YQ~~~J.ationship i.~jt would seem reasonable to conclude that any 
,-· 
notable amount of monopolistic pricing would be extremely difficult. Secondly, the statistical relationship 
between demand elasticities and the beer price is a feeble one, which excludes the possibility of more 
~tie forms of ipono12oliJtis.,pr!s.!_n~&l'ehaviour, particularly those forms that operate through the demand 
elasticities for beer such as brand loyalty, variations in product quality, advertising intensity, and the 
behaviour is seriouslv limited. 
~J------
3. INCENTIVES FOR MONOPOLISTIC BEHAVIOUR IN THE MALT BEER INDUSTRY 
The previous section considered SAB's ability to behave monopolistically. In line with the hierarchy of 
empirical conditions proposed at the outset, the present section considers SAB's incentives for 
monopolistic behaviour. In line with the usual mode of economic analysis, the following sections will make 
the assumption that economic behaviour, including monopolistic behaviour, is guided significantly by 
~~~- This assumption does not appear to be unreasonable for our purposes, particularly 












. expected from behaving in this way. And as noted earlier, the abi.lity to behav~ monopolistically is 
-- ------" ~=--,- ----'"·~~ 
meaningful only if a firm has a ~terialincentive to do so. Thus, in the following analysis, the possibility 
I 
of monopolistic behaviour may be comprehensively excluded ifthere is no material incentive to behave 
monopolistically. 
For a monopolist, a material incentive to behave monopolistically would amount to the aggregate benefits 
(net of costs) expected from raising prices above the level that might usually be expected under competitive 
conditions (Cowling and Waterson, 1976; Bradburd, 1982). The benefits expected from monopolistic 
behaviour are determined, in turn, by two key factors: the price elasticity of demand, and the extent of 
market competition. This is not to suggest that other factors do not impact on the monopolist's incentives, __ 
such as advertising intensity (Friedland, 1977; Cox, Deserpa and Canby, 1982), product quality (Bitros 
- -.. - . 
and Panas, 1.988; Reitman, 1991; ~senman and Wilson, 1991), brand loyalty .f_tloss, 1988), the 
availability of consumption substitutes (Swann, 1985), economies of scale (Levy, 1984), and barriers to 
entry (Scott, 1979). These factors will undoubtedly affect the scope of a monopolist's behavioural 
incentives. But it is important to note that these individual factors cannot operate on the monopolist's ) 
incentives independently. We argue below, in fact, that these factors do not form a separate basis for 
monopolistic behaviour-that is, except through their intermediate influence on the demand elasticity and 
level of competition. 
To see the significance of demand elasticities and the level of competition, it will be useful to introduce 
the minimum technical notation. The following equation gives the Lerner index Lij, an index of the extent 
to which a firm is able to raise prices Pij above marginal cost MCij (Cowling, 1976): 
Lij = (Pij-MCij/Pij) = MSij (1 + ij)/ j. 
In the above formulation, MSij represents the i-th firm's market share in the j-th industry, j is the industry 
price-elasticity of demand, and ij = ( Xkj/ Xij) is the industry conjectural variation~efined as the output 
(or equivalently, price) response of other firms in the industry to a change in the output (or price) of the 
i-th firm. The Lerner index suggests, consistently with our intuition, that excessive or monopoly prices are 
a function of the price-elasticity, market share and the conjectural variation (Cowling, 1976). In particular, 
the price-elasticity accounts for the consumer's response to changes in price, while market share and the 
conjectural variation account for competitors' responses to output (or price) changes. 
Clearly, regardless of the specific form-such as brand loyalty or advertising intensity-that a particular 
instance of monopolistic behaviour assumes, it is clear from the Lerner index that the extent of 
monopolistic b~haviour-wjll_u~y be detennine.d_b~s..o~-c,0mbinatjpn_Qf~1!&10t_s,Jla~~ 












from the observation that advertising intensity is devised to encourage brand loyalty, which may itself be 
devised as an activity on the producer's or reseller's part to encourage a particular range of values in the 
price-elasticity of demand for its product. Thus, by the twin processes of reduction and abstraction, the 
analysis suggests that the various factors which operate on the firm's profitability are, in turn, endogenous 
to only two factors-price elasticity of demand; and the intensity and proximity of competition. 
But the Lerner index may be simplified further, since the intensity and proximity of market competition 
is not exogenous to the consumer's demand profile. In particular, it may be argued that market or industry 
competition will themselves operate through the price-elasticity of demand. The endogeneity of industry 
competition may be seen as follows. It is usual to presume that the disciplining influence of free 
competition results when a particular firm earns excessive or monopoly profits (Kwoka and Ravenscraft, 
1986). Abstracting for the moment from barriers to entry (which are addressed below), the prospect or 
expectation 'of profits attracts firms to the industry, which induces the firms within the industry to expand 
output, eliminating much of the original monopoly rent (Ravenscraft, 1979). Therefore, in this simple case, 
the extent to which firms will compete for monopoly profits-and therefore the extent to which an existing 
monopolist will attempt to defend its profits by eliminating competition or erecting barriers to entry-will 
ultimately be determined by the potential for monopoly profits. But the original potential for excessive 
profits is determined by the price elasticity of demand, that is, by the consumer's sensitivity to the 
monopolist's pricing behaviour; The Lerner index presented above suggests, for example, that the ultimate 
potential for monopoly profits will be constrained by the consumer's original willingness to purchase the 
good. Therefore, the extent of existing monopoly profits is a function of an exogenous 'potential' for 
monopoly profits, which is in turn determined by the price-elasticity of demand. 
This suggests that the extent of market competition is not independent of the consumer's demand profile, 
or more particularly, the price elasticity of demand. Adam Smith notes the finality of the consumer's 
demand profile in these famous words: "The price of monopoly is upon every occasion the highest which 
can be got ... the highest which can be squeezed out of the buyers, or which, it is supposed, they will 
consent to give" (Smith, 1776: 164, italics added). More precisely, Kantor explains that "producers of beer 
do not only compete with each other, or with the manufacturers, producers and marketers of cider, wine, 
soft drinks or other alcoholic drinks. They also compete with every imaginable as well as presently 
unimaginable way in which their potential customers can dispose of their time and money" (Kantor, 1995: 
24). 
Thus, when determining the potential for monopoly pricing in the South African malt beer industry, there 
appear to be logically compelling reasons to omit as a redundant variable the extent of directly observable 
market competition. (The case of indirect competition, or barriers to entry, is addressed below.) That is, 












competition operates, given monopolistic conditions, through the elasticity of demand. For these reasons, 
we address our analysis in the following sections to the demand profile for malt beer. 
3.1 THE DEMAND PROFILE FOR MALT BEER IN SOUTH AFRICA 
Excise related changes in the beer price are separable into two distinct components. Firstly, excise duty 
influences SAB's profitability through the demand or revenue side, affecting beer consumption and sales 
revenues through the elasticities of demand, availability of beer substitutes, and so on (Sumner, 1981; 
Sullivan, 1985). Secondly, excise duty affects SAB's profitability through the supply or cost side, 
influencing SAB's ability to contain changes in the pure beer price through production efficiencies, 
technological developments, and so on (Sullivan, 1985). The impact of these components on the consumer 
and producer will be determined, respectively, by the fraction of excise duties passed over to consumers, 
in the form of changes in the real beer price, and the fraction covered by the producer, in the form of 
changes in the pure beer price. In this section, the preceding analysis of the beer price is supplemented by 
an analysis of the demand profile for malt beer. The supply or cost side ofSAB's profitability, which forms 
the conceptual counterpart to this analysis, will be considered in a later section. 
It is important to consider the demand profile for beer for two reasons. Firstly, it has not yet been 
established whether sharp increases in excise duty have the potential to affect seriously SAB's financial 
viability; the analysis has merely established a close link between government's excise duty and the beer 
price. In particular, a direct link be~e_5'.!:1_gQvJ!rn~~nt's~xcj~~_duty and S,AB's financial performance is 
~··----·. --·-··---~ - ··. -- ---~ ~~--------
p_g_~sj_pJ~_QfllY iCQ_~~r~cp~u~3~i§-~~:isitive_to cha_nge_~- in the peer pric_e."~s?_!~ _p~ssi~1!'-~39t 
yet been excluded that beer con_~umption is insensitive to changes in the b~_er,pri~.e. In the extreme case, 
;------~ - '-·-- -·" - - .. _ .. •· -- ·-- - . . ' 
1AJ3~s--fin~ns.i<!Lperform~~- !~~11.,_Q.t;:,u3affes;_ted _ by-(~yen .extrao~d)_Q_ary ).chap_~~~ j_n e_)(?.!§~ duty. 
Secondly, it will be important to consider the demand profile for beer since, as will be seen below, this 
approach leads us directly to the second of SAB's primary claims, namely that government applies excise 
duties in favour of wine and spirits, at the expense of beer. For two reasons, then, the analysis examines 
the various elasticities of demand for beer-that is, the extent to which beer drinkers, following an increase 
in income or in the beer price, substitute the consumption of other goods and services for the consumption 
of beer. 
In estimating the elasticity of demand for beer, it may seem appropriate to investigate the relationship 
between the variables directly-that is, between beer consumption, disposable income, the beer price, and 













OUTPUT 3. BEER CONSUMPTION AND THE NOMINAL BEER PRICE, 1961 -1996. 
LS //Dependent Variable is Beer Consumption 
Range: 1959 - 1995 Format: Annual percent change Number of observations: 37 
=========================================================================== 
Independent variable Coefficient Two-tailed significance level. 
=========================================================================== 
Constant 
Nominal Beer Price 








R-squared 0.149302 Mean of dependent var 11.54935 
Adjusted R-squared 0.099261 S.D. of dependent var 13.14971 
S.E. ofregression 12.48004 Sum of squared resid 5295.543 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.445570 F-statistic 2.983585 
=========================================================================== 
Quantitative estimates of the direct relationships between beer consumption, disposable income, the beer 
price, and the prices of substitute beverages, are presented in Output 3, which indicates that a direct 
approach is inappropriate. Firstly, the estimated income elasti~ity_of..,beer_demand is statis!i~ly 
~gn~aj_(l_4% p-level). Secondly, tl2eJ~eer price and private consumption e~genditu~,J<!ken_!.9gether, 
account for only_ <;l~e_venth (R,=_0.149) of the variatj~mjn_beer_sal~. Thirdly, the parameter on the 
nominal beer price-that is, the estimated price-elasticity of demand for beer-is significantly different 
from zero, but not significantly different from one, which represents the unitary or "benchmark" elasticity. 
T)?~ •. .Q!~<!!!fct~lllat!2!1-o(pJicLandjncome-elasticiti~of_d.emand_for_m~E~ 
' 
inapprqprfat§._ ...--
The poor performance of nominal income and beer prices in describing the variation in beer consumption 
may be explained by two factors. Firstly, the consumption of beer is determined by a range of factors which 
include, but are certainly not limited to, ~isposable.income or.the beer~price. Important ancillary variables 
.... 
include government prohibitions on beer consumption, and average annual summer temperatures (which 
are exogenous to the consumer's demand profile), and pure marketing considerations such as the size and 
coverage of SAB's distribution network (which is an endogenous variable). Although it will usually be 
desirable to incorporate these and other omitted variables in a more properly specified model of the beer 
price, or to specify appropriate proximate measures, the more usual adjustments for these auxiliary 
variables are unlikely, in this case, to improve the estimated elasticities significantly. 
Consider, for example, government restrictions on the consumption of alcoholic beverages by Blacks. 
Since these prohibitions were lifted in 1962, it may appear, at first, that differences between pre- and 
post-1962 beer consumption may be captured with a simple "dummy" variable. However, this approach 












"moonshining" production and illegal beer consumption by Blacks-are not expected to affect beer sales 
volumes in a straightforward way. That is, although the political factors affecting beer consumption 
changed discretely in 1962, when Blacks were legally allowed to consume alcoholic beverages for the first 
time, consequent changes in the composition of beer demand are expected to be more complex and diffuse. 
This type of complexity is highly problematic for an estimated model of beer consumption, since 
?onsiderations of this kind suggest that the parameters of interest-namely demand elasticities-are not 
constant over any reasonable period of time. Another reason that we do not expect the variation in beer 
consumption to be fully described by nominal income and beer prices is the phenomenal growth in beer 
consumption, particularly since 1980. In particular, beer sales growth that is unrelated to changes in the 
relative price of beer---or the real incomes of consumers-suggests that the demand profile for malt beer 
has itself undergone distinct changes, perhaps even in irregular and obscure ways. As a result, factors that 
operate through income and prices-such as advertising-will bear a complex relationship to beer demand. 
For these reasons, the usual econometric adjustments and specification improvements will not make any 
meaningful contribution, at least in this case, to the estimates of the demand elasticities derived above. 
The second factor resulting in the poor explanatory power of beer prices and disposable incomes is a 
technical consideration peculiar to simultaneous equation systems. For example, an econometric model 
of interdependent phenomena would usually be expected to specify the different relationships separately, 
particularly when the phenomenon of interest (in this case, beer consumption) has a single, mutual 
determinant (price), and a single, joint representation (volume). In particular, simultaneity is expected to 
introduce bias and inconsistency in the parameter estimates of interest (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1991 ). 
Thus, the econometric model presented in Output 3 would, at first, appear to be inappropriate, since the 
demand and supply of malt beer are interdependent phenomena mutually determined by the beer price, and 
jointly represented in market equilibrium by beer sales. In our case, the problem would appear to be 
particularly acute since, in evaluating the different demand and supply effects on beer sales, we aim to 
distinguish, further, between the impact of price and income changes. 
But for our purposes, an adjustment for this familiar econometric difficulty will not improve our model 
meaningfully. The preceding analysis has shown, for example, that the demand for malt beer is given by 
the real or "consumer" beer price, while the supply of beer is given by the pure or "producer" beer price, 
the difference being made up of changes in excise duty. Assuming that annual excise changes are 
random-or at least unpredictable, as the exogeneity of government's excise policy appears to 
suggest-beer demand and beer supply are not mutually determined by a single beer price. Rather, since 
a distinction may be drawn between the consumer and producer prices of beer, the demand and supply of 
malt beer may be treated, at least for econometric purposes, as partially independent phenomena. The 












independence. For this reason, a model of beer demand recovers an important degree of freedom, since 
the possibility of mistaking equilibrium quantities demanded with equilibrium quantities supplied is, in 
the case of beer demands and supplies, significantly reduced. Similarly, SAB holds significant investments 
in inventories of finished products-around 30% of current assets (SAB, 1980-1993}-which suggests that 
a clear empirical distinction may be drawn between beer production and beer consumption. 
For two reasons, then, the regression model presented in Output 3 appears to be appropriately specified, 
despite the poor performance of income and beer prices in explaining the variation in beer consumption. 
However, the poor explanatory power of this regression model will not be useful for our purposes, since 
the analysis aims to attach some significance to the estimated values of the parameters. (In particular, the 
incentives for monopolistic behaviour are smaller the higher are the price- and income-elasticities of 
demand.) But ~ince the price- and income- elasticities of demand for malt beer are not directly or obviously 
observable from the above regression model, this direct approach to the estimation of demand elasticities 
does not appear to be meaningful. Therefore, the analysis in the following section approaches the 
estimation of demand elasticities indirectly. 
3.2 AN ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATION OF THE DEMAND PROFILE FOR MALT BEER 
The preceding section has shown that an indirect approach is necessary to evaluate the demand elasticities 
for malt beer. In this section, these elasticities are estimated by considering the relationships among the 
different classes of alcoholic beverage, namely, beer, wine and spirits. As will be seen below, this approach 
has the additional advantage of leading our analysis directly to SAB's claim that the government applies 
excise duty against beer in favour of wine and spirits. 
Data on fiscal excise revenues for the period 1951 to 1995 are presented in Figure 2. The following 
observations may be drawn from these excise revenue patterns. Firstly, between 1951 and 1969, the 
proportion of excise revenues accounted for by duties on all alcoholic beverages generally de~lined. That 
is, for nearly two decades, fiscal excise revenues from spirits, wine and beer generally grew at a slower rate 
than total (beverage plus non-beverage) excise revenues. Secondly, Figure 2 indicates that-in 1959 for 
beer and in 1979 for wine and spirits-this pattern changed dramatically; in 19 5 9, Jhe ntQ,p.ad:io.n.of total 
~xcise revenues accounted.f.QJ~.hy.Jleer be_g!lllto acceleJ..1}1f!~sh.ar.pJy.;5~~~d- SiJ!~~-19J..9.., the prQP..QLtiQ.t:is~of 
_gQY-.emment-excise-r.e~enue-accmJnteg~fuL~Qirit~ and.win~ _ _Q':lve ~i:_el!§..e_t;l-in the case of wine, the 
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Taken together, these observations suggest that on two different occasions in the past, government's overall 
excise policy stance toward alcoholic beverages changed distinctly. In particular, Figure 2 suggests that 
the 1959 change in government's exc!se s~~1~j!!.4i~.<:lJ>J~§J,. whereas the 1979 change_iu.government, 
,ppJi~)'l~\TJ.!l_re~"Yi!i~n recent years, government's historical excise stance in favour of wine has changed 
significantly. Figure 2 indicates, for example, that excise revenues collected on wines increased by 200 
percent in 1994; and in the same year, the wine producers' co-operative-the Ko-operatiewe Wijnbouwers 
Vereniging van Zuid-Afrika Beperkt, or "KWV"-lost its statutory authority to determine minimum wine 
prices. It is interesting to note that the government's recent excise policy "shift" coincides neatly with the 
emergence of a new system of political authority in South Africa. -For the moment, it will be useful to 
highlight the point that government's excise revenues from beer have, since 1968, consistently exceeded 
the growth of total excise revenues. 
Thus, not only has malt beer, since 1959,.become an increasingly important source of total government 
revenue, but government's treatment of beer has not been matched with equal treatment of wine and spirits. 
SAB phrases the problem as follows: "It is disturbing that the question of imposing excise equitably on 
all alcoholic beverages has so far been ignored ... [B]oth natural wine and sorghum beer have once more 
escaped attention in the [latest] excise increases" (SAB, 1988: 16). As the analysis has shown, Figure 3 
confirms SAB's charge of asymmetric excise duties, against beer, in favour of wine and spirits. Thus far, 
in fact, our analysis has confirmed two of SAB's claims: fi_rstly,..gpy£,fl)men(s_excJs~.~tm1g¥.J!>_l!.simifis~nt 
determinant of th~JJJ!llt bee.rJ~rice in_Ss>J.Ith.Afrjca; andsecQ9dlx,~go~f<IQQle!1t hl_!.s not applied equal 












Whether the substantial increases in excise duty on beer during the 1950s justify the 1956 beer industry 
merger--or whether the government's asymmetric application of excise duties justifies SAB's eventual 
diversification into wine and spirits-<lepends on the price, cross-price and income elasticities of demand 
for malt beer. For it will be reasonable to conclude that excise duties account for SAB's current dominant 
position in the malt beer industry, or its conglomerate diversification into the wine and spirits industries, 
only if a definite positive relationship is found between beer consumption and the beer price, and also 
between beer consumption and the prices of wine and spirits. Clearly, in the absence of a direct 
relationship between beer prices and beer consumption (which may be the case if beer consumption is 
price-inelastic), it will not be plausible to propose a direct relationship between excise duties and SAB's 
financial performance. 
Having established the crucial significance of the price elasticity of demand for beer, and having suggested 
that the elasticity is not directly observable or estimable, at least in this particular case, it will be useful to 
proceed indirectly, by estimating the relationship between beer consumption and the prices of wine and 
spirits. The usefulness of this approach is derived from the fact that a sense of the price- and income-
elasticities of beer demand will be directly available from the cross-price elasticities of demand between 
beer and its close substitutes. In particular, the price elasticity of demand for malt beer must be negative 
if the cross price-elasticity of demand for beer is negative. This result follows directly from the symmetry 
of relative prices, and also from the definition of elasticities in terms of relative prices: if an increase in the 
relative price of wine (or spirits or soft drinks) leads to an increase in the consumption of beer, then an 
increase in beer consumption will follow also from decreases in the beer price. 
The preceding analysis, and the observations drawn from Figure 2, represent a distinct empirical 
opportunity in this regard. In particular, two approaches recommend themselves. Firstly, it is possible to 
investigate those historical instances where government's excise policy-that is, when relative excise 
duties on the various alcoholic beverages-'--underwent distinct changes. For if there is any considerable 
degree of "substitutability" between the different alcoholic beverages-in which case the cross-price 
elasticities among them will be distinctly negative, and then the price-elasticities will be negative as 
well-then sharp increases in the excise duties levied on one alcoholic beverage (relative to the excise 
duties levied on all other beverages) will be accompanied by sharp decreases in the relative consumption 
of all other alcoholic beverages. Secondly, it is possible to investigate the. direct relationship between the 
relative prices of wine and beer, and the relative consumption of wine and beer. As has been seen, the two 
, are not independent, since beer and wine prices are dominated by the influence of government excise 
duties. 
The substitutability between wine and beer consumption is represented in Figure 3, which depicts the time 






















FIGURE 3. THE SUBSTITUTABILITY BETWEEN WINE AND BEER. 
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- . - - - - - Ratio, beer price: wine price ---Ratio, beer sales: wine sales 
A distinction cannot be drawn, from Figure 3 alone, between changes in the relative consumption of beer 
and changes in the relative price of wine. Such an inference would require detailed information about a 
wide variety of factors-mainly the changing tastes of consumers-and since this particular aspect of the 
consumer demand profile is difficult to quantify (and the data have not been collected for South African 
consumers over any satisfactory period of time), this is clearly impractical. Thus, a limited degree of 
significance should be attached to the observation that the relative consumption of beer has increased 
markedly between 1980 and 1996, and that the relative excise duties levied on wine have decreased sharply 
over the same period. 
For the above reasons, a limited degree of significance should be attached to the overall trends in relative 
beer consumption and relative excise duties. Rather, only those periods where government's excise policy 
underwent discrete changes should be examined. In particular, these "breaks" in government's excise 
stance will offer significant insights into the impact of discrete changes in excise duty on the consumption 
of alcoholic beverages-assuming, of course, that consumer demand profiles for alcoholic beverages are 
relatively stable (at least, not wildly erratic) over the short term, say from one year to another. In particular, 
assuming the consumer's relative preferences for the different alcoholic beverages are relatively stable, 
then distinctchanges in the relative excise levied on beer accompanied by distinct changes in the relative 
consumption of beer, particularly over a short period of time, may be interpreted as a purely price-related 
change in the pattern of consumption. In effect, the analysis has "controlled" for the complicating 












aggregate beer consumption (by examining discrete changes in excise duty). That is, the analysis has 
effectively isolated changes in the consumer demand profile for alcoholic beverages related purely to 
changes in relative prices. 
In a previous section, it was noted that excise duties on alcoholic beverages underwent distinct changes 
on three occasions, namely, 1959 (which prejudiced beer), between 1978 and 1979 (which favoured wine) 
and the period between 1991and1994 (which significantly prejudiced wine). Thus, a significant decline 
in the relative consumption of beer should be expected in 1959, a significant increase in (relative) wine 
consumption in 1979, and a significant decline in the (relative) consumption of wine in 1994. Indeed, 
Figure 3 indicates that this is. the case: in the same years that these distinct changes occurred in 
government's excise stance, relative consumption of the different alcoholic beverages also changed 
distinctly. This suggests that the consumption of alcoholic beverages-beer, wine and spirits-is extremely 
sensitive to changes in the relative prices of the various alcoholic beverages. In line with our earlier 
analysis, the conclusion appears to be that ~er consump~ion isJ).igbh:'._c~q!)~s.:.m:tc-~~@.stic ap.~_,J}_l~~e.fgr~, 
that beer cons.wnp.tionJs_e).(tr..s:_mel~price-elastic. 
Following from the above, the following general observations may be drawn. Firstly, the analysis is now 
entitled to justify SAB 's claim that the significant excise increases between 1950 and 1957 affected its 
financial performance, ~f_e _bee! consump!io~ -~ <:!Kf~cteQJ:q ll~sjgpifl_c_a.Q!_de.gree .lJY. charigf!~ i1_1 the be~!.- .. 
.,pri~!:f ~rt~l~stence of a_direct relat_ionship be_twe§n b,eer.,,,prices. ang ~eer ~~msumption makes 
fulausible to gropose a direct relationship betweel!_!X9§.~ututies~<l.nd_SA13:s_finagciaLQ~XfaI1llan,Ce ... 
-· ·~-.....c..=~=--__,_....- ---=- --"'-=----"-~~'--- -- _o_ - __::---.. ~ --
Secondly, we are also entitled to justify SAB's claim that the government's significant and consistent 
excise stance against beer, in favour of wine and spirits, justified the company's horizontal diversification 
into the wine and spirits industries. That is, the definite relationship established above between beer 
consumption and wine prices suggests that SAB was able to avoid the government's asymmetric 
application of excise duties against beer, and to benefit from the beneficial excise stance in favour of wine, 
by diversifying into the wine and spirits industries. Finally, it should be noted that the conclusion that beer 
demand is highly sensitive to changes in the beer price is not consistent with the usual notion of 
monopolistic conditions.ln_P-articular, the higher is the Q!ice-e_lasticity .Qf~b.e~J.,.il~!lll!ld, the smaller is 
SAB's incentive to behave monqJJo!istical!y_,, This conclusion is obviously important for the hierarchy of 
- • ---- ---:x...-_~---- -
empirical conditions proposed at the outset, namely, that monopolistic behaviour is impossible where there 
is no economic incentive to behave monopolistically. 
3.3 COST AND SUPPLY CONDITIONS IN THE MALT BEER INDUSTRY 
As noted earlier, excise related changes in the beer price are separable into two distinct components. 












c2nst!Q!ption· and sales revenues through the elasticities ofd~.mand, availability_g,[b_eer_substitutes, l!nd so 
~-~- -~~--= ~ ... ~~-~---·-- - - _- .__ ---- " -- -- ----- -- -· ---~ -- --><... 
O_ll. Secondly, excise duty affects SAB's profitability through the supply or cost side, influencing SAB's 
ability to contain changes in the pure beer price through production efficiencies, technological 
developments, and so on. 
The previous section examined the relationships between the different classes of alcoholic beverage. Two 
of our conclusions-namely, that government's excise policy has been applied in favour of wine and spirits 
at the expense of beer, and that beer demand is_$S1!§itix~Jp_changesJn..th1:twi~Qf_botb~beer and suh~,titute 
alcoholic beverages-lead the analysis to several suggestions, both of which are consistent with SAB's 
claims. Firstly, it appears that government's asymmetric treatment of the different alcoholic beverages has 
affected SAB adversely, since the analysis suggests that beer consumption is sensitive to changes in the 
relative prices of beer and substitute beverages. Secondly, the analysis suggests that SAB was able to 
avoid, at least partly, the adverse effect on its financial performance by diversifying horizontally, 
specifically into the production of wine and spirits. SAB's conglomerate diversification strategy-which 
is not limited to SAB's involvement in the wine and spirits industries-is examined in more detail in a 
later chapter. 
In the present section, the preceding analysis of the demand profile for malt beer will be supplemented by 
examining the supply or cost side of SAB's profitability. In particular, the following sections consider how 
SAB has been able to avoid, independently of its horizontal diversification, the impact of successive 
increases in excise duty. Since malt beer production represents the bulk of SAB's operations, it is 
necessary at this point to explain how SAB has been able to overcome the significant effect of 
government's excise duty on its profitability. 
3.3.l RETURNS TO SCALE FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN BEVERAGE INDUSTRY 
The first explanation is returns to scale, that is, the technological relationship between production yields 
and physical inputs. In terms of the ordinary conception of the term, a firm or plant experiences economies 
of scale if, merely by expanding the volume of inputs, its production yield increases in a greater proportion 
than the original increase in inputs. That is, for a vector of inputs x and an output level y = (x), returns are 
said to be increasing, decreasing or constant as (kx) is greater than, smaller than, or equal to k x. This 
definition of economies of scale suggests that, by modeling outputs y using inputs x, and estimating the 
relationship between y and x, the analysis is able to establish whether a firm is able, by increasing the 
volume of inputs, to increase its output yield by a greater proportion than the original increase in inputs. 
Although this definition of economies of scale is inappropriate for our purposes, because it does not take 












sense of the overall pattern of production in the beverage industry. Cost advantages will be incorporated 
into a more properly specified measure of scale economies below. But for the moment, it will be useful 
to consider only the broad outline of scale economies in the South African alcoholic beverage industry. 
Figure 4 depicts the relationship between output yields and input scale for 1991-the latest year for which 
industrial census figures are available-for the beverage industry. Note that output yields are devised as 
gross output per "combined" unit of labour and capital. That is, to standardise for the capital and labour 
intensities of different manufacturing processes in the beverage industry, the units of our analysis have 
been adjusted for labour employment and the stock of fixed capital. 









Turnover categories: RI m - R4 bn 
Labour and fixed capital employed (combined 
units for different turnover categories, log 
scale) 
Gross output per input unit (log 
scale) 
An interesting feature of Figure 4 is the apparent quadratic relationship between inputs and output in the 
beverage industry. This suggests that, as combined inputs of capital and labour increase, gross output 
increases, first in a greater proportion than inputs, then in the same proportion as inputs, and eventually 
in a smaller proportion. But while the quadratic functional form may be conceptually appropriate for a 
single production process, Figure 4, which represents the entire beverage industry, combines several 
production processes. And in the beverage industry, it will not be appropriate to aggregate the 
manufacturing processes used to produce such distinct products as beer, wine, spirits and carbonated· soft 
drinks. (A similar conclusion would appear to apply to the aggregation of economies of scale data for the 
entire economy; see for example Reekie, 1984b. For a more recent view, see Bertin, Bresnahan and Raff, 
1996). Thus, since Figure 4 represents a composite of several unique manufacturing processes, we should 
not attribute too much extrapolative significance to the overall quadratic relationship reported above. 












activities that constitute "the beverage industry" may be characterised by wide differences in the economic 
significance of scale effects. 
But despite this limitation on the broad conclusions that may be drawn from Figure 4, the following 
observations may be made. Firstly, larger firms in the beverage industry have a distinctly greater "output 
productivity" than small firms. Wine producers, for example, which typically produce on a relatively small 
scale and will consequently be located further to the left in Figure 4, have a lower ratio of outputs to inputs 
than the producers of beer or carbonated soft drinks, which produce on a significantly larger scale and will 
therefore be located on the far right in Figure 4. Hawkins and Radcliffe note, for example, that "there are 
certain technological and distributional factors in the brewing industry which have always tended to 
encourage the development of large-scale units. The advantages of large-scale production are nowhere so 
apparent as in brewing which has long been a highly capital-intensive industry and where the same labour 
force can produce increasing quantities of beer at cheaper and cheaper costs per barrel" (Hawkins and 
Radcliffe, 1971: 22). In other words, firms situated in the output range between RlOm and R200m in 
Figure 4 generally experience smaller production levels, per unit input of labour and fixed capital, than 
firms situated in the output range between R200m and R4bn. Thus, in terms of the usual conception of the 
term "returns to scale", the beverage industry as a whole may, over a substantial part of its production 
range, be characterised by increasing returns to scale, if only in the limited sense discussed above. 
The second observation that is evident from Figure 4 is that (increasing) returns to scale do not exist 
uniformly over the entire range of output in the South African beverage industry. In particular, there are 
no obvious returns to scale in the range between outputs of around RI bn and R4bn. Beyond this range, 
in fact, it appears that returns to scale may be declining slightly. And since SAB is situated within the latter 
region of production-over the period considered in Figure 4, SAB 's beer division had a turnover of 
around R4.9bn-it will be necessary to use a more direct and conceptually appropriate measure of 
economies of scale in beer production. The present section estimates SAB's "cost function" economies of 
scale. 
3.3.2 ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN THE PRODUCTION OF MALT BEER 
The usual conception of returns to scale is the more restrictive "technological" economies of scale, given 
by the mathematical formulation 
e = xi( y/ x;)/( y/x), 
where x and y represent volumes of inputs and outputs, respectively, and the subscript i denotes the i-th 












ratio for firm i exceeds the output-input ratio for the industry as a whole, this firm (more precisely, plant) 
is said to exhibit increasing returns to scale. However, this conception of economies of scale is not very 
useful for our purposes. Firstly, this measure has limited empirical significance, since there is no firm in 
the malt beer industry with which to compare South African Breweries. SAB may for many practical 
purposes be regarded as the sole supplier of malt beer in South Africa and, therefore, as the entire industry. 
Thus, technological measures of scale economies are indeterminate in this particular case. Secondly, this 
formulation of scale economies is devised in terms of input and output volumes, whereas the notion of 
returns to scale, intuitively, requires a formulation in terms of costs. The analysis turns, then, to a measure 
of economies of scale that overcomes both of these difficulties, namely, "cost function" economies of scale. 
It is possible to reduce the concept of cost function economies of scale to a· single, empirically estimable 
parameter, the elasticity of scale, e: 
e = (MC-AC)/y = dAC/dy, 
where y represents production values, and AC and MC represent average and marginal production costs, 
respectively, for the i-th firm in any given industry (Schmalensee and Willig, 1991 ). Where e is smaller 
than unity, a one-percent increase in output produces a proportionately smaller increase in average costs, 
in which case the production process that generates e is said to exhibit economies of scale in production. 
By contrast, diseconomies of scale exist where e is greater than unity, that is, where a one-percent increase 
in output results in a relatively larger increase in average costs. 
To gain a sense of the cost function economies of scale for the South African Breweries' beer division, it 
will be useful-though not always necessary (Rosse, 1970)-to establish the general pattern of average 
costs in the beverage industry. The data were collected from successive issues of the Census of 
Manufactures between 1950 and 1964 (Department of Statistics, 1961-1991 ), the only period for which 
a consistent data series for costs is available for the beverage industry in South Africa. However, the 
sample period does not represent a significant problem for our analysis, since the analysis is concerned 
particularly with the period when SAB acquired its status as single supplier of malt beer in South Africa, 













TABLE 2. BEVERAGE INDUSTRY PRODUCTION COSTS, 1951 - 1991. 
' 
Year 
Ratio of direct production costs (excluding labour) to gross output 
Beverage Dstilleries Malt and Aerated and 
1951 0.56 0.80 0.26 0.38 
1952 0.54 0.81 0.29 0.36 
1953 0.58 0.80 0.33 0.37 
1954 0.55 0.78 0.26 0.36 
1955 0.62 0.75 0.30 0.43 
1956 0.63 0.78 0.28 0.45 
1957 0.61 0.69 0.51 0.50 
1958 0.60 0.69 0.52 0.50 
1959 0.63 0.71 0.54 0.52 
1960 0.63 0.70 0.58 0.50 
1961 0.65 0.73 0.59 0.47 
1962 0.62 0.71 0.48 0.47 
1964 0.62 0.71 0.49 0.48 
1972 0.61 ... ... ... 
1982 0.65 ... ... . .. 
1991 0.54 0.59 0.49 0.56 
The profile of average manufacturing costs for the different sectors in the South African beverage industry 
is presented in Table 2. Note that "input costs" are devised as the costs of processing inputs of raw 
materials. This seems a reasonable conception of costs since there do not appear to be any obvious 
economies of scale from the use of direct labour-the only other important direct manufacturing input-in 
the sort of manufacturing processes involved in the production of malt beer. For the sake of completeness, 
the following econometric analysis includes direct labour costs. But for the moment, it will be sufficient 
to consider only raw materials processing costs. 
Table 2 indicates the following. F rstly, for the beverage industry as a whole (column 1), no obvious 
pattern is evident from the ratio of direct input costs to gross output over the period between 1951 and 
1991. In the aggregate, the cost of processing raw materials for the beverage industry was a reasonably 
stable proportion (60-65%) of gross output between 1951and1964, declining by roughly 8% between 
1964 and 1991. Secondly, direct input costs for distilleries and wineries appear to have declined rapidly 
between 1951 and 1991; for example, materials processing costs accounted for around 80% of gross output 
in the early 1950s, whereas the proportion more recently has been less than 60%. Thirdly, materials 
processing costs for carbonated soft drinks manufacturers have increased steadily from around 40% of 












Table 2 indicates, however, the pattern for the malt and sorghum beer brewing industry is completely 
different from the general trends in direct input costs for the other sectors in the beverage industry. In 
particular, the cost of processing raw materials for the beer brewing industry (in other words, South African 
Breweries) increased dramatically in 1957, from an average of around 29% of gross output between 1951 
and 1956, to around 53% of gross output between 1957 and 1991. This represents a distinct increase of 
more than 80% in the single year between 1956 and 1957, the same year, incidentally, in which a 
"monopoly" was formed in the South African beer industry. In addition, it is interesting to note that no 
considerable progress has been made-either contemporaneously with the 1956 beer industry merger, or 
since the merger-in reducing the average processing costs for raw materials in the malt beer industry. 
The significant increase in 1956 in the cost of processing raw materials in the beer brewing industry is an 
interesting observation in its own right, particularly since this large increase in the direct costs of 
manufacturing beer occurred in the same year as SAB gained its "monopoly" position in the malt beer 
industry. However, it would not be correct to infer diseconomies of scale in beer production merely 
because input costs increased dramatically simultaneously with the 1956 beer industry merger. That is, this 
observation should not be taken as evidence that economies of scale do not exist in the production of malt 
beer. Recall, for example, that the mathematical formulation for cost function economies of scale is 
derived, not from the profile of average costs themselves, which have been the subject of the preceding 
analysis, but from the parameter e, which is given by the relationship between average costs and output, 
dAC/dy. In Output 4, below, this formulation is used to estimate the parameter e. 
OUTPUT 4. COST FUNCTION ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN BEER PRODUCTION. 
LS// Dependent Variable is Average Input Costs (raw materials plus labour) 
Range: 1951 - 1964 Format: Logarithms of annual values Number of observations: 14 
=========================================================================== 
Independent variable Coefficient Two-tailed significance level. 
=========================================================================== 
Constant 






R-squared 0.629451 Mean of dependent var -0.577793 
Adjusted R-squared 0.595765 S.D. of dependent var 0.208936 
S.E. ofregression 0.132841 Sum of squared resid 0.194113 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.803092 F-statistic 18.68568 
==================~============~=~===::====================================== 
The elasticity of scale e estimated in Output 4 appears to be highly significant (.1 % p-level) and 
substantially smaller than 1 (0.45). Thus, a one-percent increase in the value of output appears to be 












processing raw materials, plus the cost of labour directly involved in the process of manufacturing). In line 
with the preceding analysis, this observation may be interpreted as evidence that the manufacturing 
processes used to convert raw material and direct labour inputs into malt beer are characterised by 
increasing returns to scale. In particular, a unit increase in the value of output is associated with a 
proportionately smaller increase in the costs of manufacture. 
From the evidence assembled to this point, the following interesting conclusion may be drawn: increasing 
returns to scale form the underlying mechanism by which SAB has historically been able to absorb 
increases in government excise duties. In particular, SAB is able to absorb excise increases in one of three 
logically comprehensive ways:. by passing excise increases onto the consumer (through a higher beer 
price); by absorbing excise increases itself (through reduced profitability); and by reducing the costs of 
manufacture (by continuous improvements in the company's manufacturing technology). But as the 
analysis has shown, SAB has consistently failed to pass the full impact of excise increases onto the 
consumer, largely on account of the beer drinker's sensitivity to changes in the real beer price. And as we 
shall see in a later chapter, SAB is an immensely profitable business, which suggests that the company has 
not absorbed increases in excise duties-at least not through any significantly reduced degree of 
profitability. Rather, the preceding analysis indicates that excise increases have consistently been absorbed 
by economies of scale, that is, by improved technological and operational efficiencies in SAB's 
manufacturing processes. This suggests, in turn, that excise duties have formed a significant impetus 
behind the current single supplier position in the South African beer industry; and increasing returns to 
scale have provided the means whereby SAB has been able to achieve this dominant position. 
3.4 THE POSSIBILITY OF MONOPOLISTIC BEHAVIOUR IN THE BEER INDUSTRY 
The previous sections have considered SAB's incentive to behave monopolistically in the South African 
malt beer industry. The analysis examined, first, the demand side of SAB's incentives to behave 
monopolistically in setting the beer price, and established that the consumption of beer is highly sensitive 
to changes in the beer price. On account of the price-elasticity of demand for malt beer, this observation 
appears to suggest that SAB's incentives to inflate the price beyond the consume!.l2!._dinary_willingrn;:s_~ 
.t2.,P~y-~uld~beJ~fuiJ;fnf~l.!o its bJ:IsJnEs~, 2i!lce ~-flµen_ce. of a.p~icz.s.b~Dge_ o.n.cqnsymp_tiop~y~s 
wi ILd.Q!lltnilte_the. assoc iated.r-even1Je ~ eff e.~t~~C.Q!!!Q lete ly~ 
Secondly, the analysis examined the supply conditions underlying SAB's incentives, and established that 
significant economies of scale exist in the manufacture of malt beer. This suggests that .£AB has au 
uneguivoc~l.in~entiY£.lo_expand.production,_which~,see,im~iately_is.contr<lry~to_~otion,of.limiting 
~aJes and, therefore, contra~icts the usual conception of monopolistic behayiour framed earlier.JP addition, 














government excise duties by expanding32rodqction,fargely on account of the production efficiencies, and r---- -~-=~~- - ' ·-~ - -
t~i:.~f()!~ cost advantages~ that accrue to the firm from large-scale production. Thus, from the perspec!}v._~ 
of both demand and supply side incentives, SAB has an _111:iambiguous advantage from behaving counter-
...__, - ~- - -- ...,,-· -:_ __ -··.-:-0"""'"- ,-: . ·-· ..,.. -· - - -· _.__ - • 
monopolistically. 
4. BARRIERS TO ENTRY IN THE MALT BEER INDUSTRY 
The previous analysis made only passing references to entry barriers 'in the South African malt beer 
industry. In addition, no single reference has been made to any particular entry barrier, and our efforts have 
been spent addressing the other factors which are normally associated with the incentives and ability to 
behave monopolistically. In terms of the conditions for monopolistic behaviour posed at the outset, this 
approach has not been inappropriate-barriers to entry are a "higher order" issue in monopolistic 
behaviour, and as has been seen, monopolistic conditions in the malt beer industry may in large part be 
successfully and comprehensively addressed without resorting to anything more than a lower Jevl"I issue, 
such as demand elasticities and scale economies. That is, luJ,1-l~_al:is_~nc_e.~oL1wjd_en_c0e=oJ ~- cJ_istinct 
iuc.enfar_~---:-:ar i11deed the ability~to behave monopolistically_,_a sep~rate analysis of barriers to enttx wou_!d 
sit awkwardly in-the broader analysis;_market or industry barriers to the entry of competing firms are 
obviously irrelevant in an industry where the intensity and proximity of competition are themselves 
irrelevant. But for the moment the analysis addresses itself to entry barriers in the South African malt beer 
industry, since the respectability of this area of research in industrial economics suggests that no analysis 
will be complete without explicit account of this vital aspect of market competition (Baumol, 1989); and 
since, together with single supplier conditions and the absence of substitutes, entry barriers form part of 
the basic triplet of necessary conditions for the identification of monopolistic conditions. In general, the 
following remarks will be satisfactory. 
The various conclusions drawn throughout this chapter entail several interesting implications for entry 
barriers as the "final case" of monopolistic behaviour. Specifically, i!..~h2l1)~ be noted tha! the significance 
_gf excise duties, outlined throug;~out the am1lysis, will automatically extend not only to SAB but also to 
aJl}'..,J?,_Q!_el)tial beer_prodl!ce_r_in _south A_frica .. 'That is, £9_~e_rn111~nt ex~ise_ policjes will affect all firms 
9urrently operatin_g in, and also to all firms ylan_11il:ig _at some future date to ~nter, the South African beer 
industry. In an important sense, then, the.gp_yelJ}Illentjtself_represents an_important barrier to en_J!)', which 
entails an important implication for the beer market's "contestability" (Baumol, 1989). But it has been 
shown earlier that SAB has historically been able to avoid passing excise increases onto the beer consumer 
because the company's manufacturing processes are characterised by increasing returns to scale. 












And the impetus that sets these incentives into operation is derived in large part from the joint impact of 
price-sensitive consumers and continuous increases in excise duties on South African beer prices. 
Thus, so far as barriers to entry actually exist in the South African beer industry (and for reasons explained 
above, our analysis has not addressed itself to any level of detail on this particular point), the government 
itself constitutes a significant barrier to entry in this industry, primarily on account of the scale of 
operations required to absorb excise increases successfully. Taken to an extreme, for example, continuous 
increases in excise duty are consistent with a continuously expanding scale of operations (up to some 
technological limit, of course). And in a relatively small domestic market, particularly for a manufacturing 
process characterised by increasing returns to scale, there might plausibly be room enough for only one 
supplier. Thus, a significant entry barrier may exist in the South African beer industry, in the form of the 
scale of operations required to absorb government excise duties. But in the more restricted sense of the 
term intended here, this particular entry barrier does not appear to entail any practical consequences for 
SAB's competitive position in the South African malt beer industry. Thus, apart from the ultimate 
decisiveness of the consumer, the government's excise policy on alcoholic beverages, and the consistent 
increases in efficiency required to contain continuous increases in excise duties, have come to substitute, 
in a sense, for the extent of market competition which might reasonably have been expected under 
alternative, multi-supplier conditions. 
This dissertation has been concerned with an explanation of SAB's superior historical financial 
performance. In particular, we aim to relate the superior profitability of this, South Africa's largest single 
industrial enterprise, with the "triplet" of ~arket and corporate strategies identified earlier, namely 
monopolies, conglomerates, and pyramids. The present chapter considered the first of th~se factors, the 
"monopoly" or single-supplier positiOn in the South African malt beer industry. The remaining features 
/, 
of the SAB group will be addressed in later chapters. For the moment, the analysis aims only to establish 
whether SAB may be characterised as a monopoly; whether competitive and other pressures exist in the 
South African malt beer industry to prevent the emergence of monopolistic conditions; whether these 
competitive pressures apply to SAB; and whether SAB's profitability in the malt beer industry may 
accordingly be described as 'excessive'. In brief, this chapter has examined the link between SAB's long 
history of consistently superior financial performance, and allegations of monopolistic behaviour in the 
South African malt beer industry. 
At the outset, "monopolistic behaviour" was defined from a broad, essentially empirical perspective. In 












.b.Q~h an inc.entive and~~~ili!Y to behave mgn_Of>Qlifil:jcal_ly..; As is customary in the mode of analysis that 
distinguishes economics from other disciplines, the assumption has been made here that behaviour will 
be limited by the usual twin restrictions, namely the ability and incentive to behave in any particular way. 
In the preceding sections, where we considered SAB's incentive and ability to behave monopolistically 
in the South African malt beer industry, this mode of analysis was applied to SAB. The analysis suggested 
the following main conclusions. 
Firstly, SAB is unable to behave monopolistically, at least to any extraordinary extent, in the South African 
malt beer industry. In Jgd:jc9lar, SA..a.is$.t:JP ~leterlllln.e~ulliJajen1JJ¥,_Qn~ar_o_und~on.e-q.ua.cte.t,.ofJ_he beer 
erice. Si11£e tp~~)rn~c;_t_J)f~Ei§~,J;f u_ti~s_ on_ th{! ~e~r price app~ars _tp)~ higilJ)'~~gnific;ant, and since SAB' s 
potential for monopolistic pricing behaviour would be expected to operate in the "gap" between 
government excise duty and the real beer price-that is, in the proportion of beer prices that are not 
determined by government excise duties-..SAR'.s_inc_entiveJo __ exeJia~sj_goifl_c_ant~de,gre_e~ofjoi]uen.ce 
OYer the market E!ti.£§_oLhe.e.upp..e..ru:s...tQJ:2e limited byJ11e modest degree ofmPWlJl.Qly re.uts_tbA-UCmight 
~fjmrunau.ip.ulating..th~J:t~~_r_Q!}<:;_x.~But in addition, our analysis has suggested that the modest degree 
of monopoly rents is itself limited, in the case of SAB, since a direct relationship could not be firmly 
established between the more usual determinants of monopolistic pricing behaviour, such as demand 
elasticities and output variations, and the South African malt beer price. It should only be noted that a 
confirmed relationship of this kind would appear to be necessary for any substantial monopolistic influence 
over the beer price. 
Secondly, MIL9~~-nothav~~n obyio_us incentive Jo be_uave monopolistkall)'_in the South African malt 
J;>~er_industry. For example, the~-£_on~u':11_ption of liquor is sensitive to price competition betw_eeri~the 
diff erental_coholic~bexe_rag~"s,,J2_articl1larl)' £1lan.ge~ in rell!tiye j)ric5!_s_;_~b_e_er~c_o1J;>ump_tjpn_is~ighly se_ns itive 
to_ c_hange~ in_the beer price; government excise duties have impacted negatively on beer consumption, in 
terms of both absolute and relative alcohol consumption; and therefore, SAB has a continuously operating 
incentive to reduce the relative price of malt beer. In particular,~c_pst aQ~JechnologicaLfe_at_ures Qf be~r 
moduction, as measured by economies of scale, are such that SAB has an unambiguous incentive to 
~ap.j OU!PU( 
Since SAB does not appear to have either an extraordinary ability or a significant incentive to influence 
beer prices or beer production monopolistically, the tentative conclusion may be offered that the SAB 
group's profitability may not be ascribed to its apparent monopoly position in the South African malt beer 
industry. As the analysis has shown, the com_pany's influence over the beer price is severely circumscribed 
by the dominant influence of government'.s_~x~ise policy, while the company's production incentives are 
"- ... " -












A criticism may be offered, at this point in our analysis, that the analysis has not been comprehensive. We 
have neglected to consider systematically, for example, the many possible counter-claims of monopolistic 
behaviour, such as barriers to entry in the local beer industry, the contestability of the malt beer market, 
and so on. This criticism may be dispensed with comprehensively as follows. Firstly, monopolistic 
conditions are difficult to observe in reality, since they are at best loosely defined in theory, and therefore 
resolve themsetves mainly to observations about the conditions of concentration in industry output. 
Secondly, it will not be conceptually satisfactory for our purposes to observe industry concentration, and 
to infer monopolistic behaviour, since an earlier argument suggested that the two are not synonymous, nor 
even related in a causally significant way. For this reason, the notion of monopolistic behaviour was 
revised as the incentive and ability to behave in this way. Thus, instead of defining a structural link 
between industry concentration and monopolistic behaviour, a behavioural link has been defined between 
monopolistic behaviour and the monopolist's peculiar system of abilities and incentives. Clearly, so far 
as the mode of economic analysis is concerned, the latter characterisation of economic behaviour is more 
appropriate. 
It will not be reasonable to infer monopolistic behaviour purely because we observe the incentive and 
ability to behave monopolistically. So our analysis appears to offer no obvious advantage over the usual 
inferences of monopoly from observations of industry concentration. However, it should be noted that the 
earlier definition of monopolistic conditions may be framed as a falsifiable one. That is, the customary 
mode of analysis in economics leads us to suggest, absent the ability and incentive to behave 
monopolistically, that monopolistic behaviour may not reasonably be inferred. This leads us to a very basic 
definition of monopolistic incentives and monopolistic abilities, such as the ability to exert a significant 
degree of independent influence over prices, or the incentive to restrict output by a substantial margin. The 
advantage of this presentation is that it allows us to dispense-mainly implicitly-with some of the 
alternative counter-claims of monopolistic behaviour, including barriers to entry, market contestability, and 
so on. This advantage flows directly from our definition of monopolistic conditions at a basic or 
fundamental level: barriers to entry, for example, are important only to the extent that they discourage 
prospective entrants; and to the extent that the reduction in observed competition will allow a producer 
greater freedom to raise prices, the irrelevance of barriers to entry may be seen to follow immediately from 
an inability to raise prices. The observed inability, say, to raise prices performs the function in our analysis 
of an "umbrella" condition: all monopolistic behaviour operates through this ability; and in the absence 
of such an ability, it may be presumed that monopolistic behaviour is similarly absent. Therefore, it seems 
reasonable to conclude that ifthe determinants of SAB's behaviour in the South African malt beer industry 
were ranked in terms of their significance, then monopolistic factors-such as unilateral pricing and output 












the South African malt beer industry may not be characterised to any significant degree by monopolistic 
conditions. 
This conclusion does not apply exclusively to South African Breweries, or exclusively to the South African 
malt beer industry. The selection of SAB as the object of our analysis, particularly since SAB is the most 
prominent, most important, and most temporally persistent example of economic concentration in the 
history of the South African economy, allows us to transfer some of our conclusions, in a number of 
interesting circumstances, to the balance of South African industry. For example, our analysis has 
suggested that the economic meaning of statements about the extent of economic concentration is distinctly 
unclear. Consider, for example, the observation that "[ e ]conomic concentration in the South African 
economy is high and increasing" (Fourie and Smit, 1989); or more importantly, the claim that "[economic 
power] lends itself to abuse and ... tends to be abused if long possessed" (Competition Board, in Fourie 
and Smit, 1989). In particular, the preceding analysis of the most prominent, important and temporally 
persistent example of economic concentration in South Africa-namely South African Breweries--does 
not appear to offer support that statements of this kind contain, on their own, any real underlying economic 
significance. 
Thus, using a conventional and non-controversial definition of monopolistic behaviour-as the ability and 
incentive to behave in this way-the analysis has found in the strategically interesting case of absolute 
economic concentration, that monopolistic abuse and economic concentration are empirically independent 
phenomena. Although the conclusions should, at this early point in the analysis, be framed tentatively, it 
should be noted that empirical independence in a controlled environment-'controlled' in the sense that 
SAB was selected as the object of our investigation for various tactical reasons-suggests that statements 
about direct and straightforward relationships between the observed level of economic concentration and 
the imputed level of monopolistic behaviour are substantially mistaken. In fact, the following chapter 
confirms that SAB's superior historical profitability is determined (or at least may be explained) by a small 
number of factors that dominate almost completely the direct impact of SAB's dominant position in the 
malt beer industry. That is, empirical grounds will be offered for the suggestion made here that the degree 
of industry concentration is-in this tactically interesting case, and presumably, then, in a number of 
ancillary cases as well-very nearly irrelevant. 
Before we proceed to the following chapter, it will be useful to recall the question, posed at the outset, 
whether an explanation for the superior profitability of the SAB group may be found in: SAB's position 
as single supplier in the malt beer industry; SAB's strategy of conglomerate diversification; and the 
group's pyramid corporate structure. In particular, our aim throughout the dissertation is to relate these 
features of the SAB group in an economically important way to the profitability of this, South Africa's 












the level of economic concentration-and therefore imputations of trends in economic power drawn 
directly from observed levels of economic concentration-are perhaps less meaningful than is sometimes 
thought. In the following chapter, the historical significance of SAB's conglomerate diversification 
strategies are compared with the company's monopoly position in the beer industry, and with the group's 













AN ANALYSIS OF CONG LO MERA TE DIVERSIFICATION 
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO 
SOUTH AFRICAN BREWERIES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation has noted four essential features of the South African Breweries group. Firstly, SAB is 
widely regarded as South Africa~s premier industrial enterprise (Barr, Gerson and Kantor, 1994). Secondly, 
SAB may be regarded for many practical purposes as the single supplier of malt beer in South Africa. 
Indeed, for several extended periods in the past, SAB has accounted for wholly I 00 percent of the local 
malt beer market (Competition Board, 1982). Thirdly, SAB is located at the heart of the South African 
system of conglomerate diversification: the group is itself a diversified conglomerate, and at the same time 
forms part of a broader conglomerate. Finally, SAB is part of a broader set of pyramid-type arrangements, 
the predominant mechanism of corporate control in South Africa. 
The question was considered, at the outset, whether an explanation for the SAB group's superior 
profitability may be found in any of these special features. In particular, this dissertation aims to establish 
whether SAB's position as single supplier in the malt beer industry; SAB's strategy of conglomerate 
diversification; and the group's pyramid corporate structure are related in any economically meaningful 
way to the superior profitability of SAB group. The previous chapter discounted the influence of SAB 's 
monopoly position in the local malt beer industry, and offered various arguments against the conclusion 
that the explanation for SAB's historical financial performance may be found mainly in its "monopoly" 
or single supplier position. The evidence does not appear to offer support, for example, for the notion that 
SAB is a monopoly, except in a relatively remote sense-certainly not in our definition--of the term. 
Indeed, various arguments have been offered to suggest that certain important instances of monopolistic 
behaviour in the malt beer industry are attributable, not to South African Breweries, but rather to the South 
African government. 
The present chapter investigates SAB 's strategy of conglomerate diversification to establish whether the 
firm's history of superior financial performance may be explained by the system of horizontal expansion. 
In particular, the empirical analysis aims to decompose SAB's historical financial performance into the 
three different components-monopoly, conglomerate and pyramid-each of which are theoretically 
expected to have a distinct influence-positive or negative--on the firm's profitability. The chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 2 examines the essential features of the more important empirical literature 












conglomeration, and attempts to verify some of the predictions of the most prominent theory for South 
African Breweries. Sections 3 and 4 examine the basis for the present chapter's empirical methodology: 
Section 3 considers the different data; and Section 4 explains the appropriate empirical method. Section 
5 investigate the consequences for SAB 's financial performance of its single supplier position in the beer 
industry; the company's conglomerate diversification strategy; and the group's pyramid structure. The 
analysis aims, first, to quantify the financial advantages that flow from SAB 's strategy of conglomerate 
diversification, and secondly, contrasts these with the advantages of SAB's single-supplier position in the 
beer industry. Section 6 extends the analysis to the SAB group's "pyramid" system of corporate control. 
Section 7 presents the chapter's principal conclusions. 
2. A HISTORICAL REVIEW OF THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON 
CONG LO MERA TE DIVERSIFICATION 
2.1 THE AGGREGATE RISK REDUCTION OR "COINSURANCE" HYPOTHESIS 
The earliest general theoretical development proposed as an explanation for conglomerate diversification 
makes the observation that conglomerates, as combinations of horizontally unrelated bus~inesses, are simply 
combinations of statistically independent or negatively correlated income streams (Adelman, 1961 ). The 
presence of statistically independent returns streams suggests, in turn, that the total variance of returns is 
· lower for a conglomerate than the simple sum of the variances of the individual pre-merger income 
streams. According to this so-called "coinsurance" theory, the incentive for conglomeration may essentially 
be framed as an enhanced ability to raise finance since, for any given level of profitability, reductions in 
the variability of income reduce the probability of bankruptcy (Lewellen, 1971 ). Reduced risk of financial 
failure, in turn, increases a lender's willingness to issue debt and an investor's willingness to subscribe for 
equity. 
Although this view gained enormous currency in the academic literature, it may readily be shown to be 
false. Levy and Sarnat (1970) showed, for example, that gains of the coinsurance variety would be 
impossible in perfect capital markets. In such circumstances, lenders and investors are able to diversify 
their exposures to the same extent by taking positions in the individual firms in the same ratio as those 
taken by the conglomerate firm. Thus, the conglomerate would have no obvious reason to exist in the 
absence of capital market imperfections-such as positive information costs, portfolio indivisibilities, 
differential transaction costs, and the costs of actively managing an investment portfolio. Clearly, the 
probability of perfectly functioning capital markets will not usually be relevant, since for most practical 
purposes, most analyses are likely to accept willingly the possibility of imperfections in the capital market. 
But it is important to note, for our purposes, that in this risk-reduction view, conglomerate mergers serve 












external-capital markets. The conglomerate is an institutional form, in this view, that is designed to 
"internalise" or overcome the difficulties associated with external capital markets. 
Two principal objections to this view may immediately be mounted. Firstly, it does not seem reasonable 
that the factors highlighted by the theory may, on their own, explain the full scale and scope of merger 
activity throughout the history of the modern conglomerate corporation. In particular, it does not seem 
plausible that the significant fluctuations in the 'taste' for conglomeration which are observed from time 
to time-such as the sudden surge in merger and acquisition activity reported in the United States in the 
1960s (Business Week, 1968}-are explained to any significant extent by discrete changes in the 
magnitude of capital market imperfections. This criticism is supported by a number of empirical 
investigations. Most recently, for example, Comment and Jarrell (1995) have noted that debt does not 
appear to increase systematically with the degree of horizontal diversification (which excludes the 
coinsurance view more implicitly), and also that conglomerate firms do not appear to make less use of 
external capital market transactions (which excludes the coinsurance view more directly). 
A second reason for the implausibility of the risk-reduction theory of conglomerate mergers, is that the 
theory restricts conglomerate activity to portfolio strategies of reducing the aggregate risk of a bundle of 
individual firms. But as may be seen, a conglomerate may have good reasons for selecting a portfolio of 
individual firm's with higher stand-alone risks. That is, an analysis of conglomerate diversification 
strategies will not necessarily be restricted to the sort of diversification which typifies ordinary share 
portfolio investments. There is, in fact, a substantial body of empirical evidence which suggests that 
conglomerate firms are engaged in generally more risky projects than non-conglomerates (Hill, 1983). So 
far as SAB is concerned, the coinsurance theory of conglomerate diversification may be evaluated in a 
fairly simple way. Figure I contrasts the returns for a composite of the individual firms attached to SAB 
(the "pure" conglomerate portfolio) with the returns for SAB's beer division (the conglomerate "core"). 
Returns to the pure conglomerate portfolio are calculated from historical returns of the various individual 
components, in proportion to the actual historical weights of these individual firms in the broader SAB 
conglomerate. Returns to the conglomerate core-in this case SAB's beer division-are calculated as the 












FIGURE 1. A SIMPLE TEST OF THE COINSURANCE OR RISK REDUCTION HYPOTHESIS. 
---Returns from simulated portfolio of SAB's investments 
- - - - - - - South African Breweries Beer Division returns 
°" '' 
" . ,. 
Figure 1 indicates that except for a brief period between 1986 and 1987, the returns from SAB's Beer 
Division have been consistently less variable than the returns from a simulated portfolio of SAB's 
individual conglomerate investments. That is, the pure conglomerate portfolio appears to be 
consistently more "risky" than the conglomerate core. This is clearly inconsistent with the total risk 
reduction hypothesis. In particular, the returns streams for the various components of SAB's 
conglomerate portfolio are considerably more variable the returns stream for SAB 's Beer Division. 
Thus, a conglomerate portfolio-indeed any ordinary portfolio combination-of the different entities 
that constitute the broader SAB group would necessarily increase the variance of the combined 
entity's returns. 
This observation is clearly inconsistent with the supposed total risk reduction rationale proposed for 
the system of horizontal diversification. That is, this observation suggests that a conglomerate is not 
"diversified" in the sense usually implied by financial theory-combining various returns streams to 
reduce the aggregate variability of returns. Rather, it appears that a conglomerate is diversified in the 
more limited economic sense of its involvement in a variety of horizontally unrelated industries. 
2.2 DESCENT OF THE COINSURANCE VIEW 
The coinsurance hypothesis described above has very little substantive theoretical or empirical 
content, and perhaps represents a case study in the bold principle that new and interesting 
developments in one area of economics (in this case, developments during the 1960s in general 
portfolio theory) are eagerly and enthusiastically transferred, occasionally with doubtful 
consequences, to other areas of the subject. Firstly, the literature on conglomerate 
diversification leaves the overwhelming impression that the risk reduction hypothesis is an 












and 1970s in the general field of portfolio finance. Secondly, the empirical evidence for the theory 
seriously contradicts the theory's predictions. For example, predictions implied by the theory-framed 
primarily in the language of risk reduction, but also ancillary propositions-are soundly refuted by the 
empirical evidence (Mueller, 1973; Higgins and Schall, 1975). And although the obvious empirical 
discrepancies found in the literature make the theory eminently falsifiable, the theory's respectability 
continued for some time-throughout the 1960s and 1970s-and it still appears on occasion (Amihud and 
Lev, 1981; Majd and Myers, 1987). 
Surprisingly, the demise in academic centres of the coinsurance view of conglomerate diversification came 
from an unexpected quarter. Theoretical developments in the 1960s and 1970s-which were primarily 
associated with the coinsurance motive for conglomerate diversification discussed above-generally 
address themselves to the benefits of conglomerate diversification. However, more recent arguments are 
disposed to address the aggregate costs of this corporate strategy. That is, academic arguments were 
distinctly in favour of conglomerates in the 1960s and 1970s, but became distinctly less favourable during 
the 1980s. The marked difference in emphasis between these two periods coincides neatly with changes 
in the general attitude toward conglomeration that emerged in the business community. In the 1950s and 
1960s, for example, there was a large wave of highly visible mergers, primarily conglomerate activity 
involving large and prominent organisations (Business Week, 1968). But since the early 1980s, and 
similarly in the 1990s, this trend has largely been reversed (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Accordingly, the 
potential benefits of horizontal diversification (which include: managerial economies of scale and scope; 
greater operating efficiency; economies of scope in production and marketing; improved debt capacity; 
lower tax charges; and the efficiency of an internal capital market) have been superseded in the literature 
by the potential costs (including: cross-subsidisation of losses; increased internal dispersion of information; 
and the phenomenon of value-decreasing investments). Thus, the coinsurance view of conglomerate 
mergers did not reach its descendency, as might be expected, on account of the vast empirical evidence 
that suggested the view was false. The preceding analysis has shown, for example, that the theory persisted 
for a longer period than might ordinarily be expected. Rather, it appears that the academic arguments-first 
in favour of mergers, and subsequently opposed to them-were simply swept along with the prevailing 
activities of the corporations themselves (Jarrell, Brickley, and Netter, 1988). 
' 
It would be substantially incorrect to claim that this 'vacillation' in economic commentaries of the time 
represent a flaw in the academic literature. Having committed themselves to explaining conglomerate 
firms, economic commentators have simultaneously committed themselves to explaining both the ascent 
and subsequent demise of much of the conglomerate merger activity previously observed in practice. The 
temptation proved too great, it seems, to explain the observed ascendancy of these firms with theories that 












academics' claims of their undesirability. This is perhaps more in the nature of academe than in the nature 
of conglomerates. For our purposes, it will be sufficient only to note that a particular theoretical view of 
conglomerate mergers has not yet been firmly established. In particular, the aggregate effect of distinct 
historical changes in the literature's attitude toward conglomerates is an obscure prediction about the 
overall effects of conglomerate diversification (see for example Berger and Ofek, 1995). The theoretical 
significance of the immediate work should not be overstated, of course-since we aim exclusively to 
dissect and systematise the loosely bound empirical stylisations of conglomerate diversification 
strategies-the above observation alone justifies our investigation of horizontal diversification, since it 
appears that no consistent theory of conglomeration exists. 
2.3 CONGLOMERATES AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORA TE CONTROL 
At this point, it may be proposed that following the coinsurance view, no individually accepted theory of 
conglomerate diversification has emerged in the academic literature. It may be objected at this point that 
the significant increase in merger and acquisition activity during the 1980s was associated with a new 
theory of conglomerate diversification, apparently based in the market for corporate control which became 
prominent as a separate phenomenon during that period. This objection may, in turn, be based on various 
observations drawn from the literature of the time. Firstly, diversified or conglomerate firms were more 
likely during the 1980s to be takeover targets, and conglomerates appeared to participate more actively in 
the market for corporate control over that period (Comment and Jarrell, 1995). Secondly, some authors 
integrated the conglomerate firm into more general theories of internal and external mechanisms of 
corporate control (Jensen, 1995; Barr, Gerson and Kantor, 1994). 
But on closer inspection, it is apparent that much of this literature aims less to describe conglomerates, as 
it does to explain the U.S. corporate control system, which in the 1980s took the form mainly of 
conglomerate mergers. A later section draws an important distinction between the corporate strategy of 
conglomerate diversification and the various corporate control mechanisms which have been associated 
in recent years with conglomerates. This distinction proves to be important in the following chapter, since 
corporate control mechanisms appear in various alternative forms, and are not exclusively associated with 
the conglomerate form of business enterprise. Thus, despite its concern with the corporate control 
implications of merger activity, the corporate control literature, particularly in North America, is not a 












3. THE APPROPRIATE EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY: DA TA CON SID ERA TIONS 
The more important literature on conglomerate diversification is drawn from a vast system of 
commentaries, of varying degrees of significance for our purposes. These commentaries extend in South 
Africa alone from the early 1900's through to the present day. At times, for example, the conglomerates 
appear to have played a special part in the history of South Africa's corporate and economic development 
(Horwitz, 1967). At other times, the conglomerates have been viewed as unfashionable by the South 
African investment community (Kantor, 1995). The conglomerates have also, on occasion, encountered 
the hostility and resistance of the broader political community (Andrew, 1994). Thus, as noted earlier, the 
contribution in the present chapter to the vast system of empirical and theoretical literature on 
conglomerate diversification may be justified precisely on the grounds that the entire body of commentaries 
has failed to establish firmly-or invalidate finally-the desirability of conglomerate diversification 
strategies. Clearly, if the empirical investigation presented in this chapter is to make a meaningful 
contribution to the literature, then the pitfalls evident from the existing body of literature should be 
overcome. For our purposes, the more important pitfalls may be noted and addressed. 
Firstly, the empirical approach adopted in this chapter must be as simple as possible. That is, elaborate and 
complicated theoretical depictions-particularly of something that may be reduced in a later section to a 
relatively simple empirical problem-must be avoided (Holmstrom, 1979). Secondly, the investigation 
must make the absolute minimum data aggregations (Benston, 1985). There is strong evidence to suggest, 
for example, that the contradictory findings in the empirical literature arise precisely because the research 
object is devised-and conclusions are sought-at the level of the individual firm, while the research 
method is devised to draw conclusions from data for industry-wide or even economy-wide aggregations 
of individual firms (for example, Goldberg, 1973; Melicher and Rush, 1974; Rhoades, 1975). Thus, it is 
a primary advantage of this dissertation that our analysis addresses itself to the problem of explaining a 
particular firm's profitability, as opposed, say, to an industry-wide or economy-wide analysis (Baker, 
1992). 
Thirdly, the analysis must make the minimum use of accounting data, since concepts drawn from 
accounting practice bear an obscure relationship in practice to their closest economic equivalents (Kay, 
197 6; Fisher and McGowan, 1983; and Stark, 1979). In the first instance, some important economic 
concepts-such as marginal or opportunity cost-just do not have empirical equivalents, or at least 
straightforward ones. In the second instance, accountants take account of the temporal dimension of cash 
flo~s and returns streams-important for such concepts as risk, present value, internal rates of return, 
profitability, and so on-in an extremely simple way. In the second instance, the data of interest to market 
and industry researchers, including summary profit statistics, will normally be simple summations of 












through aggregation-perhaps even amplified (Fisher and McGowan, 1983)-to a significant part of the 
industry data available to researchers in this area. Since research in this area is particularly concerned with 
the connection between economic magnitudes (such as industrial performance) and accounting 
relationships (such as industrial profitability), such inadequacies as exist in accounting data will obscure 
the empirical analysis in a variety of undesirable ways. 
For these reasons, the concepts used in accounting practice make it difficult, in practice, to establish the 
significance of economic conclusions derived from accounting data. It is not a surprising result, for 
example, that five different empirical studies-each of which used Tobin's q ratio as a measure of 
corporate financial performance-established different relationships between profitability and corporate 
diversification strategies (Salinger, 1984; Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988; Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 
1988; Lang, Stulz and Walking, 1989; Lang and Stulz, 1994). Indeed, it would not be unreasonable to 
expect, based on the preceding discussion, that each study would highlight a different empirical regularity, 
and therefore draw a different conclusions about economic behaviour, from essentially similar accounting 
data. 
Clearly, robust statistical results are essential for meaningful empirical analysis. Thus, the usual 
conceptions of empirical studies in this area-including studies of industry data drawn from firm-level 
accounting information-will be inadequate for our purposes. The following analysis considers stock 
market returns since this approach offers several impo1iant advantages. 
Firstly, stock price data are useful for capturing market expectations about a particular variable. For 
exampl~, economic behaviour-which on account of the irrelevance of past decisions will always be 
forward-looking-is naturally and more precisely phrased in terms of expectations about the future value 
of some variable. And since stock price data represent expectations about future performance, at least to 
a greater extent than historical accounting data, stock prices will often be the only practicable alternative 
when producing an approximate empirical measure of expected profitability. 
Secondly, stock price data overcome some of the difficulties with accounting data. Data drawn from stock 
prices are available regularly; stock prices have a standard format; they have a single interpretation for all 
firms, also across time; and if stock price data are not precisely accurate, then the data are at least 
consistently inaccurate. Thus, meaningful and reliable conclusions are more readily available from returns 
calculated using stock prices than from accounting data. 
Thirdly, stock market data are flexible enough for studying historic financial performance at various 
degrees of aggregation. In particular, stock price data are available for all individual listed firms (such as 
South African Breweries), composite indices are available for individual sectors and industries (such as 












index). And on account of their common features; discussed above, stock price data may be combined in 
a large number of seamless ways. Thus, unlike accounting data, stock prices are useful because they are 
calculated at the level of the individual firm, not from industry- or economy-wide sampling procedures; 
and they may readily be fashioned into composites with varying degrees of aggregation, as the analysis 
requires. 
Thus, stock price data appear to overcome some of the more important problems discussed above. This 
suggests that empirical analysis based on stock price data will have a desirable degree of empirical 
significance, and will not depend on incorrect conceptual specifications and empirical counterparts of the 
economic concepts of interest. And since stock prices are often the only conceptually appropriate measure 
of financial performance, it seems appropriate to frame our methodology, wherever possible, in terms of 
stock market performance. The following section will show that there are also sound economic reasons, 
apart from those related to stock price data, for basing our empirical approach on the stock market. 
4. THE APPROPRIATE EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY: CONGLOMERATE 
DIVERSIFICATION AS PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT 
Conglomerate diversification is a business strategy designed to support a firm's operations in a variety of 
horizontally unrelated industries. Therefore, important parallels may be detected between the horizontal 
diversification decisions of conglomerates and the ordinary portfolio investment strategies of individual 
investors. This "portfolio management" approach has a long history, and dates back to the original 
empirical studies of conglomerate diversification-notably Hall and Weiss, 1967; Smith and Shreiner, 
1969; Levy and Sarnat, 1970; Weston and Mansinghka, 1971; Weston, Smith and Shrieves, 1972; 
Melicher and Rush, 1973; and Mason and Goudzwaard, 1976. These authors generally take the approach 
of evaluating conglomerate performance within the framework of portfolio management that was 
developing at the time. The portfolio approach was drawn, as has been shown, from contemporary 
developments in general portfolio theory, and suggested that the conglomerate was a natural subject for 
general portfolio analysis. Note that our earlier criticisms of the general portfolio approach to the 
performance of conglomerate firms were based on the prevailing assumptions that conglomerates invest 
for the same reasons as the ordinary stock market investor, including portfolio coinsurance. For reasons 
explained above, this argument will not be made here. Instead, it may be argued only that the conglomerate 
may be seen to invest in essentially the same way as the ordinary portfolio investor. The economic rationale 
behind this approach may be framed as follows. 
Investment decisions involve a choice among the various asset classes, ranging from purely material assets 
(such as land, buildings, and plant and machinery) to purely financial assets (such as cash, equity, and 












investors may be identified, including "portfolio" investors who typically consider investments only in 
financial assets, and "real" investors who typically consider investments only in physical assets. Clearly, 
the division will not always be so neat, but for our purposes the distinction will be useful. The ordinary 
investor's portfolio decisions may be framed, for example, as an optimisation problem among financial 
assets, namely cash, equity, and bonds. The conglomerate's investment decisions, by contrast, involve a 
choice among various industries and sectors. These observations follow immediately from the definitions 
of "portfolio", namely a bundle of financial assets drawn exclusively from the money and capital markets, 
and "conglomerate'', namely a bundle of firms drawn exclusively from horizontally unrelated industries. 
The appropriate proportions of ~ssets in a portfolio will be determined by the risk profile of the portfolio 
investor, together with the expected risk-return profiles of the different financial assets (Lintner, 1971). 
For a conglomerate, these profiles will determine, by contrast, the desired mix of industry or sectoral 
exposures in the conglomerate portfolio. Thus, conglomerates may be seen as a subset of the full set or 
universe of portfolio investors. In particular, ordinary portfolio investments may be drawn from the 
universe of assets, whereas conglomerate investments are drawn exclusively from different industries or 
sectors (Caves, 1980). Thus, given the relative logical positions of the concepts "portfolio" and 
"conglomerate", it will be appropriate on many occasions to evaluate conglomerate performance on the 
same basis that portfolio performance would normally be evaluated for any investor. 
This is not to say that conglomerates are indistinguishable from ordinary portfolio investors. Firstly, 
conglomerates are primarily concerned with sectoral investments, since horizontal diversification strategies 
are devised solely on the basis of the conglomerate's desired levels of participation in various horizontally 
unrelated sectors or industries. Thus, conglomerates may readily be separated from firms that do not base 
their portfolio strategies solely on the identity of sectors or industries, for example money market funds 
and narrow investment trusts. Secondly, conglomerates are concerned exclusively with equity investments, 
that is, claims to participate directly in profits as opposed, say, to rentals or interest. Thus, regardless of 
whether a conglomerate takes up a stock market investment in listed corporations, or private investments 
in unlisted corporations, or even whether the conglomerate maintains its structure as a system of integrated 
divisions, the conglomerate will nonetheless always maintain an equity stake in the profits of an 
economically distinct business unit. This definition of a conglomerate excludes the possibility that other 
firms-for example banks, which lend money to credit-worthy investors in any and all industries-will 
be classified as conglomerates. 
Thus, given only these limitations-that the basis for a conglomerate's portfolio selection is restricted to 
a sectoral investment strategy; and also that this strategy is further limited to equity investments-a 
conglomerate's portfolio performance may be evaluated on the same basis as historical performance would 












involved in essentially similar, underlying investment strategies. In particular, the ordinary stock market 
investor's portfolio decision typically involves calculated speculation about three variables-the universe 
of international stock markets in which investments may be made; the various sectors or industries within 
each stock market; and the individual firms within each sector. 1 In terms of the above conception of the 
term, a conglomerate faces precisely the same decisions. 
A comparative basis has therefore been established on which to evaluate the historical performance of 
conglomerate diversification strategies. The portfolio investment decisions for any conglomerate-like 
those for any domestic equity investor-may be reduced to the following four distinct steps (Livingstone, 
1977), which may be explained with the aid of the following simple specification. 
Y, = , + , · X;, + ; · X,, + ,, 
where Y, represents portfolio returns in period t; X,, is a vector of all possible sectoral investments; X, is 
a vector of all possible firm-level investments within each sector; , and , are vectors of portfolio weights; 
and , is a classical error term. Using this specification, it seems reasonable to reduce the investor's 
portfolio decisions to essentially four components. First, the investor must identify the sectors in which to 
invest (x, X,,), based on his informed expectation about the future performance of the different sectors. (In 
the following analysis, this component of the overall portfolio decision will be termed the "sectoral 
identification" decision, on account of the investor's responsibility to identify-and subsequently to 
select-a particular sector from those available.) Secondly, he must determine his desired level of exposure 
to the various sectors ( ,), that is, the proportions of available wealth that he will devote to each sector. 
(This may be termed the "sectoral allocation" decision.) Thirdly, from the identified sectors, the investor 
must determine the firms in which to invest (x, X,,), based on his expectations about the relative 
performance of the different firms within each sector. (This may be termed the "firm identification" 
decision.) Finally, from the identified firms, the investor must determine the desired level of exposure to 
the different earmarked firms in the various selected sectors ( ,), that is, the proportions of available wealth 
that he will devote to each identified firm. (This may be termed the "firm allocation" decision.) Thus, a 
distinction may be drawn between industry-level and firm-level decisions, and further between 
identification and allocation decisions. 
1 In the following analysis we will be concerned exclusively with domestic equity portfolios. That is, the 
first variable in an equity investor's portfolio decision - the universe of international equity markets -
will be ignored in the following analysis. Without limiting the general applicability of our conclusions, this 













The distinction drawn above between the different investment decisions may at first appear to be 
insignificant. The following sections will show how this specification defines our empirical methodology. 
But for the moment we should note only that, by differentiating between the different portfolio decisions, 
we are simultaneously able to differentiate in an empirically quantifiable way the returns that accrue to a 
particular firm purely on account of its conglomerate, monopolistic, and pyramid corporate strategies. For 
example, conglomerate strategies of horizontal diversification are fully specified by the sector and firm 
identification decisions. That is, horizontal diversification strategies constitute portfolio diversification in 
much the same way thjlt an individual's equity portfolio strategy will normally be one of investment 
diversification-identifying (that is, locating or isolating) the particular firms and sectors which are 
expected to yield superior returns in the future. Thus, for a conglomerate, the portfolio investment decision 
reduces to identifying the sector or industry in which an investment will be made (the sectoral 
identification decision1d identifying the firms within each sector or industry in which to invest (the firm 
l
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le remainmg detiS"ions-the proportion of wealth devoted to the various sectors (the sectoral allocation 
decision) and the portfolio's relative exposures to the various firms within each sector (the firm allocation 
decision)-correspond more closely with the decisions that face monopolies and pyramids than 
conglomerates. A pyramid, for example, like any other corporate control mechanism, faces a firm-level 
portfolio allocation1..-decision. That is, a decision to exercise control over the affairs, operations, and 
objectives of a firm is simultaneously a decision to hold a particular fraction of the firm's outstanding 
equity shares (usually an effective majority) rather than any other fraction (especially a minority). So 
portfolio allocation and pyramid control strategies may both be devised as a decision to commit a particular 
fraction of available wealth-rather than any other fraction of wealth to a given firm. The discontinuity 
in returns theoretically expected from the benefits of corporate control-framed as a decision to hold a 
majority of a particular firm's issued equity, rather than a minority stake-introduces the issue of strategic 
portfolio concentration into the pyramid's decision making framework, which is obviously distinct from 
the issue of portfolio diversification. Thus, the distinctions proposed above allow us to differentiate-for 
the moment conceptually, but later also empirically-between conglomerate returns and pyramid returns, 
even ifthe two different returns components exist within the same firm. 
In contrast to conglomerate and pyramid strategies, a monopolist faces a sector or industry level portfolio 
allocation decision. That is, a monopolist's strategy may be devised as a decision to commit a particular 
fraction of aggregate wealth-rather than any other fraction of wealth-to a given industry. That is, the 
benefits that accrue to the monopolist purely on account of his decision to invest in a strategic proportion 
of an industry's available equity-in particular, the pure monopolist will usually acquire the industry's 












investment decision making framework, specifically at the industry level. This, too, is distinct from the 
conglomerate's decision to diversify his investments across the various industries, and the pyramid's 
decision to concentrate his investments in particular firms. 
5. AN EMPIRICAL DECOMPOSITION OF SOUTH AFRICAN BREWERIES' HISTORICAL 
FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
As noted above, a distinction between firm-level and industry-level investment decisions, and between 
allocation and identification investment decisions, may appear to be insignificant. But as will be explained 
in greater detail below, this characterisation of equity portfolio investment decisions is useful because it 
separates the decisions related exclusively to conglomerate diversification strategies (namely, sector and 
firm identification decisions) from the decisions related exclusively to pyramids and other corporate control 
mechanisms (namely, the firm allocation decision) and also from decisions related exclusively to 
monopolistic behaviour (the sectoral allocation decision). Given this characterisation, it is a relatively 
simple empirical matter to isolate the different elements, as defined, of a particular firm's financial 
performance. 
The following sections use a simple empirical technique to decompose SAB's stock market returns into 
the four different components identified above. This approach has the advantage of leading the analysis 
directly to a quantitative estimate of the contributions of conglomerate, monopolistic and corporate control 
strategies to the historical financial performance of the SAB group. For an economic precedent to this 
broad approach, see Schmalensee 's (1985) conceptually similar application, in a different area, of the 
distinction between "firm", "market", and "industry" effects on corporate profitability. 
5.1 THE SECTORAL IDENTIFICATION DECISION 
The economic meaning of sectoral (as opposed to firm) decisions has already been suggested, and also 
identification (as opposed to allocation) decisions. The class of portfolio investment strategies given 
exclusively by sectoral identification decisions may be explained more precisely as follows. For various 
reasons, the performance of different firms within the same industry will correspond more closely, on 
average, than the performance of firms within different industries (Nightingale, 197 8). Macroeconomic 
factors, for example, are expected to affect most sectors in the economy; but firms within a particular sector 
will be affected by these macroeconomic factors in much the same way, purely on account of the 
asymmetric impact across sectors of any given macroeconomic factor. Thus, although the real interest rate 
environment-a macroeconomic factor-is expected to affect all firms in the economy, all banks-as 
participants with other deposit-taking institutions in the financial services industry-are expected to be 












In brief, then, a common "industry effect" might be expected to operate on the profitability and 
performance of various firms within a particular industry or, equivalently, within a particular stock market 
sector. And to the extent that this "industry effect" is expected to be significant, an important decision for 
any equity investor is the appropriate sector in which to invest his wealth. This decision was referred to 
earlier as the sectoral identification decision. For a conglomerate, the identical decision is involved in 
selecting the industry in which to invest-except that the investment will usually occur on a significantly 
larger scale. 
The present section evaluates the impact of industry effects on SAB 's profitability by isolating the sectoral 
identification decision from historical data. As a first step, two indices may be constructed. The first index 
is simply the overall stock market index, and measures the aggregate performance of the various stock 
market sectors weighted statistically by the market capitalisation of each sector. 2 In a sense, this index may 
be regarded as a 'control' index, since it tracks the performance of a completely neutral sectoral investment 
strategy. 
Investments made in accordance with the overall market index are 'neutral' in two important respects. 
Firstly, the passive investment strategy blindly includes all the sectors that comprise the overall market 
index. Thus, the sectoral identification decision may be framed as the decision to invest in a subset of the 
overall market index, excluding those sectors which are expected to perform relatively poorly, and 
including only those sectors which are expected to perform relatively well. Secondly, the neutral 
investment strategy will use the market capitalisation weightings of the various sectors. Thus, the sectoral 
allocation decision may be devised as the decision to deviate from the market capitalisation weights 
implicit in the calculation of the overall market index, increasing the portfolio's exposure to the better-
performing sectors selected by the sectoral ident fication decision, and reducing the exposure to the poorer-
performing sectors. In sum, the overall stock market index is neutral in two distinct senses, and allows for 
a "purely" passive investment strategy by excluding both the sectoral identification and sectoral allocation 
decisions. 
The second index is calculated in the same way as the overall index, but includes only those sectors in 
which SAB has listed portfolio investments, That is, while the first index is simply the market index, this 
index takes as its starting point the overall market index; goes on to exclude all sectors in which SAB does 
not have listed equity investments; and leaves the market capitalisation weights-not SAB's actual 
2 The overall market index is not actually calculated using market capitalisation weights. It is calculated, 
instead, by a complex variant of statistical cluster analysis. However, for our purposes, it will not be 
incorrect to view the market index as weighted by market capitalisation, since the market index we will 
consider below is calculated from a sample of the top 80 shares on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 












historical weights-to define the relative proportions invested in the various sectors. Thus, the sectoral 
investment strategy implied by the second index is no longer purely passive, since some sectors which are 
included in the market portfolio (our control index) will not appear in our simulation of SAB 's portfolio. 
Note that the sectoral investment strategy remains a passive one in terms of the weightings assigned to the 
various assets. Thus, our second index makes allowance only for the fact that SAB has made a judgment 
to exclude certain sectors from its portfolio. 
To see how this is possible, consider that so far as the sector weights are concerned, the use of market 
capitalisation weights is maintained when calculating the 'control' index. Market capitalisation weights 
reflect, at least in part, the market's expectations about the relative prospects of the various sectors. Thus, 
any deviation from this passive system of weightings will imply a set of expectations which differ from 
the aggregate market expectation and, therefore, a non-neutral sectoral allocation strategy. But for the 
moment, the analysis is concerned exclusively with the impact on SAB 's returns of a non-neutral sectoral 
identification decision. Thus, a non-neutral sectoral allocation decision may be 'controlled' by adopting 
the same weighting system employed by the overall market index. In effect, the analysis aims to avoid 
introducing an asymmetry between the market's expectations of future relative performance (given by 
market capitalisation weights) and SAB 's expectations (as revealed by the historic weights in SAB 's 
portfolio of listed investments), for this would imply a non-neutral sectoral allocation strategy. 
The effect of contrasting these two indices will be to isolate, in an empirically quantifiable way, the impact 
on SAB's profitability of the group's historical sectoral identification decisions. Since returns from the 
'control' portfolio or index represent the returns available from a passive investment strategy, and since 
returns from the 'alternative' portfolio represent the returns available from an active investment 
identification strategy, the difference between the two series of historical returns may be seen as a historical 
measure of the excess returns which flow purely from a decision to deviate from the investment strategy 
given by the overall market index. These excess returns may, in turn, be framed as SAB's historical skill 
in identifying those sectors which are profitable exclusively on account of their positive industry effect. 
More precisely, this difference represents the aggregate benefits which flow from forsaking the neutral 
sectoral investment strategy implied by the overall index-by simultaneously eliminating selected sectors 
from the market portfolio, and maintaining the market's stance about the market's implicit sectoral 
weights. 
The approach outlined above may appear to be unnecessarily elaborate. Certainly, this particular empirical 
approach is intricate, as may be seen from our definitions of the 'control' and 'alternative' indexes. But 
the intricate nature of the approach belies an important advantage for our analysis. Note, for example, that 
the dissertation is concerned exclusively with a particular firm, as opposed, say, to an industry-wide or 












undesirable feature of many studies in this area that they are concerned with industry-wide 
aggregations of what are essentially firm-specific phenomena. But the firm-specific nature of this 
study appears to present special empirical problems, particularly if conclusions drawn from South 
African Breweries-as the subject of our analysis-are to be used when offering more general 
conclusions about the broader phenomena of monopolistic behaviour, conglomerate diversification, 
and corporate control. 
However, an interesting feature of the empirical method outlined above is that it does not rely on 
direct comparisons with other firms. In particular, it will not be necessary to contrast the patterns 
which emerge from the two indices described above with patterns from other firms. This is so for two 
reasons. Firstly, by the peculiar definition of our indices, we have been able to isolate the particular 
advantages that flow to conglomerate firms. Comparisons with non-conglomerate firms will therefore 
be meaningless. Since the empirical method described above was devised precisely to avoid this 
necessity, many of the problems implicit in comparative techniques, and therefore many of the 
criticisms that may be raised against such an approach, have effectively been overcome. Secondly, by 
the strategic choice of SAB as the research object, the analysis has largely ensured that the results 
will be broadly applicable to conglomerates in general. The general substance of this approach may 
be seen by considering the previous chapter, which selected SAB from the single most concentrated 
industry in South Africa. This selection proved extremely useful for our analysis, since it drove home 
the point that--even for the country's most concentrated industry-industrial concentration and 
monopolistic behaviour are causally independent phenomena. The selection of SAB as one of South 
Africa's biggest and most profitable conglomerates serves a similar function. 
Figure 2 presents percent changes in the above indices, and the arithmetic difference between them. 
FIGURE 2. 'INDUSTRY' EFFECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICAN BREWERIES, 1980 - 1996. 
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Figure 2 indicates that the returns to SAB's identified or "ear-marked" sectors-that is, the sectors in 
which SAB has historically made various strategic investments-consistently exceed the overall market 
or 'control' index returns. For example, Figure 2 shows that the difference between the returns available 
from the 'control' and 'alternative' indices is consistently-almost universally-positive. Jn particular, it 
may be concluded from Figure 2 that SAB's 'sectoral identification' skills have had a distinct positive 
impact of SAB's historical financial performance. As will be seen below, when the advantages that flow 
from SAB's sectoral identification skills are quantified, pure sectoral identification decisions alone have 
historically contributed roughly 45%-very nearly half-of the SAB group's total stock market 
performance between 1980 and 1996. This appears to suggest that SAB has a distinct aptitude for 
identifying 'strategic' sectoral investments-sectors which are consistently profitable relative to the 
universe of possible sectors. For the moment, it will be sufficient to note only that this ability is critical to 
a strategy of conglomerate diversification. Since conglomerates are business enterprises with selected 
investments in a variety of horizontally unrelated industries, the ability to make historically 
significant-and more importantly, consistently profitable-selections from the total set of all industries 
would imply that conglomerate diversification has, in its own right, a distinctly positive impact on financial 
performance. 
5.2 THE SECTORAL ALLOCATION DECISION 
Related to the sectoral identification decision discussed above, is a decision about the relative portfolio 
allocation among sectors. A distinction may be drawn between these two decisions. The sectoral 
identification decision, for example, determines which sectors are potential candidates for investment, 
while the sectoral allocation decision detennines the proportion of wealth which will be committed to any 
given sector. This distinction would not ordinarily be important, since it would appear that the sectoral 
identification and sectoral allocation decisions are implied by each other. For example, a decision to 
commit a particular proportion of wealth to a particular sector is simultaneously a decision to invest in that 
sector. 
However, the distinction between sectoral identification and sectoral allocation decisions is more than 
technically significant when the analysis is concerned with investors who have considerable wealth 
available for investment, such as SAB. In such a case, the sectoral allocation decision may effectively be 
framed as a choice between acquiring a nominal stake in an identified or 'candidate' sector, and acquiring 
a significant equity stake in that sector. And the decision to dominate the available (public and private) 
equity in a particular industry or market will, of course, correspond in the extreme case with the usual 












characterised by its dominance of industry supply, it may readily be seen that this kind of dominance 
implies also a dominance of total industry equity. Thus, for South African Breweries-by far the dominant 
firm in its industry-the distinction between sectoral identification and sectoral allocation decisions 
becomes extremely important. 
The present section examines the impact on SAB's financial performance of variations in its equity 
concentrations in the various sectors by isolating the sectoral allocation decision from historical data. Once 
again, the previous approach is maintained. The approach constructs two indices, a 'control' index and the 
alternative index or 'experiment'. Both indices are performance composites of the sectors in which SAB 
has listed portfolio investments. However, the first index-the 'alternative' index-assigns actual historical 
weights to the various sectors in SAB's portfolio; in constructing this index, SAB's actual historical 
exposures to the various industries in its portfolio are calculated and used. The second index-the 'control' 
index-assigns equal weights to the different sectoral indices; this index 'controls' for the impact of 
asymmetric expectations about the relative future performance of the various sectors. But note that in both 
cases, data are only considered for those sectors in which SAB has made portfolio i vestments. That is, 
the approach aims to isolate the historical difference between equally-weighted and differently-weighted 
portfolio investments.3 Thus, essentially the same method is followed in the present section as was adopted 
in the previous section, except that the sectoral allocation decision is isolated here, not the sectoral 
identification decision. The difference between the returns from the two indices devised above represents 
the benefits of maintaining a particular sectoral allocation, relative to the alternative equal (neutral) 
allocation. 
The advantages that flow from non-neutral investment allocation strategies are presented in Figure 3. 
3 Note that we use equal weights, and not market capitalisation weights, when calculating the control 
index. This approach introduces a "true" neutrality in the control index, since as we have seen above, 














FIGURE 3. RETURNS TO VARIATIONS IN SECTORAL ALLOCATION 
FOR SOUTH AFRICAN BREWERIES, 1980 - 1996. 
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An interesting feature of Figure 3 is the close correspondence between returns realised from the 
actual historical index (using actual sectoral weights) and the control index (equal sectoral weights). 
As may be seen, the two indexes track one another fairly closely. The close correspondence between 
these indices suggests that SAB' s financial performance is determined largely independently of the 
investment weighting in each sector, since Figure 3 suggests that variations in the sectoral allocation 
do not contribute in a meaningful way to the firm's overall returns. In fact, a later section estimates 
that around 11 % of SAB 's historical financial performance may be explained directly by the sectoral 
allocation decision described above. 
This does not appear to be an intuitively appealing conclusion. How is it possible, for example, that a 
firm's investment in a group of individual sectors is important, and simultaneously that the firm's 
individual equity commitments to these firms is substantially irrelevant? The point to be made here is 
that the different assets that constitute SAB 's portfolio are essentially "substitutable", since the 
relative weightings attached to the individual components of the portfolio do not appear to make a 
significant overall contribution to total historical returns. That is, the individual assets within SAB' s 
portfolio appear to have similar returns profiles over time, accounting for the insignificant 
contribution to returns that may be expected from simple variations in the portfolio weights of the 
different firms. Indeed, it may be known that this is the case a priori, given the overall preponderance 
of the aggregate market effect on different equity return streams. 
The result derived above lS actually intuitively appealing, since SAB should be 
expected to impose a selection process on the individual candidates for investment, 
or at least expect the market to make such a selection m the aggregate, particularly 












assets are bound to the market returns cycle, substantially similar, or at least similarly positive. That is, 
while SAB is not an entity on its, but rather composed of a mass of contracts between individuals, it will 
in the aggregate behave as an individual, with a single schedule of preferences for investments, based on 
the competition of the various factors of production within the firm. In terms of this single preference 
schedule, SAB will be expected to pursue consistently a certain class or range of investments, with similar 
risk and return profiles, and so on. In the process, the weighting attached to any particular investment will 
make little difference for aggregate returns. On account of SAB's selection criteria for investments, similar, 
or similarly positive, investment returns will be sought, and these will be combined in almost arbitrary 
proportions to form a single profile of portfolio returns, based on essentially similar individual investments. 
This conclusion may immediately be seen to be a significant one, whatever the particular reasons for the 
historical irrelevance of SAB 's portfolio weighting strategy. The latter point, at least, is a purely empirical 
matter, but outside the scope of our immediate interest. As noted above, the sectoral allocation decision 
may effectively be framed as a choice between acquiring a nominal stake in a candidate sector, and 
acquiring a significant equity stake in that sector. Thus, the benefits which accrue to SAB as a direct result 
of its decision to invest a significant fraction in any particular industry-as opposed to the 'control index' 
decision of equal fractions in each industry-appear to be relatively small. Indeed, the historical financial 
benefits which accrue to SAB purely from following a particular conglomerate diversification strategy 
appear to dominate almost completely the advantages which flow from pursuing investments purely on the 
basis of strategic equity concentrations in the various industries. 
The following conclusions may be drawn from this result. Firstly, it appears that the ability to identify 
strategic industries-quite independently of the proportions of aggregate wealth devoted to that 
industry-is by far the more significant factor in determining total historical financial returns. Secondly, 
this result appears to confirm our conclusion in an earlier chapter that SAB's position as sole supplier in 
the South African malt beer industry does not, on its own, impact in a substantially positive way on the 
firm's profitability. In particular, the analysis has suggested that SAB's decision to commit a particular 
proportion of wealth to, say, the malt beer industry--even capturing the whole equity of the industry-is 
dominated by the prior decision to invest in that industry in the first place. This observation leads us to 
suggest, in turn, that SAB's conglomerate diversification decisions may be seen as part of a broader interest 
in capturing a strategic investment, rather than a particular fraction of the equity of that investment, 
particularly on account of the small empirical estimates reported here of the returns to be expected from 
monopolistic or "industry dominating" behaviour. 
Thirdly, since the ability and foresight necessary to identify strategic industries are normally associated 
with entrepreneurial abilities, the following tentative conclusion, further supported below, may be offered: 












talent. In particular, there do not appear to be good reasons to suspect that the activities of a highly talented 
entrepreneur should be limited to a particular industry. This follows immediately from the above 
conception of entrepreneurial ability, namely a skill in identifying in advance strategically successful 
industries. Thus, the preceding analysis suggests the tentative general position that the likelihood that a 
conglomerate business format of individually successful components will emerge, is a distinctly positive 
function of the scope of any given entrepreneur's skills (Gerson, 1992). 
5.3 THE FIRM IDENTIFICATION DECISION 
At this point, the analysis has investigated two of the elements of SAB 's historical financial performance. 
The first element of SAB's profitability is related directly to the firm's strategy of conglomerate 
diversification, while the second element is related to an hypothesised strategy of strategic equity 
concentrations in various industries. The analysis suggested, in particular, that the first element, termed 
'sectoral identification', has had a distinctly positive impact on SAB's historical financial performance. 
In particular, the existence of a significant industry effect suggests that SAB has had a special historical 
ability to identify relatively profitable industries. The analysis found, in addition, that the second element 
of SAB's profitability, termed 'sectoral allocation', has had a relatively small impact on SAB's historical 
financial performance. The insignificant "market" effect suggests, in line with our conclusions in an earlier 
chapter, that SAB's profitability does not depend to any extraordinary extent on its concentration within 
various industries. 
But up to this point, our analysis has considered only sectoral decisions, that is, decisions relating to the 
identification of various sectors, and the allocation of wealth among these sectors. The present section 
identifies a third element of SAB's profitability. In particular, the analysis aims to estimate the historical 
benefits that have accrued to SAB purely as a result of its firm identification decisions. 
As noted above, the significance of an overall industry effect suggests that the performance of firms will 
correspond more closely within a particular industry or sector than within the market as a whole. This 
suggests that a particular firm's profitability will at least to some extent be composed of the profitability 
profiles of firms in the same industry. But some firms will obviously outperform other firms, even within 
the same industry. That is, although industry effects are significant, there are also "firm-specific" 
factors-such as the quality and expertise of one firm's management, ratherthan the managerial expertise 
of another firm-that impact on a firm's profitability. In this section, following the mode of empirical 
analysis introduced above, two indices are constructed to isolate the impact of firm specific influences on 
SAB 's profitability. 
The first index represents SAB's actual stock price returns, derived in a straightforward way from 












performance derived from the sectors in which SAB maintains listed investments. Thus, the second 
index merely substitutes for each of SAB' s investments in a particular firm, an equivalent investment 
in the corresponding sector. The difference between these two indices may be regarded as the 
benefits which accrue to SAB on account of its decision to invest in a particular firm within a given 
sector (given by the firms in which SAB has actually maintained investments), rather than the 
average firm within that sector (given by the 'average' firm, or by proxy the sector index itself). 
Returns available from these indices are presented in Figure 4. 














Figure 4 indicates that firm-specific effects, as identified by the empirical procedure outlined above, 
is consistently positive, although this effect is not quite as regular in its impact on SAB's profitability 
as the industry effect observed earlier. For example, SAB's firm-specific returns appear to be 
(almost) universally positive between 1980 and 1988, while there appears to be a smaller (but on 
average significantly positive) firm specific effect between 1988 and 1996. And over the full period, 
the firm specific effect for SAB appears to be generally positive. Thus, in addition to SAB's distinct 
historical ability to identify strategic sectoral investments, there appears to be a secondary ability to 
identify strategic firms, that is, firms which are consistently profitable relative to the population of 
firms in the same sector or industry. Indeed, the following section estimates that around 44%-very 
nearly half-of the SAB group's total historical financial performance may be attributed to firm 
specific factors. Thus, the firm identification decision appears to have similarly crucial implications 
for SAB's historical financial performance as the sectoral identification decision. 
But despite the similarities between these two effects, it is important to maintain a distinction 












here. For our purposes, the most important difference may be framed as follows. The benefits (or costs) 
that result from sectoral identification are not transferable across industries, since successful sectoral 
identification decisions (or significantly positive "industry" effects) imply a commitment to the identified 
or "ear-marked" industries. That is, once a decision has been made to invest in a particular sector, and once 
a proportion of wealth has been allocated to that industry, the decision may be taken as a final commitment, 
or a fixed stream of benefits or costs. Of course, the investor will subsequently be able to avoid a negative 
industry effect, for example by disposing of his equity investment in the industry. But a fixed stream of 
net costs (as opposed to net benefits) will be found only in an industry undergoing natural decline (as 
opposed to an "emerging" industry). And a sectoral identification strategy will aim to avoid in its selection 
of successful industries those which are in a process of natural decline, seeking instead to concentrate 
investments in strategically successful industries. 
Thus, a successful sectoral identification strategy is expected to yield not only a positive stream of benefits; 
the benefit stream will also be consistently positive. The consistency of an industry effect derives, of 
course, from the "inherent" profitability of the selected sectors relative to other, less profitable sectors. 
Since a profitable industry will not usually be expected to be profitable at one time, and unprofitable soon 
after, and thereafter profitable again, the industry effect will usually be consistent. Indeed, this is the 
pattern detected in Figure I above, which indicates clearly the consistency of South African Breweries' 
positive industry effect. Responsibility for this commitment, of course, must ultimately rest with the 
founders of SAB, who made the decision to invest in the South African malt beer industry more than I 00 
years ago. 
But unlike industry factors, there appears to be no similar commitment, nor then consistency, for firm-
specific factors. In particular, firm specific factors, unlike industry factors, an~ transferable between 
companies and industries, at least to a larger extent than industry factors. That is, the boundaries of the firm 
or industry will not represent a restriction on the portability of the stream ofreturns derived from firm-
specific factors, such as the quality and expertise of the firm's management. This is not to suggest, of 
course, that managerial expertise is an "amorphous substance ... which can be applied with equal success 
to totally unrelated lines of business" (Mueller, 1973). However, it is an indication of the special ability 
that good managernent will usually have to manage a bundle of diverse resources, whether those resources 
are devised as physical capital or human labour; or whether they are regarded as the physical capital of a 
malt brewery or the human labour of a television network. Therefore, it will not be argued, as Chandler 
(1977) does, that "because multidivisional firms create a level of management specifically concerned with 
the coordination of specialised decisions, they are inherently more efficient and thus more profitable than 












verification. The less controversial claim will be made, here, that to the extent these special abilities exist, 
the advantages that flow from them will be more freely transferable across different firms. 
But since firm-specific factors, such as managerial expertise, are transferable among firms and sectors, they 
may over any extended period of time be positive or negative, or vice versa, and will therefore not be 
necessarily consistent. In some circumstances, for example, good management will leave a particular firm 
in search of other opportunities. In other circumstances, a poor quality of management may persist in the 
firm for some extended period of time. There is therefore nothing implicit in the nature of firm-specific 
factors which suggests that they will have a durable or consistent impact on the firm's profitability. Instead, 
it might be expected that certain periods are characterised by positive firm specific factors-such as a 
sustained period of good management-while other periods are characterised by negative firm specific 
factors. Thus, in contrast with industry effects, there do not seem to be compelling reasons to expect that 
firm effects will be consistently positive, or consistently negative. 
Now if we turn again to Figure 4, it may be seen that firm-specific factors for the SAB group have been 
consistently positive, except for two brief occasions in 1991 and 1994. And even though the returns that 
accrued to SAB from firm specific factors were distinctly higher, on average, between 1980 and 1988 than 
over the period between 1991 and 1995, firm-specific returns-which, as will be seen below, account for 
roughly one-half of the SAB group's total historical returns-have been generally positive over a large part 
of the full period. The significance of these factors, on average, suggests that firm effects are an integral 
component of SAB's program of conglomerate diversification. In particular, the conglomerate may have 
a useful ability to encourage or ensure a consistent stream of firm-specific benefits. To use managerial 
expertise as an example, the conglomerate may be able to achieve a historically consistent and significantly 
positive "firm" effect by facilitating the transfer among subsidiaries of the calibre, quality and expertise 
of management, or in some way by avoiding poor management altogether. The same result would appear 
to apply to other firm-specific factors, which are not restricted exclusively to managerial expertise. 
Thus, quite apart from the identity of the firm specific factor, it would appear, in general, that successful 
conglomerate diversification strategies-such as the one followed by South African Breweries--<:apture 
in their returns (presumably because they facilitate in their operations) the inter-firm and inter-industry 
distribution of significant, positive firm specific factors. This observation suggests that an ordinary stock 
market investor, having invested in a portfolio of representative or randomly selected firms in the same 
sectors as SAB, would obtain lower returns than the returns available from a direct investment in SAB's 
stock. Obviously, the returns from a direct investment in SAB's shares will be different from the returns 
obtained from a simulated portfolio of SAB's listed investments, purely because the former includes the 
highly profitable, unlisted malt beer division. But quite apart from SAB's beer division, and abstracting 












direct investment in an SAB share appears to include SAB's peculiar ability to identify strategic firms. This 
advantage would not appear to be possible, of course, without a direct investment in SAB itself. 
5.4 THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE FOR CONGLOMERATE DIVERSIFICATION 
Despite our decision throughout the dissertation to focus on a particular firm, the empirical analysis in the 
preceding sections has been able to suggest a series of general results about successful conglomerate 
diversification strategies, as typified by SAB. In particular, the empirical analysis in the preceding sections 
suggests that the economic rationale for conglomerate diversification consists of at least two elements. 
TABLE 1. COMPOSITION OF SAB'S CONGLOMERATE RETURNS, 1980-1996. 
(proportion of total conglomerate-type returns in parentheses) 
Year 
Conglomerate returns Monopoly returns Total 
Industry effect Firm-specific effect Sector allocation effect returns 
1980-85 8.7 (31%) 16.2 (57%) 3.5 (12%) 28.4 (100%) 
1968-90 16.1 (47%) 16.6 (48%) 1.8 (5%) 34.4 (100%) 
1991-96 13.2 (65%) 3.6 (18%) 3.4 (17%) 20.2 (100%) 
Average 12.4 (45%) 12.1 (44%) 3.0 (11%) 27.5 (100%) 
Firstly, the decision-making body responsible for the portfolio identification and allocation decisions 
within the conglomerate appears to have a special ability to identify strategic sectors, that is, sectors which 
have a distinct potential in advance for superior profitability, and which actually produce in retrospect 
superior financial performance. This conclusion may be confirmed in Table 1, which summarises 
numerically the historical data presented in Figures 2 to 4. 
The following observations may be drawn from Table 1. Firstly, Table 1 suggests that the SAB group's 
special sectoral identification ability, which may be regarded as a positive "industry" effect, has historically 
been highly significant. Between 1980 and 1996, for example, the industry effect contributed on average 
around 45% to the SAB group's total returns. This suggests that almost one-half of the SAB group's 
historical returns may be attributed to its ability to identify "strategic" industries. 
Secondly, Table I indicates that within each of SAB's strategic industries, SAB appears to have the 
additional ability to identify "strategic" firms-those firms which have a distinct potential for superior 
financial performance. This ability on the part of SAB's management, which may be regarded as positive 
"firm specific" effects, is at least as significant as the "industry" effect. Table 1 indicates from historical 













Thirdly, it may also be noted from Table 1 that the significance of SAB 's "industry" effect has increased 
closely in line with dramatic increases in the group's conglomerate merger activity. For example, SAB 
made investments in only 4 distinct companies between 1895 and 1980-namely, Southern Sun (1969), 
Afcol (1973), OK Bazaars (1974), and Coca-Cola (1977). During the period considered in Table 1, SAB 
made significant horizontal expansions into the operations of 8 different companies-Scotts ( 1981 ), Ed gars 
(1982), Appletiser (1982), Sun International (1984), Ceres (1986), Lion Match (1987), Da Gama textiles 
(1989), and Plate Glass (1992). It should only be noted that these observations are directly linked, in a pure 
causal sense: Firstly, we have defined a "conglomerate" as a business enterprise which maintains 
operations in various horizontally unrelated industries. Secondly, our empirical methodology is devised 
in a way that measures the benefits that flow from maintaining investments in a variety of horizontally 
unrelated industries. It is not an unexpected result, therefore, that SAB's historical "industry" effect has 
increased neatly with the group's expansion into a broader range of industrial enterprises. After all, the 
preceding analysis suggests that SAB has a historical ability to identify strategically successful industries. 
Finally, Table 1 indicates that the 'sector allocation' effect has historically been a relatively insignificant 
determinant of SAB 's returns. This observation suggests that deliberate variations in such factors as the 
degree of equity participation in a particular industry-which for large investments will correspond closely 
with the degree of industry concentration-do not enter into the determination of SAB 's profitability in 
a significant way. Table 1 indicates, for example, that this effect contributed ai'ound 11 % to SAB's total 
returns between 1980 and 1996. And as Figure 3 has shown, these returns are variable and highly 
inconsistent, which suggests that they may be used by SAB in a strategically significant way only with 
extreme difficulty. 
Taken together, Table 1 suggests that SAB's ndustry and firm-specific effects account for roughly 90 
percent of the group's historical performance as a conglomerate. It may be noted, by contrast, that the 
sector allocation effect has historically contributed around l 0 percent to the SAB group's historical 
performance. This suggests that decisions about the extent of a conglomerate's participation in a particular 
industry-for extremely large investments this may be expected to correspond with the level of industry 
concentration-contribute substantially less to overall conglomerate performance. That is, the most 
impo~ant contributors to profitability appear to be involved with identifying and selecting strategic firms 
and strategic industries. The point was made earlier, for example, that the ability and foresight necessary 
to identify strategic industries are normally associated with entrepreneurial abilities; and that the 
conglomerate may have a useful ability to encourage or ensure a consistent stream of firm-specific benefits 
within its various associated businesses. The tentative conclusion may be drawn, then, that the system of 












so, that the conglomerate facilitates the transfer among subsidiaries of the calibre, quality and expertise of 
management, or that the conglomerate in some way avoids poor management altogether. 
6. EXTENDING OUR ANALYSIS TO THE SYSTEM OF "PYRAMIDS" 
The results in the preceding section reinforce our distinction at the outset between conglomerate 
diversification strategies and positions of monopoly power. In particular, the preceding analysis makes the 
important point that a firm's decision to be involved in a variety of industries (the sector identification 
decision) says nothing about the extent of the firm's level of participation in those industries (the sectoral 
allocation decision) nor, then, about the potential for monopolistic behaviour within these industries. This 
result confirms the conclusion drawn previously that the observed level of economic concentration and the 
imputed level of monopolistic behaviour are unlikely to be related in a direct or straightforward way. This 
conclusion appears to be true, whether 'concentration' is framed as dominance in the supply of total 
industry output (see Chapter I), or by dominance in the total industry equity (see above). That is, 
monopolistic behaviour and conglomerate diversification must, like economic concentration and 
monopolistic behaviour, be maintained as materially distinct phenomena. A distinction between these 
phenomena would appear to be especially important in this case, where the benefits of conglomerate 
diversification dominate very nearly all of the historical financial performance of a group such as South 
African Breweries. 
Thus, we may distinguish, firstly, between economic concentration and monopolistic behaviour; and 
secondly, between monopolistic behaviour and conglomerate diversification. This section proposes a final 
distinction between the "triplet" of institutional forms, namely monopolies, conglomerates, and pyramids. 
Our conclusions lead us to expect that pyramids and conglomerates must-like industrial concentration 
and monopolistic behaviour; or concentration and conglomerates-be maintained as conceptually distinct 
phenomena. 
SAB 's historical decision to invest in a particular group of sectors, rather than any other group, has been 
enormously successful, contributing on its own around 45 percent of SAB's historical returns. SAB's 
decision to invest in a particular group of firms, rather than any other group, has been similarly successful, 
contributing on its own roughly 44 percent of SAB 's historical returns. And SAB 's decision to allocate 
its wealth to a particular fraction of the sector's outstanding equity, rather than any other fraction, has 
historically contributed around I 0 percent to the group's profitability. These observations lead ~s to 
suggest that sector- and firm-level identification decisions, unlike the corresponding allocation decisions, 
are relatively significant determinants of profitability, particularly in the case of a distinctly profitable firm 
such as SAB. This suggests that a primary determinant of SAB's historical profitability derives solely from 












complete our investigation of the triplet of institutional and market structures (namely, 
conglomerates, monopolies and pyramids), this section attempts to quantify the historical returns that 
have accrued to SAB purely on account of the group's decisions to invest in a particular fraction of a 
firm's outstanding equity, rather than any other fraction. For investors like SAB, which has a 
significant volume of wealth available for investment, this decision may be framed as the 'pyramid' 
decision, or the decision to take up a majority or controlling stake in the outstanding equity of a 
particular firm, rather than, say, a minority stake. As may be appreciated, this decision may be framed 
as a corporate control decision. 
To evaluate the historical contribution of this type of corporate control decision to SAB's 
profitability, the analysis utilises the same empirical methodology employed throughout this chapter. 
In particular, the returns on a simulated portfolio of SAB's investments using SAB 's actual historical 
portfolio weights, are contrasted with the returns on a similar portfolio using a system of equal 
portfolio weights. The difference between these two return streams would appear to represent the 
benefits that accrue to SAB purely on account of the group's decision to invest according to a 
particular weighting strategy, rather than the control or neutral decision of equal portfolio weights. As 
may be seen, this sort of decision will correspond, for large investments, with the decision to take up 
a majority or controlling stake in the outstanding equity of a particular firm, rather than a minority 
stake. An empirical estimate of the historical success of SAB' s corporate control strategy may be 
seen from Figure 5. 
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Figure 5 indicates that the benefits which have historically accrued to SAB, purely on account of the 
group's corporate control strategy, appear to follow distinct trends over time. The benefits of control 













between 1987 and 1993; and negative since 1994. This observation suggests that SAB's corporate control 
strategy was successful between 1987 and 1993, when the portfolio weightings chosen by SAB proved 
better for the group's aggregate performance than a neutral or control strategy of equal weights. Similarly, 
SAB's corporate control strategy was largely unsuccessful between 1993 and 1996, when a different 
weighting strategy than the one followed by SAB would have provided superior results. 
It is interesting to note that the period of 'success' in this area coincides neatly with SAB's increased 
conglomerate merger activity between 1987 (when the group acquired Lion Match) anq 1993 (shortly after 
the group acquired Plate Glass). Similarly, the period of corporate control 'losses' coincide with the period 
when SAB's investment in OK Bazaars proved to be an exceptional failure (SAB, 1995). The conclusion 
to draw from these observations is that SAB's corporate control strategy has not provided consistently 
positive results. This suggests, in turn, that SAB's consistently superior profitability may not be explained 
to any significant extent by the group's pyramid or corporate control strategy. 







TABLE 2. COMPOSITION OF TOTAL RETURNS, 1980 - 1996. 
(proportion of total returns in parentheses) 
Conglomerate returns Monopoly returns Pyramid returns 
Sector identification Firm identification Sector allocation Firm allocation 
8.7 (40%) 16.2 (74%) 3.5 (16%) -6.4 (-30%) 
16.1 (41%) 16.6 (42%) 1.8 (5%) 4.8 (12%) 
13.2 (54%) 3.6 (15%) 3.4 (13%) 4.3 (18%) 







Table 2 indicates that the firm allocation or "pyramid" effect is almost entirely insignificant over the Jong 
term. Between 1980 and 1996, for example, the proportion of SAB 's returns that result directly from the 
pyramid-type strategy of corporate control amount to around 2 percent of total historical returns. And over 
the same period, the "pyramid" effect is highly inconsistent, accounting between 1986 and 1990 for around 
12 percent; between 1991 and 1996 for around 18 percent; and between 1980 and 1985 for negative 30 
percent of SAB's total returns. Thus, as is the case with "monopoly" effects, the "pyramid" effect is 
dominated almost completely by the contribution of SAB's conglomerate strategy to the group's historical 
performance. 
This observation suggests the following conclusions. Firstly, as noted earlier, pyramids and groups must 
be maintained, like monopolies and conglomerates, as conceptually distinct phenomena. Their implications 












strategy implicit in SAB's pyramid-cype arrangements contribute a relatively insignificant fraction (around 
2 percent) to the group's overall historical performance. Thirdly, the monopoly-type strategy of economic 
or industrial concentration contributes a similarly insignificant amount (around 11 percent) to the SAB's 
historical profitability. Thirdly, the two special conglomerate strategies-sector and firm 
identification-dominate total returns completely; taken together, these two factors account for around 
87% of SAB's total financial performance. Thus, the "twin" entrepreneurial abilities contained within the 
strategy of conglomerate diversification-identifying in advance strategically successful firms and 
industries, and subsequently deriving a greater success from these firms than might be expected-appear 
to be by far the most important determinants of SAB's superior historical profitability. Finally, the 
theoretical and empirical work conducted in South Africa has focused almost exclusively on the system 
of pyramids, as will be seen in the following chapter. For the moment, it will be sufficient to note that the 
function, and equivalently the performance, of conglomerates is central to the whole system of pyramids 
and groups. Thus we may frame the tentative suggestion, supported further below, that the academic 
literature in South Africa should concern itself primarily with conglomerates-their function, performance, 
and consequences-rather than the system of pyramids, which as we have seen empirically, serves a less 
important economic function. 
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
An explanation for the superior historical performance of the SAB group is the underlying aim of this 
dissertation. The previous chapter examined the claim that SAB's superior profitability results from the 
firm's monopolistic position in the South African malt beer industry. This claim was comprehensively 
refuted; we observed, for example, that SAB's superior profitability should not be seen as excessive 
profitability, since the firm operates under at least the same competitive pressures, as well as the additional 
pressure of government influence in the malt beer industry, that might be expected of any other firm. Since 
the analysis concluded that monopolistic conditions do not characterise the malt beer industry, we 
concluded simultaneously that SAB 's profits, while superior, may not be seen as 'excessive', as would be 
the case in monopolistic circumstances. Thus, it might reasonably be concluded that an alternative 
explanation must be sought for SAB's historically superior financial performance. 
The present chapter introduced the two remaining elements of SAB's corporate structure that are of 
immediate interest, namely the group's twin strategies of conglomerate diversification and pyramid-type 
corporate control. The former was investigated in some detail, while the latter will be examined in the 
following chapter. In particular, our analysis drew the conclusion that the two special entrepreneurial 
abilities which appear to underlie conglomerate diversification-identifying in advance strategically 












historical profitability. That is, our analysis found that the corporate control strategy implicit in SAB's 
pyramid-type arrangements, and the monopoly-type structure implicit in the level of concentration in the 
South African malt beer industry, contribute a relatively insignificant fraction to the group's overall 
historical performance; taken together, these factors represent a historical maximum of around 13 percent 
ofSAB's total stock market returns, relative to a total 97% derived exclusively from the twin conglomerate 
abilities of identifying strategic firms and industries. 
Several interesting applications follow from these observations. For example, the government will usually 
have an interest, on a variety of political grounds, in the concentration of equity ownership in the economy. 
The government may also have.an interest in the concentration of industry supply conditions in various 
industries. And where the perception prevails among politicians and government officials that 
concentration~ of economic activity, equity ownership, or corporate control are indicators of an undesirable 
distribution of wealth, or grounds for the suspicion of anti-competitive behaviour, the political interest in 
these economic conditions may be expected to increase accordingly. The analysis contained in this chapter 
has several important points to raise about precisely this issue. 
Firstly, conglomerates, as separate economic entities, do not merit political or regulatory attention on either 
of these grounds. That is, the distribution of wealth and the concentration of industry supply may, in fact, 
constitute legitimate grounds for a political assessment of pyramids and monopolies, respectively. But 
these political considerations do not appear to be reasonable grounds for any type of analysis of 
conglomerates, since as economic phenomena, conglomerates are conceptually distinct from monopolies 
and pyramids. In particular, concentrations ofcorporate control (through the elaborate system of pyramids), 
concentrations of industry supply (through a dominant position in a particular industry), and a presence 
in various horizontally unrelated industries (through conglomerate diversification), were shown to have 
substantially different implications for historical financial performance. These observations prompt the 
conclusion that conglomerates, pyramids, and monopolies are conceptually distinct phenomena, and 
therefore that these economic entities must be treated accordingly, not only for purposes of economic 
analysis, but also for political and regulatory purposes. 
Secondly, so far as the economic implications of conglomerates are concerned, particularly as distinct 
economic entities, the advance identification and advance selection of strategically successful firms and 
industries appear to be the most important single contributors to a conglomerate's historical financial 
performance. And since the ability and foresight necessary to identify strategic firms and industries are 
normally associated with the special range of abilities normally evident in entrepreneurs, our analysis 
suggests in turn that the system of conglomerate diversification may be designed to support and capture 
these special entrepreneurial talents. And so, successful conglomerates appear to facilitate among their 












management; or that successful conglomerates in some way avoid poor firm-specific factors altogether. 
Taken together, these observations suggest that the conglomerate emerges spontaneously with a particular 
entrepreneur's superior ability to identify, and subsequently to manage, enterprises and activities in a wide 
variety of industries. 
These observations suggest, firstly, that conglomerates serve a distinct and useful economic function; 
secondly, that the particular economic function served by conglomerates corresponds to the functions 
normally thought to reside exclusively in entrepreneurs; and thirdly, that these functions are served quite 
independently of the pyramids and monopoly situations which may-but equivalently which may not-be 
observed to occur at the same tirne. Thus, to the extent that South African Breweries is the representative 
South African conglomerate, a criticism of South Africa's vast system of conglomerate diversification may 
be expected .to yield the same aggregate benefit as will typically be expected of a criticism of 
entrepreneurial activity in general. And so far as there are any doubts about the transferability of our results 
to the broader South African economy, we should note only that, by the selection of our research object 
this will be the case in many important circumstances: as noted at the outset, SAB has for a considerable 
part of its history been part of the most extensive conglomerate in South African history, and has itself 
been involved in a vast system of conglomerate merger activity. Phrased in this way, a criticism of 













AN ANALYSIS OF CORPORA TE CONTROL 
MECHANISMS WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE 
TO SOUTH AFRICAN BREWERIES 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The emergence of large modem corporations has produced an unprecedented scale and scope of economic 
activity, concentrated within individual business enterprises. The sum of economic activity contained 
within the largest of the modern corporations-and consequently the wealth of those who own the 
corporations--:-rivals that of many governments, and internationally, some of the large colonial empires in 
history (Berle and Means, 1932). This result has primarily been achieved by the emergence of the 
corporation as a separate economic unit, with rights and responsibilities which are distinct from the rights 
and responsibilities of the corporation's providers of capital (Jensen, 1993). The modem corporation 
lowers its cost of capital, for example, purely because the liabilities of the corporation's capital providers 
are legally distinct from the liabilities of the corporation. In short, capital providers sacrifice part of their 
return, since investors do not assume liability for the consequences of the decisions taken on their behalf. 
The scale of economic opportunities, and the scope of individual business enterprises, have increased 
accordingly-to the point that some of the largest modern corporations are also conglomerates, evolving 
over time by the continuous discovery and acquisition of economic opportunities (Jensen and Ruback, 
1983). 
Significant problems must clearly be associated with business activity on such a large scale, particularly 
when large scale is accompanied by significant scope. Before the 1930s, for example, the orthodoxy in 
economics held the view-or at least preferred the view-that the economy should consist of isolated 
operators and atomistic competitors at a highly fundamental level (Berle and Means, 1932). It was assumed 
that each of these atomistic competitors acted passively to information signals offered by the marketplace. 
When an advertised price increased in the market, firms received a signal that the continuous interaction 
of consumers and suppliers demanded a greater valuation on the particular good or service. It mattered 
little whether the firm was small or large, for there were no further difficulties associated with the internal 
organisation of information flows, that is interpreting and acting on the market's signals. Within the large 
modem corporation, however, the smooth costless functioning of the economic information system, 
provided largely by signals in the marketplace, was now provided by an elaborate network of signals within 












much of the continuous stream of economic information signals previously provided by the marketplace 
itself. 
The internal network of signals organised within the large modem corporation is subject to a wide range 
of difficulties, like any other information system (Holmstrom, 1979). In particular, the modem corporation 
achieved a distinction between "owners"-the personal and institutional holders of corporate equity-and 
"managers"-the owners' representatives or agents who exert a substantial independent influence over the 
corporation's resources. The conceptual and legal separation of ownership and control resulted, in tum, 
in a separation of the objectives that prevailed in the corporation. The owners, on the one hand, wished 
to have the corporations' assets direct to particular goals, such as the intertemporal maximisation of profits 
or dividends; while the managers, on the other hand, wished to have the corporations' assets direct to goals, 
such as the maximisation of executive compensation or staffs, which were essentially misaligned with the 
objectives of the owners. Thus on account of the separation of ownership and control observed by Berle 
and Means (1932), an important need arose to align the incentives of managers (agents) and owners 
(principals). In other words, the central result of the burgeoning of the large modem corporation may be 
framed as a principal-agent problem, with a concomitant separation of the owners' objectives, and the 
objectives pursued by the corporations' managers. 
It should not be expected that these problems have gone unrecognised. For contemporaneously with the 
evolution of the large modem corporation, we should expect that there have emerged various systems to 
overcome precisely these problems, analogous with an economic equivalent of the natural selection process 
(Alchian, 1950). Corporate control mechanisms are just one solution, designed to overcome the vast 
informational problems associated with the optimal functioning of a large modem corporation. More 
particularly, alternative corporate control devices are designed to overcome the modem corporation's 
principal-agent problem. The method of corporate control is designed to overcome the separation of 
ownership and control that emerged, of necessity, with the phenomenal growth of the modem corporation 
(Berle and Means, 1932). The need to monitor the vast resources owned by large corporations has 
produced a clearly identifiable class of professional managers, whose objectives and incentives are 
typically arranged independently of the objectives and incentives of the shareholders and other capital 
providers (Berle and Means, 1932; Alchian, 1965; Ross, 1973; Jensen, 1983; Fama and Demsetz and 
Lehn, 1985; Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny, 1989; Jensen, 1993; Barr, Gerson, Kantor, 1994). In 
consequence, various mechanisms of corporate control have emerged to supervise-and also to check-the 
objectives and incentives of managers, who would otherwise control the corporation's aims and objectives, 
purely on account of their control over the corporation's resources. 
The present chapter may be framed as an investigation of corporate control mechanisms, particularly the 












corporate control arrangements may possibly take; and then to explain why the benefits of corporate 
control at South African Breweries, like all of the large South African corporations, are achieved through 
the system of pyramids, rather than from the equally viable competing systems of corporate control 
observed elsewhere in the world. The present section reviews the more important theoretical and empirical 
literature on corporate control mechanisms, from two distinct angles: firstly, we investigate the more 
important alternative mechanisms of corporate control, and secondly, the precise nature of pyramids, 
particularly as these structures are observed in South Africa. 
2. CORPORATE CONTROL: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
2.1 ALTERNATIVE MECHANISMS OF CORPORA TE CONTROL 
The theory of the firm is an attempt to assemble data about various aspects of business behaviour; to 
identify common patterns within the data; simplify these patterns into a group of more abstract underlying 
principles; and to distinguish between the causal forces in the firm's underlying behaviour. It seems 
natural, in terms of this characterisation, that our analysis of South African Breweries has followed a 
similar approach. In particular, the analysis has identified the consistent historical success of the SAB 
group, and framed SAB as the object of our analysis to learn about the source of its historical performance. 
Further, the analysis identified three structural features which might be expected to influence the group's 
financial performance-namely monopoly, conglomerate diversification, and corporate control. The firm's 
monopoly and conglomerate structures were examined in previous chapters. The present chapter 
investigates the last of these parallel structures-the system of pyramids-and aims to explain the function 
and financial consequences of this elaborate system, particularly as it applies to the South African 
Breweries group. The following sections, which review the literature on corporate control mechanisms, 
are intentionally brief As will be seen, for present purposes, only a few features of the considerable recent 
literature are important. A perspective on the remaining features of these systems may be gained from 
Gerson (1992). 
Essentially three broad models of corporate control are highlighted by the literature: the Anglo-American 
system; the German-Japanese model; and the systems of"pyramids" and low-voting shares. For purposes 
of this dissertation, the pyramid system is clearly the more interesting since it is the corporate control 
mechanism, not only for the South African Breweries group, but also for all the major mining, finance, and 
industrial groups in South Africa. In the present section, we investigate mainly the Anglo-American and 
German-Japanese systems, primarily as a comparative basis for our discussion of the South African system 












The Anglo-American Model• 
In the United States and the United Kingdom-to a smaller extent, Australia and New Zealand as 
well-managers and owners objectives are aligned by active participation in the stock market, primarily 
in the form of hostile corporate takeovers (Scherer, 1988). The operation of this system of corporate 
control-the "Anglo-American" system-may be outlined briefly as follows. The major shareholders of 
U.S. corporations tend to be individuals, rather than institutions. Strict regulation of the U.S. and U.K. 
financial systems, as well as active political and legislative support for dispersed equity ownership in both 
countries, severely limit the potential size of equity stakes that banks and large financial institutions may 
take in U.S. and U.K. companies. (Roe, 1990). Bank holding companies in the U.S., for example, may not 
hold more than 5% of the voting stock of any non-banking institution (Bank Holding Company Act, 1956); 
and life insurers may not hold more than 2% of their assets in a single company, and no more than 20% 
in equity shares (Investment Company Act, 1940). 
In the absence of large institutional participation in the market for corporate control, the active corporate 
control market has come to exist in the form of professional corporate 'raiders'-individuals who, by 
means of highly publicised corporate takeovers, directly obtain from the stock market, large blocks of 
shares in under-performing companies; restructure these firms; introduce new management; and sell off 
the resurrected firms at a profit. Essentially, the stock market serves in the Anglo-American system as a 
mechanism of continuous competition for control, which forces an alignment of managers and owners 
incentives, by monitoring management performance, and disciplining wayward behaviour. The view that 
the stock market serves as a device for corporate control may be represented by the following quotation 
from Fama (1980): 
"first set aside the presumption that a corporation has owners in any meaningful sense. 
The entrepreneur [should] also [be] laid to rest, at least for the purposes of the large 
modern corporation. The two functions usually attributed to the 
entrepreneur-management and risk-bearing-[must be] treated as naturally separate 
factors within the set of contracts called a firm. The firm is disciplined by competition 
from other firms, which forces the evolution of devices for efficiently monitoring the 
performance of the entire team and of its individual members. Individual participants in 
the firm, and in particular its managers, face both the discipline and opportunities 
provided by the markets for their services, both within and outside the firm." (p. 288) 
4 A distinction may be drawn between the Anglo-American model of corporate control, which is based 
on the corporate control mechanisms observed in the United States and the United Kingdom, and the 
mechanism of corporate control employed by the Anglo American Corporation of South Africa Ltd, which 












For present purposes, it is sufficient only to note that the stock market is the central feature of corporate 
control in the Anglo-American corporate control system (Gerson, 1992). 
The German-Japanese Model 
By contrast, corporate control in the German-Japanese model is exercised through the system of bank 
holding and life insurance companies. Large financial institutions in the countries which follow this model 
control the corporations through their large direct block holdings of equity (Roe, 1990). For example, the 
twin Japanese systems of zaibatsu and keiretsu amount to interlocking systems of industrial holding 
companies, with a bank or life insurer at the centre. By means of a similar mechanism, the German bank 
holding companies hold voting shares in industrial companies directly, and exercise their votes in these 
companies either in their own right, as custodians, or on behalf of the pension funds under their control. 
As an indicator of the significance of these arrangements, the Japanese financial institutions control 
roughly one-quarter of the stock of listed Japanese firms, while the German banks control as much as 40% 
of the market value of the stock market (Roe, 1990). By contrast, financial institutions in the United States 
control in the aggregate only 8% of the market value of the U.S. stock market. Thus the banks and 
insurance companies are the central feature of corporate control in the German-Japanese corporate control 
system (Gerson, 1992). 
The primary differences between the Anglo-American and German-Japanese systems of corporate control 
are highlighted in Table I. 
TABLE I. COMPARING THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AND GERMAN-JAPANESE SYSTEMS OF 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
Germany Japan United Kingdom/ 
Executive compensation Moderate Low High 
Board of directors Management/ Primarily insiders Primarily outsiders 
Ownership Concentrated: Less concentrated: Diffuse/ Non-corporate 
Capital markets Relatively illiquid Somewhat liquid Very liquid 
Stock market Minor role Minor role Major role 
Banking system Universal banking Main bank system Fragmented 
Source: Kaplan, S.N. 1997. Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance: A Comparison of 
Germany, Japan, and the U.S. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9 (4). p. 87. 
As may be seen from Table I, the different features may be arranged on a spectrum of possibilities. Jn 
Germany and Japan, for example, ownership of corporate equity is highly concentrated; while in the U.S., 
corporate ownership is highly diffuse. Jn the U.S., the active corporate control or "takeover" market is 












control is similarly active, though primarily in the form of financial intermediaries-the so-called 
"universal" and "main bank" systems. Further, it may be seen that the primary difference between the 
Anglo-American and German-Japanese systems is the diffusion of corporate ownership and control in the 
U.S., and the relative concentration of corporate ownership and control in Germany and Japan. It seems 
an obvious question, why these differences exist. Before we address this question directly, it is necessary 
to introduce the system which prevails in South Africa, namely the pyramid system of corporate control. 
The twin systems of ''pyramids" and "low-voting" shares 
The Anglo-American and German-Japanese corporate control systems outlined above have clear 
differences. As has been seen, corporate control is exercised almost exclusively through the stock market 
in the U.S. and the U.K., whereas in Germany and Japan, corporate control is exercised largely through 
the large financial institutions, primarily the banks. As such, institutional participation in the corporate 
control market is relatively limited in the United States and the United Kingdom (around 8%), while the 
banks and insurance companies have a strong presence in Germany and Japan (40% and 26%, 
respectively). In the U.S. and the U.K., the diffuse corporate ownership appears to be related to the wide 
dispersion of corporate control; while in Germany and Japan, ownership and corporate control are both 
relatively concentrated. 
These differences are less important, relative to the observation that corporate control activities are 
significant-admittedly with differences in the degree of corporate control-in all of the countries 
considered, namely the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan (Roe, 1990). For 
example, the German-Japanese system exists, not only in Germany and Japan, but also in Canada, France, 
and The Netherlands, among other countries. That is, there appears to be a distinct preference in the largest 
industrial economies of the world for concentrations of corporate ownership, apparently with the ultimate 
aim of concentrating control of the corporations in the hands of a small number of investors. That is, 
regardless of the alternative forms in which these systems exist-the German bank holding companies; the 
Japanese insurance companies; the active takeover market in the United States and the United Kingdom; 
and as will be seen below, the systems of "pyramids" and low-voting shares in South Africa, Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland-the preceding analysis suggests only that the underlying preference 
for concentrated corporate control exists, in a cross-country context, as a strong empirical regularity 
·(Gerson, 1992). 
2.2 AN OUTLINE OF THE PYRAMID SYSTEM OF CORPORA TE CONTROL 
The previous sections framed the salient features of the alternative corporate control systems in four of the 
major industrial countries-the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Japan. Firstly, 












number of shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986), perhaps even one dominant shareholder (Morck, 
Randall and Vishny, 1989). Secondly, concentrations of corporate control appear to allow the controlling 
shareholder-the banks in Germany and Japan, the major blockholder or corporate raider in the U.S. and 
the U.K.-a continuous opportunity to monitor and supervise the management of their resources, and also 
to discipline wayward behaviour on the part of the corporations management (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). 
Thirdly, there appears to be a distinct preference, in the largest industrial economies of the world, for 
concentrations of corporate ownership; that is, in a cross-country context, there appears to be an underlying 
preference for concentrations of corporate control. In the present section, we extend these features of 
alternative corporate control mechanisms to the South African system of "pyramids". 
It should be noted that the preceding chapters have used the terms "conglomerate" and "pyramid" in their 
broad, generic sense, and exclusively as these respective systems apply to SAB. The analysis has pointed, 
for example, to the corporate control dimension of pyramids in general, without an explicit discussion of 
the nature of these peculiar corporate control mechanisms. Clearly, before an explanation may be offered 
for SAB's pyramid structure, or alternatively why SAB does not form part of the equally viable alternative 
systems of corporate control discussed above, the precise nature of pyramids should be investigated. These 
issues are addressed in the present section, by way of a review of th  more important theoretical and 
empirical developments in the academic literature. 
It was noted at the outset that the South African corporate landscape is dominated by a small number of 
large, diversified conglomerates, commonly known as "groups". SAB, for example, was selected as the 
object of this analysis for precisely the reason that the SAB group is central to the system of conglomerate 
diversification in South Africa: the group is itself a conglomerate, and at the same time forms part of a 
broader conglomerate. But the country's largest groups, namely Anglo American, Rembrandt, Anglo Vaal 
and Liberty Life, are typically also "pyramids", or tiered systems of holding and operating companies. 












FIGURE 1. AN OUTLINE OF THE BASIC PYRAMID STRUCTURE. 
A 
Bl B2 B3 
CJ 
As may. be seen from Figure 1, a distinction between conglomerates and pyramids is difficult to draw at 
first. Both forms reflect the fact that operational activities will ultimately be maintained in a variety of 
different firms and industries (D 1 through D5 in Figure 1 ); both are characterised by holdings and cross-
holdings of equity (Bl and Cl, Cl and D3, and so on); and neither is characterised by a "flat" 
organisational structure (as may be seen from the vertical extension of levels A, B, C and D). In the face 
of the similarities between these two corporate structures, at least as they are observed in reality, it should 
be clear why this chapter aims precisely to explain why the pyramid structure fits so neatly onto the 
conglomerate structure. 
Apart from the structural similarities between groups and pyramids, a distinction between these corporate 
structures may be drawn as follows. As conglomerates, the groups are combinations of horizontally 
unrelated business enterprises. As the previous chapter has shown, the groups are 'diversified' in the same 
sense that an ordinary portfolio of equity shares is usually a combination of 'distinct' equity investments. 
So the business enterprise represented in Figure 1 may be characterised as a conglomerate if business units 
Dl through D5 are involved in distinctly different lines of business. Pyramids, on the other hand, are a 
class of corporate control mechanism, and are arranged in such a way that the pyramid's apex (A in Figure 
1) is able to regulate the performance of the pyramid's associated or subsidiary business enterprises (levels 
B through D). In particular, the pyramid's apex will maintain a controlling interest in business unit Bl, 
which will in turn hold a controlling interest in business unit C 1, which in turn will control business unit 
Dl. (For practical purposes, a 'controlling' interest may be defined as a simple majority of the issued 
equity capital. More generally an investor, or group of investors, will have a 'controlling' interest if they 
hold a larger fraction of the issued equity capital than is held by any other group of investors.) In this way, 












effect of the apex's control over the business operations at every single level of the pyramid is to control, 
at the same time, the business operations of the ultimate unit in the pyramid. 
2.3 THE PYRAMID FORM OF CORPORA TE CONTROL: THE EXAMPLE OF SOUTH AFRICAN 
BREWERIES 
Thus pyramid and group structures are conceptually distinct: groups, that is conglomerates, relate to the 
composition of a particular portfolio, to the identity of the business's activities within each distinct element 
of the business hierarchy, and therefore to the business's ownership of a portfolio of investments. 
Pyramids, on the other hand, rel~te to the management and control over the portfolio's individual assets, 
to the relationships between the elements in the business hierarchy, and in particular, to the ultimate 
control over the portfolio of investments. Thus, a pyramid is not necessarily a diversified conglomerate; 
such an arrangement may be seen from Mr. Ackerman's control over Pick 'n Pay, which has the above 
elaborate system of control arrangements, but which is involved in only one line of business, and does not 
qualify therefore as a conglomerate. Similarly, a group is not necessarily a pyramid, though there does not 
appear to be a precedent in South Africa for this type of arrangement. As indicated above, in fact, this 
chapter wishes to explain precisely why these two corporate structures coincide in the case of the SAB 
group, and also in the broader South African corporate landscape. 
·In summary, a conglomerate is a form of diversified corporate ownership, while a pyramid is a form of 
concentrated corporate control. That is, a conglomerate is a bundle of firms which nominally maintains 
operations in a variety of apparently unrelated industries. A pyramid, on the other hand, is an economic 
device which has the effect of concentrating, in an "ultimate controller", control over the various 
underlying assets. The interaction between these twin structures--conglomerate and pyramid-may be 
seen from the corporate history of South African Breweries, most particularly in the 1983 contest for 
corporate control of SAB, between Anglo American and Old Mutual. The contest may be related briefly 
as follows. 
In the early 1980s Associated British Foods (ABF), a firm based in the United Kingdom, sought to reduce 
its exposure to South Africa. ABF aimed, in particular, to sell its 52% controlling interest in Premier, one 
of the country's largest food "combines" (as conglomerates were then known), which in turn held a 34% 
controlling interest in South African Breweries. Clearly, the problem for ABF related to finding a willing 
buyer, at an acceptable price. The first component of the transaction, a willing buyer, was found in the 
Anglo American Corporation. Possibly, Anglo's interest was a response to competitor Barlow Rand's 
creation, in 1983, of the Tiger & Sugar (Tisugar) giant, which increased controlling partner Old Mutual's 
interest in the Barlow Rand corporation beyond that of Anglo American. More probably, Anglo had been 












profitable business in its own right (Financial Mail, l 983a). The second component of the transaction, 
namely an acceptable price, was offered by sustained and significant reductions in the discount between 
the foreign exchange value of the financial and commercial Rands, as well as the South African Reserve 
Bank's subsequent abolition of the dual currency system. Both developments enabled ABF to repatriate 
the proceeds of its disinvestment program at a relatively satisfactory exchange rate. The result of an 
enthusiastic buyer and an acceptable price was the sale of a controlling interest in Premier, by ABF, to the 
Anglo American Corporation. 
Several features of this transaction merit attention. Firstly, Anglo and the Old Mutual were, originally, joint 
controlling partners of Barlow Rand. However, as a result of the 1983 takeover deal, Anglo's stake in SAB 
was increased to 34%, compared with the Old Mutual's 25% interest, changing the balance of corporate 
control significantly. This observation is in line with Anglo's traditional insistence on effective control, 
particularly at this level, over the corporations within its investment portfolio. Secondly, Anglo's 
partnership agreements, which enabled it to raise the funds to finance the takeover of Premier, changed 
dramatically as a result of the Premier deal. Anglo's association with Old Mutual was weakened in favour 
of competitor Liberty Life; and the banking relationship (through Old Mutual) with Nedbank had largely 
been replaced with an association (through Liberty Life) with the Standard Bank Investment Corporation. 
It appears, in fact, that Anglo American's alliances with other controlling interests do not stand in the way 
of significant changes in corporate control; it appears that relationships of long standing, such as the 
relationship with the Old Mutual, are also subject to intense scrutiny. This is a particularly interesting 
observation since the chairman of Old Mutual was angered by Anglo's takeover of Premier and SAB 
(Financial Mail, 1983b). 
Finally, it should be noted that Harry Oppenheimer had recently resigned the chairmanship of Anglo 
American. (Oppenheimer did retain his joint chairmanship of E. Oppenheimer & Son and De Beers 
Consolidated Mines, and thus continued to exercise final control over the Anglo American Corporation.) 
For present purposes it is sufficient only to note that the effective transfer of operational and strategic 
control of Anglo American, from retiring owner Oppenheimer to former manager Gavin Reily, did not 
reduce the intensity of Anglo's contest for corporate control. Indeed, Relly's alliance with Oppenheimer's 
interests are most clearly evident from the hostility of SAB's senior management-notably Dick Goss (then 
managing director ofSAB), Sol Kerzner (managing director of Southern Sun), and Meyer Kahn (managing 
director of OK Bazaars)--many of whom threatened to resign at the change of corporate control. 
According to Reily, a deal which promised "to give Anglo effective control of both Premier and SAB was 
far too important to be lost because it had upset a group of managers" (Financial Mail, l 983b ). 
There is clearly an economic rationale behind the corporate control activity related in the preceding 












literature, notably Barr, Gerson and Kantor (see for example Gerson, 1992; Barr and Gerson, 1994; and 
Barr, Gerson and Kantor, 1995). These authors have devised a coherent economic explanation for the 
corporate control activities of the large South African corporations-in this case Anglo American-framed 
largely in the language of principal-agent theory. 
2.4 PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORY AND THE SYSTEM OF CORPORATE CONTROL 
The most prominent explanation for the elaborate system of pyramids in South Africa is offered by Barr, 
Gerson, and Kantor (1992, 1994, 1995), who in general view the twin systems of groups and pyramids as 
efficient and superior outcomes to specific market allocation problems. These market allocation problems 
are addressed below. For the moment, it will be sufficient to note only that, as a first step, the analysis pays 
particular attention to the views of Barr, et. al.. Firstly, the efficiency of the conglomerate and pyramid 
corporate structures has been most carefully and comprehensively articulated in South Africa by these 
authors. Thus, if attention is appropriate, then attention must be paid in the first instance to their views. 
Secondly, as has been seen, the position suggested by the previous empirical analysis is similar in its 
general outline to the position of these authors, who generally conclude that the pyramids are an efficient 
form of business organisation. Thus, criticising their view will, at the same time, have the effect of 
criticising the views expressed in a later section. 
The general approach adopted by Barr, et. al. may be outlined as follows. The authors argue that conflicts 
of interest between principals (in the case of corporate activity, the principals are usually the shareholders) 
and agents (the corporation's managers) are substantial enough to account for the vast and elaborate system 
of pyramids in South Africa. They argue, in particular, that pyramids enable controlling shareholders, 
situated in the pyramid's apex, to contract management, and subsequently, to monitor management's 
behaviour. This view clearly has in mind a controlling shareholder who participates actively (at least, 
intervenes strategically) and who, by threatening to enforce discipline against wayward behaviour on the 
part of management, overcomes the problems usually associated with management's conflicts of interest 
vis-a-vis shareholders. Clearly, our finding in an earlier chapter, namely that the historical benefits of 
corporate control do not appear to be substantial for the SAB group, does not sit well with this view. The 
analysis should expect, instead, that an intricate and elaborate system of corporate control will result only 
if the historic benefits of corporate control are reasonably significant. Thus, in this section, we turn our 
attention to the shortcomings of the principal-agent framework proposed by Barr, Gerson and Kantor. It 












2.4.1 EXCESS HOLDING COMPANY RETURNS 
The first shortcoming of the principal-agent framework may be framed as follows. The hypothesis 
advanced by Barr, et. al. relies heavily on various empirical regularities, most notably that some-mainly 
mining-holding companies in South Africa earn rates of return in excess of the returns implied by 
simulated portfolios of their stand-alone components: the whole, in short, is greater than a simple 
summation of the constituent parts (Barr, et. al., 1995). Of course, an explanation of this empirical 
regularity is important since there appears to be a long history of diversified conglomerates trading at 
discounts to their stand-alone components (Mandelker, 1974). And since South African conglomerates are 
peculiar-because they are usually also pyramids-it would seem plausible to ascribe the conglomerate's 
(or more precisely, the pyramid's) premium returns to the positive influence of shareholder (in contrast to 
management) control. 
But underlying such an hypothesis is the perception of a fundamental asymmetry between the holding 
company and its component operating companies: namely, that the benefits of control are present in the 
holding company and, simultaneously, absent from the operating companies. Clearly, if the benefits of 
shareholder control were enjoyed by both the holding company and its component operating companies, 
then the holding company should not earn a rate of return in excess of the returns on its components. But 
so far as the benefits of control are concerned, it is a simple task to demonstrate that the holding company 
should not earn excess returns. In particular, it is the probability or threat that control will be exercised, 
and not necessarily the exercise of control, th~t is important in determining the likelihood that the 
controlling shareholder will oust the board of directors when they perform poorly. Control in this sense 
cannot be exercised by the holding company independently of its constituent operating companies. 
Thus, control cannot be present in the holding company, and at the same time absent from the operating 
companies, since the threat of control resides (and the benefits of control are valued) either in both, or in 
neither. Therefore, excess returns to the holding company cannot be explained exclusively by the benefits 
of shareholder control. To explain the empirical regularity detected by Barr, et al., an asymmetric 
explanation is necessary, that is, an explanation which accounts for benefits that reside exclusively in (and 
are valued only for) the holding company. The following section attempts to replicate the empirical 
regularity observed by Barr, et. al., for South African Breweries. The analysis suggests that this empirical 
regularity constitutes evidence of the value of unlisted investments. The first example of "excess holding 
company returns" is derived in the way suggested by Barr, Gerson and Kantor. First, an index of SAB's 
actual returns is obtained from regular quotations of SAB's share price on the Johannesburg Stock 













The difference between these two performance measures is presented in Figure 3. 












--Excess holding company returns: actual - simulated 
Figure 3 indicates, as Barr, et. al. predict, that SAB's returns consistently exceed the returns available 
from a simulated portfolio of the group's listed investments. But this must not be interpreted as a 
confirmation that the whole is greater than a simple summation of the individual components. Such a 
statement would suggest that listed components are the only significant components of the whole. In 
the case of South African Breweries, where the bulk of profits is contributed by the unlisted beer 
division, this is obviously incorrect. And given the obvious problems associated with the valuation of 
unlisted investments, there do not seem solid grounds on which to conclude that the unlisted 
investments contribute to SAB's overall returns in an insignificant way. Indeed, the best estimate of 
the contribution of an unlisted investment to the entire investment portfolio is the excess returns 
stream itself, as presented for example in Figure 3, whic~ may be taken to represent, in the case of 
South African Breweries, changes in the market's valuation of SAB's beer division, and the SAB 
group's various unlisted investments, such as Southern Sun Hotels and Resorts (Pty) Ltd and OK 
Bazaars (1929) (Pty) Ltd. 
The second example of "excess holding company returns" is derived in a way implicit in the work of 
Barr, et. al. Recall, for example, that a fundamental asymmetry is implied in their work: 
some element of the holding company is valued separately from the component operating 
companies, namely the value of concentrated corporate control. It was noted 
earlier that this "valuation asymmetry' does not make sense, which may be empirically confirmed 
from Figure 4. Figure 4 presents the difference in returns between SAB and Beverage 












(As may be seen from Figure 2, Bevcon is controlled by Johannesburg Consolidated Investments 
("Johnnie") and ultimately-until the fairly recent sell-off to a consortium of Black investors-by the 
Anglo American Corporation.) 
FIGURE 4. HOLDING COMPANY RETURNS FOR THE SAB GROUP, 1990- 1996. 
--Excess holding 
company returns: 
Bevcon - SAB 
For our purposes, it is interesting to note from Figure 4 that the excess returns stream for South 
African Breweries is not consistently positive; the excess returns range between -7% and 12%, with 
an average of 0%, and a standard deviation of 4%. Indeed, these excess holding company returns 
appear to follow a random, unpredictable pattern, centred about zero. 5 Thus, if the return stream 
depicted in Figure 4 does, in fact, represent the benefits of concentrated corporate control, then these 
benefits are by no means consistent, straightforward, or on average even positive. 
Thus, in two different examples, the empirical regularity observed by Barr, et. al. cannot be 
supported by observation. Firstly, the excess returns between SAB and a simulated portfolio of 
SAB 's listed investments represent, not the benefits of concentrated corporate control, but changes in 
the market value of the portfolio's unlisted investments. Secondly, the excess returns between SAB 
and the holding company which has SAB as its sole asset represent a complicated and inconsistent 
stream of corporate control benefits, if they represent the benefits of corporate control at all. 
5 The Quenouille statistic may be used to gain a straightforward sense of the 'randomness' of stock 
market returns, based on the series' autocorrelation structures. Using 12 lags, and annual returns on 
monthly data, the Q-statistic is 33.2 (at the 1 % a-level), which indicates that the excess returns series 
presented in Figure 4 is, indeed, "random". In particular, the excess returns series is not characterised 












2.4.2 CORPORATE CONTROL AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE-RIDERS 
The second objection to the hypothesis proposed by Ba~r, et. al. may be framed as follows. The authors 
estimate that the value of benefits which flow from shareholder control of the large South African mining 
houses ranges between 5.6 and 11.3 percent per annum (l 995). The authors do not verify these excess 
returns across the entire spectrum of South African industry-and as was seen above, the empirical 
verification of excess holding company returns is not straightforward-but, iftheir hypothesis holds, then 
excess returns in roughly similar orders of magnitude should be expected for all companies with similar 
pyramid or control arrangements. The present dissertation is not so ambitious, however, and takes as its 
point of departure, instead, the fact that excess returns in roughly similar orders of magnitude should be 
expected for all companies with similar pyramid or control arrangements, including South African 
Breweries. Although the preceding analysis was unable to verify these excess returns for SAB, it will be 
sufficient for the moment to make the following general remarks. 
If the numbers obtained by Barr, Gerson and Kantor are applied to the SAB group, which has a market 
capitalisation of more than R40 billion, then the direct pecuniary benefits that flow to all shareholders from 
Anglo American's ultimate control over the SAB group ranges between R2 and R5 billion per annum. 
(The analysis returns later to the point that these benefits flow, not only to the controlling shareholder, but 
to all shareholders.) These values seem extremely large, and increase dramatically when applied to the 
broader spectrum of groups quoted on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. With a market value ofR500 
billion, the benefits which flow to the entire stock market range between R25 billion and R60 billion per 
annum, around 10 percent of South African GDP.6 In particular, the significance of the values obtained 
by Barr, et al., reflects either very poorly on the propensity of South African management to act in a 
wayward fashion, or very well on the controlling abilities of some South African shareholders. 
However, it should be noted that the mere improbability of these large numbers does not constitute 
evidence that the hypothesis advanced by Barr, et. al. is incorrect. Rather, the principal objection appears 
to be that the significant pecuniary advantages of the magnitude envisaged by Barr, et. al., fail to explain 
why alternative systems of corporate control have not emerged in South Africa. In Germany and the 
Netherlands, for example, the banks are an alternative system of corporate control. And in Japan, banks 
and insurance companies are the important forms of corporate control and institutional monitoring (Roe, 
1990). Returns of this magnitude would appear to justify the emergence of institutions which serve the 
explicit function of removing control of the corporation's operational assets from management. 
As has been seen above, it may easily be seen that South African banks are not serious competitors in the 
market for corporate control. In general, banks are discouraged in South Africa from investing in the equity 
6 A weighted average of 5.6% and 11.3% yields 8.5%. 












of the broader South African industry. Capital and reserve fund requirements for the general equity 
investments of commercial banks range, for example, between I 00% (for general equity investments) and 
possible impairment (for equity investments in deposit-taking institutions outside the same group) 
(Government Gazette 12871, 1990). Therefore, since the practice of banks holding equity stakes in other 
companies (particularly in other banks) is either discouraged in South Africa, or at least appears to serve 
no special advantage, the question of South African banks as an alternative system of corporate control is, 
in general, ruled out. 
But quite apart from banks as competitors for corporate control, a formal market for corporate control 
exists in the United States, and also in the United Kingdom, in the form of corporate takeovers (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1973). It may be, of course, that shareholder concentration is, as Demsetz suggests, "a 
monitoring mechanism more basic to and more continuously operating than the corporate takeover" 
(1986), in which case shareholder concentration would be a preferable system to a formal, external market 
for corporate control such as the stock exchange. In South Africa, however, it is important to note several 
basic objections to Demsetz's underlying suggestion, namely, that the stock excha ge as a market for 
corporate control is less desirable than concentrations of shareholder control. 
The academic literature on the formal external market for corporate control (in the form of the stock 
market) highlights several objections to the view that the 'waves' of corporate takeovers which emerge 
from time to time are examples of the corporate control mechanism in action. The most important among 
these objections appears to be the "free rider" problem associated with corporate takeovers (Scherer, 1988). 
According to this view, a principal-agent explanation for the periodic waves of conglomerate mergers is 
implausible, since the benefits of takeovers on the open market flow, not only to the controlling 
shareholder, but to all shareholders. In particular, the benefits of corporate control flow to the controlling 
shareholder in relation to the proportion of the corporation's equity owned, which as we have seen will 
always be significantly smaller than the proportion of the corporation's equity sufficient for control. 
Clearly, this objection may be used to argue that one of the most important reasons why corporate 
takeovers and formal markets for corporate control fail to exist, is not applicable in South Africa. The 
implication would appear to be that a market for corporate control would be a close substitute in South 
Africa for the system of pyramids, at least insofar as the corporate control functions of these alternative 
structures is concerned. Such a conclusion would, in turn, appear to suggest that the control function of 
a pyramid is not a complete explanation, either of South Africa's system of pyramids or, given the 
conceptual equivalence under the agency explanation of pyramids and groups, of South Africa's system 
of conglomerates. The argument may be presented briefly as follows. 
The principal-agent or shareholder control explanation of the corporate takeover has been challenged from 












excludable. The corporate 'raider,' for example, cannot exclude the general investing public from the 
benefits of effective corporate control, since the benefits of reconstituting the management of a poorly 
performing firm cannot be diverted, from the minority shareholders, in his favour. Now it may be noted 
in South Africa-at least according to Barr, Gerson and Kantor-that the benefits of shareholder control 
are typically large. It has been noted earlier, for example, the claim that for a group such as SAB the 
benefits amount to around R3.5 billion per annum. However, the ownership stakes of South Africa's 
controlling shareholders are usually small. Gerson (1992) estimates, for example, that the Anglo American 
group controls between 30 and 45 percent of the underlying equity of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
while it owns significantly less, around 12 percent. 
This suggests that the benefits of control flow to the controlling shareholder in a relatively small 
magnitude, presumably in the order of magnitude of the controlling shareholder's percentage claim to 
dividends, which is usually much smaller than the effective percentage of control. Therefore, while it 
appears to be an attractive enterprise in money terms to exercise effective control over a business enterprise 
(since the benefits of control are evidently large, according to Barr, et. al.), it represents a significant 
problem for the agency model of pyramid control structures that institutions do not exist which exclude 
the general public from the benefits of effective shareholder control (it was noted earlier that the benefits 
of control flow, not only to the controlling shareholder, but to all shareholders). This is not to say that 
without some way for the controlling shareholder to appropriate the entire benefits of corporate control, 
it is unlikely that he should take steps to control the corporation in the first place. Rather, the corporate 
takeover and the pyramid both face the problem of being unable to raise a charge against the 'free riding' 
investor public. In this respect, then, there does not seem to be any obvious advantage of a pyramid, rather 
than any other, form of corporate control mechanism. 
It would appear, then, that the control function of a pyramid is not a complete explanation of South 
Africa's system of conglomerates, since the control function is not peculiar to pyramids (or conglomerates), 
and might reasonably be expected to exist, under the agency hypothesis, in at least one alternative form, 
namely, the corporate takeover. This must not be interpreted as making the case that an external market 
for corporate control should exist in South Africa. Rather, the analysis points to the agency explanation's 
inability to explain why an external corporate control market does not exist, especially since the 'free rider' 
problem outlined above points to neither form in particular. The benefits of corporate control flow in the 
order of magnitude of proportional ownership, not only for the corporate takeover market, but also for the 
pyramid. Consequently, it would be a desirable feature of an alternative explanation of the system of 
groups and pyramids that it explains why the pyramid structure is different from each of the alternative 
systems of corporate control. In particular, it needs to be explained, not only why the pyramid structure 












corporate control, which exist outside the firm), and at the same time why the system of pyramids in South 
Africa has come to exist within conglomerate firms. 
2.4.3 ACCOUNTING FOR THE EMERGENCE OF PYRAMIDS 
The third shortcoming of the principal-agent framework is that it does not provide a complete rationale 
for the conglomerate or "group" structure. While the group structure may be more profitable and ex post 
efficient, in part because the controlling shareholder's reputation allows him to raise capital at a 
considerable discount (Barr, et. al., 1995), there is no integrated reason under the principal-agent 
hypothesis for the ex ante emergence of the conglomerate or group structure. It would be preferable, of 
course, in a more general explanation of South Africa's system of pyramids and groups, to accommodate 
an explanation of the emergence of these institutions. Consider, for example, that Barr, et al., propose 
diversification as the economic rationale for producing a pyramid structure. That is, the founding 
shareholder becomes wealthy, and proceeds to diversify his personal wealth by accumulating various 
enterprises, simultaneously retaining control by the system of pyramids (Gerson, 1992; Barr and Kantor, 
1993; Barr, et al., 1995). 
Finance theory demonstrates, however, that higher returns are in equilibrium available only at the cost of 
higher risks; where arbitrage is possible, returns should, in risk-adjusted terms, be equalised across the set 
of investment opportunities, at least in expectations form (Fama, 1986). In terms of the theory proposed 
by Barr, et al., this implies that the holding company, which earns higher returns, should also entail higher 
risk. Indeed, their analysis finds this to be the case; the mining house trades at a risk premium of between 
1.3 and 7.0 percent per annum (Barr, et al., 1995: 26). This is clearly inconsistent with the diversification 
rationale for structures such as pyramids. Indeed, as noted in an earlier chapter, it appears that the groups 
in South Africa are not 'diversified' in the financial sense ofreducing the variability ofreturns, but rather 
in the more limited economic sense of their involvements in a wide variety of industries. An explanation 
for the system of groups and pyramids in South Africa must consequently incorporate the more restrictive 
economic sense of the term 'diversification', or draw a clearer distinction between the economic functions 
and consequences of conglomerates and pyramids. 
More importantly, perhaps, the result that groups are not diversified in the sense implied by finance theory, 
is at odds with the theory of South African entrepreneurship implied by the agency explanation of Barr, 
Gerson and Kantor. Under the agency hypothesis, for example, the system of pyramids and groups is the 
end point of the process of South African entrepreneurship, since the founding entrepreneur has allocated 
his entrepreneurial skills to an investment, accumulated wealth from the investment, and proceeds to 
diversify his personal wealth. Thereafter, the founding entrepreneur expends effort, presumably a 












That is, the economic rationale for the system of diversified groups is, according to Barr, Gerson and 
Kantor, the diversification of wealth, and represents the end point of the entrepreneurial process. As noted 
above, however, this explanation is at variance with the data, because the diversification of wealth (in the 
limited finance theory sense of the term) does not appear to enter the conglomerate diversification strategy 
in any meaningful way. 
2.4.4 THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL: SOME CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In summary, four objections to the agency or shareholder control explanation for South Africa's vast 
system of pyramids and groups have been noted. Firstly, an asymmetric explanation for the premium 
returns earned by holding companies is absent from the agency theory. Secondly, the agency theory 
suggests unrealistic orders of magnitude in the direct pecuniary benefits of shareholder control. Thirdly, 
the agency theory provides an incomplete explanation of the ex post emergence of South Africa's system 
of pyramids and groups, namely the diversification of entrepreneurial wealth. Finally, the agency 
explanation fails to explain the absence in South Africa of alternative forms of shareholder control. Indeed, 
the principal-agent framework leaves the impression that no material distinction may be drawn been 
conglomerates and pyramids. Accordingly, a conglomerate is in practical terms indistinct from a pyramid, 
or more precisely, the system of conglomerates and groups is explained almost entirely by the shareholder 
control function of the system of pyramids. This dissertation has primarily been an attempt to separate 
these issues-monopoly, conglomerates, pyramids-and in this way to gain a clearer understanding of the 
rationale, and economic consequences, of the different systems. 
3. THE RATIONALE FOR SOUTH AFRICA'S SYSTEM OF PYRAMIDS 
The preceding analysis may leave the impression that this dissertation aims to question the role and 
consequences of the pyramid system in South Africa. For example, the analysis has discussed the 
Anglo-American model of corporate control, in which individual action in a continuously active stock 
market is thought to be sufficient, firstly to discipline management, and secondly to align managers' and 
shareholders' interests. The analysis then considered the German-Japanese model, in which continuous 
monitoring by a variety of financial institutions-mainly a few large banks and insurance companies-is 
thought to be closely substitutable with the Anglo-American model. In turn, the analysis considered in 
some detail the South African system of pyramids-and its own close substitute, the system of low-voting 
shares. In particular, the analysis has contradicted--or at least raised certain important objections to-the 
most prominent South African research into the pyramid system. Thus the impression may easily be gained 













However, two important points are raised by the preceding analysis. Firstly, each of the different corporate 
control systems seems to be equally viable. That is, the Anglo-American, German-Japanese, and pyramid 
mechanisms of corporate control all have the effect of aligning the operations and activities of large 
modern corporations with the shareholder's desired objective of wealth maximisation. For example, the 
different systems enhance shareholder's ability to monitor management, and grant them the power to 
discipline wayward management behaviour. Thus, the first point to note is that' the different corporate 
control mechanisms appear to be substitutes for one another, at least so far as their objectives are 
concerned. Secondly, and more importantly for present purposes: if the different corporate control 
mechanisms are indeed substitutes (as will be argued below), then it seems reasonable to expect an 
explanation for the fact that only one system is observed in South Africa. Given that the various corporate 
control systems are close and equally viable substitutes-since they all have the desired result in a 
principal-agent framework-why do we observe only one of these systems in South Africa, namely 
pyramids, rather any other system? 
The present section argues, firstly, that the observed differences between corporate control arrangements 
around the world are more apparent than real; secondly, that the different corporate control mechanisms 
are close substitutes; and finally, that the pyramid is observed in South Africa precisely because it is the 
only system which corresponds with the structural result of South African entrepreneurship, namely the 
conglomerate. Thus, the analysis aims to situate the South African system of pyramids within the South 
African system of conglomerates. Essentially, the analysis may be reduced, simply, to making the rationale 
of a pyramid endogenous to the special functions and abilities situated within the conglomerate. 
3 .1 SUBSTITUTABILITY BETWEEN THE VARIO US CORPORA TE CONTROL SYSTEMS 
Before the analysis considers, more directly, the possibility that the various corporate control systems 
observed in practice are close substitutes for one another, the counter argument should be noted. In 
particular, it may be argued that the various mechanisms of corporate control-the Anglo-American and 
German-Japanese models, or the pyramid and low-voting share approaches-are not substitutes for one 
another. The most prominent of these arguments is presented by Roe (1993), who argues that international 
differences in political and legal "codes" account for the observed differences among preferred corporate 
control systems in different countries. In particular, Roe argues that the prevailing "populist" political 
culture in the United States and the United Kingdom accounts for the dispersed and non-concentrated 
ownership of U.S. and U.K. corporations. 
For example, Roe argues that U.S. and U.K. politicians have enacted corporate legislation which serves 
to limit the concentrations of ownership in the hands of, say, financial institutions, or equivalently, tax 












industrial companies-on account of the populist resentment of narrow concentrations of wealth. In the 
U.S., the legislation to which Roe refers range from antitrust provisions and tax considerations; direct 
prohibitions on bank, insurance company, and mutual fund control of public corporations; and the 
imposition of direct bans on various corporate control mechanisms (Gerson, 1992). Presumably, Roe 
argues that a greater cultural and political affinity exists for concentrated corporate control in Germany and 
Japan (though Roe does not suggest the individual or aggregate differences upon which these cultural 
differences might be based). 
Roe's "politico-legal" explanation accounts neatly with observed empirical regularities-such as the 
observed dispersion of U.S. equity ownership, and the existence of legislative limitations on industrial 
participation by financial institutions in the U.S. and the U.K .. However, an important objection may be 
raised against this approach. In particular, Roe's explanation fails to make the point that legislation and 
political obstacles to concentrated corporate ownership and control can be endogenous to an efficient 
system of economic activity. That is, Roe's argument fails to pay the appropriate degree of attention to the 
possibility that economic-particularly corporate and commercial-legislation has a fundamental enabling 
nature. As will be seen, the political and legal restrictions to which Roe refers-particularly since these 
"restrictions" exist within the framework of corporate and commercial activity-are at least equally likely 
to be endogenous to the economic system, rather than exogenous. 
Easterbrook (1997), for example, agrees with Roe's observation that 
"[for a business enterprise, the relevant economic constraints] include politics. If some 
external force really means that American mutual funds can't own more than a few 
percent of the shares of any large corporation, that handicap may lead to a reduction in 
efficiency." (p. 25 .) 
But as Easterbrook notes, 
"[I wonder] whether businesses can't control their surroundings, instead of the other way 
'round. More than one thoughtful person has believed that business leaders could have 
defeated efficiency-reducing bills by applying the tools of political suasion .... [U.S. milk 
producers, for example] win higher prices in the political arena even though they are few 
in number and opposed to the most popular cause of all-good nutrition for children. 
Why should things be different in financial markets? ... [For example] why is there so 
little resistance to the laws and rules that fracture holdings in the United States? And why 
is England's structure of holdings so similar to the United States, even though its laws are 
like those of Japan and Germany?" (p. 23.) 
Easterbrook raises the important possibility that U.S. legal and political restrictions-which Roe views as 
disabling for American corporations-are essentially enabling. In particular, the possibility should not 












hand, and the body of legislation which seems to prevent concentrations of corporate control, on the other, 
are related in a causally meaningful way. It may be, for example, that a third joint determinant exists for 
both systems: the wide dispersion of ownership and control which is observed in practice in the U.S., and 
the legislation which (on the face of it) prevents the emergence of alternative systems, may be related by 
a mutual causal determinant, founded in the economic activities of the corporations themselves, which 
secure both systems simultaneously. In particular, the underlying economic functioning of the corporations 
in the U.S. may necessitate the emergence of a diffuse and widely dispersed system of corporate control. 
As will be seen below, this argument rings particularly in South Africa, where the pyramid may be framed 
as the best-indeed the only-corporate control device which corresponds closely with the underlying 
structure of corporate activity, riamely the conglomerate. 
3.2 SITUATING THE PYRAMID WITHIN THE CONGLOMERATE 
The above argument frames a number of serious doubts about the economic validity of the politico-legal 
explanation for the active use of the stock market for corporate control purposes in the U.S. As a corollary, 
it would appear that differences in international politico-legal environments are insufficient to explain the 
differences in international corporate governance systems. This argument seems particularly appropriate 
in the South African context. As has been seen, SAB's conglomerate structure appears to offer a significant 
explanation for the group's historical financial success. At least, in a decomposition of SA B's historical 
performance, the group's conglomerate activities contributed substantially more, relative to the alternative 
pyramid and monopoly explanations for the group's performance. The monopoly and pyramid structures 
account, on their own, for a relatively insignificant fraction of SAB' s historical financial success. Thus, 
as has been seen, a successful conglomerate diversification strategy provides a highly fundamental 
explanation of the successful performance of South Africa's premier industrial enterprise. 
Clearly, then, the pyramid cannot be an 'accidental' structure in the South African corporate landscape. 
Nor can the preponderance of the pyramid system in the South African context be explained exclusively 
by the preference among U.S. populists for a diffuse system of corporate ownership and control, and 
presumably then, a relative preference on the part of the South African political system for a system of 
concentrated corporate control. In other words, the pyramid is not arbitrarily appended to the South African 
corporate landscape, but serves as the preferred corporate control device given the essential feature of the 
conglomerate-type structure in South Africa. 
Simply put, the pyramid is endogenous to the conglomerate. The preponderance of the pyramid structure 
in South Africa follows directly from the preponderance of the conglomerate structure. The argument may 












• The desire for corporate control exists as an inherent feature of the scale and scope of modern 
corporate activity. Concentrations of corporate ownership and control appear to be a solution to the 
principal-agent problem inherent in the large modern corporation. 
• A preference for concentrations of corporate ownership and control exists-at least as a strong 
empirical regularity-in all economies where the large modern corporation exists. Wherever corporate 
activity exists on a significant scale, a solution to the principal-agent problem exists as well, 
specifically in the form of concentrations of corporate control. 
• The various alternative corporate control systems seem to be close substitutes for one another, since 
they serve the common underlying function of concentrated corporate control. 
• The basic appearance of corporate control mechanisms differs widely across countries. In the U.S. and 
the U.K., the market for corporate control exists in the stock market, which serves as an active market 
for takeovers. In Germany and Japan, the market for corporate control exists within the large financial 
institutions, particularly the banks and insurance companies, as a continuous principal-agent type 
monitoring system. In South Africa, the corporate control market exists in the system of pyramids (and 
to a lesser extent, low-voting shares). 
• Therefore, an explanation for the observed differences in international corporate governance structures 
must be sought within the structure of corporate activity itself-not from political and legal 
explanations. Possibly, political and legal restrictions may be endogenous to the desires of the 
corporations themselves. Probably, the corporate structures upon which economic activity is based 
determine, simultaneously, the basic format of the preferred corporate control mechanism. 
• In the case of South African Breweries, the strategy of conglomerate diversification accounts for a 
significant fraction of the group's historical financial success. More generally, it appears that the 
conglomerate business format emerges from the concentration of entrepreneurial success in a handful 
of key South African entrepreneurs, all of whom are represented, in the case of South African 
Breweries, in the country's most profitable business. 
• In the same way that the conglomerate is a natural-indeed the only--corporate structure appropriate 
in such circumstances, the pyramid is the appropriate corporate control structure. That is, given the 
preference for corporate control mechanisms, and the apparent superiority of SAB's conglomerate 
diversification strategy, SAB's arrangement in terms of the two business formats--conglomerate and 












4. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The existing explanation for the system of pyramids in South Africa is slightly misleading. In particular, 
the academic literature's exclusive focus on the pyramid system suggests that the pyramid itself occupies 
a key position in the structure of the South African corporate landscape. Certainly, the pyramid is 
important: it offers a solution to the separation of ownership and control--or more broadly, the 
principal-agent problem-encountered in all large modern corporations. But the pyramid is only one of 
several competing and equally viable systems of corporate control. The most that can be said, therefore, 
is that pyramid and non-pyramid systems of corporate control are roughly equally efficient-as efficient, 
that is, as the principal-agent problem appears to justify. 
Certainly, there may be efficiency differences between the different approaches, and their broader 
economic desirability should be evaluated by an appropriate comparative method. But the peculiar 
preponderance of the pyramid system in South Africa is not readily explained by political or cultural 
differences or, for that matter, by obvious substantial differences in the different advantages of the pyramid 
system, relative that is to the equally viable alternative systems of corporate control. Rather, the pyramid 
system is justified in the case of South African Breweries-and perhaps more generally-precisely on 
account of the underlying arrangement of the group's corporate activity. That is, the close correspondence 
between the twin systems of conglomerate diversification and pyramid-tyep control does not exist as a 
coincidence. Specifically, the pyramid system exists in the case of SAB as a natural result of the group's 
conglomerate corporate structure. 
Thus the argument reduces essentially to a single causal proposition: Does the pyramid determine the 
conglomerate, or does the conglomerate determine the pyramid? As has been seen in an earlier chapter, 
the conglomerate is the key "source" of SAB's historical financial viability: in particular, the 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills which reside in the conglomerate were measured, and when these 
were related to the pyramid, the empirical magnitudes themselves illustrated that the conglomerate-not 














This dissertation sought to explain the extraordinary historical success of the South African Breweries 
group, with particular reference to the three parallel structures which are usually expected to explain SAB 's 
extraordinary profitability. Firstly, the analysis considered SAB's apparent monopoly position in the South 
African malt beer industry. Secondly, the analysis examined the SAB group's twin conglomerate and 
portfolio diversification strategies. Thirdly, the analysis investigated the SAB group's pyramid system of 
corporate control. Briefly, we established that SAB does not have a distinct ability, or a significant 
incentive, to behave monopolistically in the beer industry. In several important contexts, SAB has an 
incentive to behave in ways which are not expected of a monopolist. Thus, we concluded that monopolistic 
behaviour cannot account for the SAB group's extraordinary financial performance. The analysis then 
decomposed by empirical methods the respective contributions of the three different systems-monopoly, 
conglomerate, pyramid-to SAB's historical success. We established that SAB's corporate control 
mechanism contributes to an explanation of SAB 's historical financial performance in roughly the same 
limited order of magnitude as the company's single supplier position in the malt beer industry. We 
concluded, then, that the pyramid system cannot account for the SAB group's historical financial 
performance. Consequently, the analysis directed its attention to SAB's horizontal diversification strategy, 
that is, SAB's conglomerate structure. 
The conglomerate structure proved to be central in explaining SAB's historical financial performance, in 
several respects. Firstly, the company's beer division accounts for a significant component of the group's 
overall historical returns. Thus, the beer division may be situated within the SAB group as a strategically 
successful investment, that is the result of an ordinary portfolio-type decision which, with foresight and 
good management, proved to be a phenomenal success. Secondly, the SAB group's success consists, not 
only of its strategic investment in the company's beer division, but also in a broader range of horizontally 
unrelated investments. Thus, the overall pattern of SAB's historical financial success may be framed 
largely in terms of successful portfolio investment-a distinct and superior ability to identify and invest 
in companies and industries which are themselves highly successful. Thirdly, the analysis suggested that 
the skills which have been the primary contributors to SAB's historical success-namely the ability to 
identify and invest in strategically successful companies and industries-are the very same skills which 
are normally associated with successful entrepreneurs. Thus, we concluded that SAB's conglomerate 
structure has its own 'rationale'; that this rationale may be framed in terms of South African 
entrepreneurial activity more generally; and that the conglomerate seems to be a natural outcome of that 
entrepreneurial process. Since the SAB group is a conglomerate and itself forms part of a broader 












diversification in the South African context. Finally, SAB's conglomerate structure is itself the determinant 
of the group's pyramid corporate control mechanism. That is, in selecting from several alternative 
mechanisms of corporate control, SAB's controllers selected (or indeed devised) the pyramid, because this 
is the only corporate control structure which corresponds precisely with the SAB group's hierarchical 
conglomerate structure. Thus, so far as SAB is the representative South African conglomerate (a result 
which is suggested by our analysis), we may conclude that the various, equally viable systems of corporate 
control are not uniformly observed in practice in South Africa, precisely because the pyramid system is 
the only one that corresponds with the preferred conglomerate structure. 
The implications of this conclusion were examined in detail in the main body of the dissertation. For 
present purposes, it will be necessary only to note the following practical results. 
Firstly, the academic literature in South Africa should focus less on the rationale of pyramid corporate 
control mechanisms. Similarly, the international academic literature on the subject should not direct its 
focus exclusively, as has been the case, to an explanation of the alternative corporate control devices 
observed in practice. The principal-agent foundations of these structures have been firmly established, so 
little remains to explore in this area. Instead, the South Africa literature should aim to achieve an 
explanation for the unique emergence in South Africa of the pyramid corporate control mechanism-as 
opposed, that is, to the emergence in other countries of equally viable alternatives. This type of analysis 
would have the advantage of explaining, not only the success of conglomerate diversification strategies 
in the South African corporate landscape, but also-more fundamentally-the extraordinary success, in 
the history of South African economic development, of the entrepreneurs who are vested in these 
conglomerates. Indeed, since the pyramid and the conglomerate are closely related-and since South 
African conglomerates are closely related to entrepreneurial capitalism, an analysis of the pyramid system 
in South Africa cannot hope to do otherwise. Thus, empirical and theoretical analyses of conglomerate 
diversification strategies, as they have applied in South Africa, are a crucial area for future research into 
the profile of corporate governance systems in South Africa. 
Secondly, the government's occasional resistance to the twin systems of pyramids and conglomerates 
appears to be misplaced (ANC, 1992; and Andrew, 1994). Admittedly, the government has a degree of 
legitimate political interest in the extraordinary concentration of wealth in South Africa. But this resistance 
must be seen in precisely that context: it is a resistance to the concentration of wealth-not to the 
concentration of ownership, or the concentration of industry output, or to the concentration of corporate 
control. The preceding analysis suggested, for example, that the questions of monopoly, conglomerates, 
and pyramids should be maintained as conceptually distinct phenomena. Similarly, a clear conceptual 
distinction should be maintained between the functions of-or more precisely, the underlying economic 












ownership; and concentrations of corporate control---on the one hand-and concentrations of wealth and 
economic power on the other. The results drawn in this dissertation suggest, for example, that the effect 
of criticising the concentration of ownership in South Africa is, simultaneously, a criticism of the 
concentration of entrepreneurial expertise. Similarly, the effect of criticising the concentration of industry 
output in South Africa is, at least in the case of South African Breweries, a criticism of the concentration 
of entrepreneurial success. Similarly, the effect of criticising the concentration of corporate control in 
South Africa is a criticism of the concentration of managerial expertise. Clearly, it will not ordinarily be 
desirable to criticise the institutional framework surrounding entrepreneurial and managerial success. 
Indeed, the results obtained in this dissertation imply, instead, that the South African government's interest 
in the redistribution of wealth may well be achieved independently ofredistributions of industry output, 
redistributions of equity ownership, or redistributions of corporate control. The appropriate forum for the 
redistribution of wealth may well be derived in the usual way, including a progressive tax system, welfare 
transfers, or poverty relief. But within the context of South African Breweries, and perhaps more broadly, 
there does not seem to be an appropriate forum for redistributions of corporate control or equity ownership. 
Finally, the analysis suggested that SAB's pyramid structure is endogenous to the corporation's 
conglomerate diversification strategy. Since the conglomerate is the "driver" of SAB 's historical financial 
success, the pyramid seems to be a natural option-among the various corporate control alternatives---on 
account of its close correspondence with the core strategy of conglomerate diversification. This suggests 
that an explanation for the preponderance of the pyramid system in South Africa is simultaneously an 
explanation for the preponderance of the conglomerate structure in the South African corporate landscape. 
Such an explanation is beyond the scope of the present work, though it has been suggested that the 
entrepreneurial and managerial success contained within the conglomerate account for a significant fraction 
of the SAB group's historical financial success. More importantly, however, this result suggests that the 
recommendations based in various academic quarters-about the desirability of one corporate control 
mechanism vis-a-vis any other system-are misleading. For example, the suggestion that the U.S. system 
should be restructured to resemble more closely the Japanese model, is substantially-indeed 
causally-misguided. The corporate control structure adopted by any particular company-and the 
structure which prevails in any particular country-is itself determined by the appropriate structure for 
economic activity in general, in much the same way that the peculiar features of the pyramid structure are 
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